It was welcome news that Turkish
President Erdoğan was dramatically foiled in his bid to win a majority in
Turkey’s recent parliamentary elections. Those election were in essence a
referendum on Erdoğan himself and his ambitions to create a super-presidency in
which he could legally extend his increasingly authoritarian ruling style for years
to come. The Turkish public clearly recognized that Erdoğan had overextended
himself and had lost his touch in the increasing self-adulation and erratic
ruling style over the past few years. The AKP, even with a plurality of votes,
will not now be able to form a government without the participation of one or
more opposition political parties.
Washington, which had grown increasingly
irritated with Erdoğan’s policies and unpredictable style in recent years now
hopes that a new Turkish government, even a coalition, will significantly
change Turkey’s foreign policy strategies and tactics.
Don’t bet on it. Despite Erdoğan’s
personal excesses and recent poor judgment in foreign policy, the main thrust
of his earlier foreign policies is unlikely to change significantly. While we
can’t know yet what kind of ruling coalition will emerge in the weeks ahead, no
combination will dramatically change the substance of Turkish policies.
In my book of last year, “Turkey and the
Arab Spring: Turkey and Leadership in the Middle East” I set forth detailed
arguments for why AKP foreign policy in its first decade of rule (up until the
turmoil of the Arab Spring) represented a new, profound, substantive, and
permanent strategic shift in Turkey’s foreign policy vision.
What are those key elements of AKP
strategy?
-1 As a “lite” Islamist party, the AKP
moved to embrace and celebrate Turkey’s Islamic heritage and identity, much to
the approbation of a majority of Turks; that identity had been suppressed under
previous decades of imposed, official, authoritarian secularism that alienated
large segments of the traditional Turkish population. The AKP moved to
acknowledge and embrace Turkey’s central role in the past centuries of Middle
Eastern history in the form of the Ottoman Empire. In this sense it represented
“the return of history”—Turkey’s re-acknowledgment of itself as, among other
things, a Middle Eastern culture.
-2 The AKP moved to distance itself from
key US policies in the Middle East which it had judged to be flawed, failing,
and, above all, harmful to Turkey’s own interests: US refusals to negotiate or
deal with its chief opponents in the region (Iran, Hizballah in Lebanon, Hamas
in Palestine, and Saddam’s Iraq); coupled with the US invasion of Iraq and
Afghanistan; and US unconditional backing of Israel).
-3 Foreign minister Davutoğlu proclaimed
a new policy of “zero problems with neighbors.” That meant abandoning its
long-term ideological hostility against virtually all of Turkey’s neighbors and
working to reach accommodation on all bilateral issues where possible. Ankara’s
new relations were revolutionized in respect to Iran, Syria, Iraq, Hamas,
Hizballah, as well as with Russia and China—efforts that were hugely successful
in promoting Turkish economic and political interests in these regions. “Zero
problems with neighbors” actually embraced a new ideological open-mindedness
and flexibility, very much at odds with US policies that were quick to brand
countries and leaders as enemies; in Davutoğlu’s view, how you address another country can heavily
influence your relations with it.
-4 A new sensitivity to Arab issues and
a desire to witness the spread of democratic values whose absence Davutoğlu saw
as a key source of the region’s weakness. But Turkey nonetheless accepted
existing rulers of the day as a reality.
-5 A “global” vision of Turkey’s place
in the world that included a Eurasian dimension (close relations with Russia,
China, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Central Asian states), expansion
of interests and ties into Africa (especially Muslim Africa), and even early
forays into Latin America. Turkey proclaimed its interest in preserving Islamic
culture across the Muslim world and bolstering Islamic development.
-6 Ankara encouraged the spread of
high-quality Turkish schools in over 100 countries under the aegis of Fethullah
Gülen’s huge Islamic civic organization Hizmet (Service) whose vision openly
championed building schools, not mosques, as the best way to advance the Muslim
world as a whole. (Ironically, Erdoğan later came to feel threatened by the
Islamic credentials and growing power of Hizmet, especially in its willingness
to call out the AKP government on corruption issues; Erdoğan has since
proceeded to demonize his former ally and conduct an hysterical and obsessive
witch hunt against it.)
In short, Turkey saw itself as becoming
a significant major player with a broad visionary foreign policy while its
economy attained the position of number sixteen in the world, becoming a new
international hub. Turkey was democratic, it removed the military from politics
for the first time ever, had a powerful army that was part of NATO, all while
bidding to meet EU criteria for membership. Most Muslim states would have given
their eye teeth for accomplishments like this, especially when coupled with
AKP’s confidence in being able to still say no to the US on key foreign policy
issues.
Whatever new government emerges in
Turkey, these milestones will almost surely persist. Turkey is never going back
to being a “loyal American ally.” It will never again deny its Islamic identity
(although it will likely downplay some of the Islamic rhetoric). It will not
destroy the valuable international network of Hizmet schools. It will not
reject the foundations of Turkey’s broad political, economic and cultural soft
and hard power. Turkey will not cease to be the most important Muslim country
in the world—without benefit of oil.
But then Turkey’s foreign policy went
off the rails with the roller coaster events of the Arab Spring. (So did
America’s). It could not decide whether to deal with existing realities, or to
push for democratic change that would alienate authoritarian rulers. Erdoğan’s
personal prestige got particularly caught up in overthrowing Asad in Syria at
all cost, a massive mistake. A new government will likely walk back from that
blunder. A new government will also be less sympathetic to the Muslim
Brotherhood (but will not condemn it.) It will work with Iran as a vitally
important neighbor. It will not give up its Eurasian (Russian, Chinese) ties.
It will maintain its strategic independence from Washington.
So we should welcome the curtailing of
much of Erdoğan’s new and dangerous megalomania and personal ambitions. But
don’t expect any new government to introduce dramatic changes in foreign policy
either.
Graham E. Fuller is a former senior CIA
official, author of numerous books on the Muslim World; his latest book is
“Breaking Faith: A novel of espionage and an American’s crisis of conscience in
Pakistan.” (Amazon, Kindle) grahamefuller.com
