Reference ID Date Classification Origin
08ANKARA1643 2008-09-15 04:04 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXRO2572
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #1643/01 2590427
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 150427Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7454
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5//
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU//TCH//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEUITH/TLO ANKARA TU
RUEHAK/TSR ANKARA TU
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TUC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001643
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE (GARBE)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2018
TAGS: PGOV SCUL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: CHARITY FUND SCANDAL PROMPTS PM ERDOGAN
BATTLE WITH PRESS TYCOON
REF: ANKARA 1626
Classified By: POL Counselor Daniel O'Grady, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. A very public and ugly battle has erupted between Prime Minister Erdogan and the Dogan Group. The conflict dominated the news this week after Erdogan lashed out at business and media mogul Aydin Dogan for reporting on allegations in a German court that the German-based Deniz Feneri Charity laundered funds to individuals in Turkey who are close to Erdogan and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). The charges focus public attention on widespread allegations about corruption in the AKP, a key vulnerability for the party. Still, Erdogan seems indifferent to reporting on the scandal in other media outlets, and has turned his wrath solely on the Dogan Group with competing charges about corruption linked to a zoning deal for the Istanbul Hilton. Erdogan launched a milder campaign against the Dogan group in Febuary for carrying “pornographic” photos of women on its front pages, but the latest attack is a significant escalation of tensions. Erdogan has not been this truculent since long before the AKP court closure case; ironically, the new scandal has fed speculation that a second closure case could result. END summary.
It Only Took A Spark
--------------------
¶2. (SBU) On September 1 the first court case against Deniz Feneri convened in the Frankfurt Regional Court. By September 5, German Prosecutor Kerstin Lotz publicly stated that the Turkish Government “tried to intervene in the case and wanted suspects released.” The next day, CHP leader Deniz Baykal announced on NTV, a non-Dogan media outlet, that “Mehmet Gurhan, International Director at Kanal 7, acknowledged he took money from the German Deniz Feneri and passed it to PM Erdogan.” Baykal implied that he Prime Minister and his party were direct recipients of funds embezzled from the charity. Dogan's three flagship papers – Hurriyet, Milliyet, and Radikal – quickly picked up the story the next day with screaming, front-page banner headlines.
¶3. (U) In response, Erdogan publicly charged Dogan with corruption regarding a zoning application for new residences at the Istanbul Hilton. Dogan responded to the allegation by declaring: “The German judiciary claimed that the Prime Minister was involved in this case. The main opposition party leader announced this on NTV, but I am having difficulty understanding why I stand accused of reporting this in my papers.” In a second attack, the Prime Minister announced that Dogan had not been granted permission by the Turkish Board of Television and Radio (RTUK) to use an additional TV terrestrial frequency that he had purchased. Dogan denied Erdogan's charges and accused the Prime Minister of trying to stifle any press criticism of himself.
Tango with Turkey's Rupert Murdoch
-------------------------
¶4. (C) Dogan Media Holdings owns several mainstream daily newspapers and three major television stations. Although relations between Erdogan and Dogan have never been particularly warm, a detente of sorts has existed for most of the Erdogan administration. Dogan media players were only moderately critical of the Government, and the Goverment did not put undue pressure on Dogan's other business interests. Long before the public barbs, a familiar behind-the-scenes tango was taking place. Because of the Turkish media ownership structure, media owners use their press resources to curry favor with the Government on behalf of their own businesses. They also punish governments that, in their view, do not give them a sufficient cut of Government largesse. With control of 30-40 percent of the nation's media, Dogan is a major player in this game. Two years ago, the goverment fined Dogan's Petrol Offisi $200 million for tax evasion. This appears to have been the spark that ignited the current tensions.
Erdogan Spokesman on the Media: Feed the Beast or Else
Ankara 00001643 002 of 002
----------------------------------------- ------------
¶5. (C) PM Spokesman Akif Beki contends, “It's a media habit. They want something; they don't get it, so they attack.” He defended RTUK's refusal to allow Dogan to use his recently purchased terrestrial television channel by arguing that this station would have put Dogan in control of more than 50 percent of the media. Beki also believes this fight will not last long. “Dogan is wrong,” he argued, because he is “printing allegations being adjudicated in a German court as (if they are) pure truth.” AKP Vice Chairman Nihat Ergun made the same point to us in a September 11 meeting at the Parliament. (COMMENT: Although Beki contends that Erdogan's criticism is justifed and that the Prime Minister has actually shown admirable restraint, there are suggestions of a deliberate political move against Dogan. Several weeks ago, Minister of Trade Simsek told a group of investors in London to sell their Dogan stock because Dogan “won't be around much longer.” END COMMENT) Indeed, after Erdogan's attacks began last week, Dogan stock fell 8 percent. And although Dogan Holding showed a profit last year, several media and business sources have indicated the lack of government tenders and contracts is beginning to hurt the massive conglomerate.
¶6. (SBU) Last fall the editorial stance noticeably shifted at Dogan's flagship newspaper, Hurriyet. The paper became more critical of the government. xxxxx described for us several factors which he said led to the shift. Among them was the Petrol Offisi case, a decision by the Government not to issue a valuable Ceyhan oil refinery tender to Dogan, and a blistering speech Erdogan made to a closed AK Party meeting where he called Dogan a crooked businessman. The last item was taken personally by xxxxx because Dogan has supported Erdogan in his press on certain issues in the past.
Comment
--------
¶7. (C) This battle could be seen as just a very direct and personal fight between two titans. However, coming on the heels of other recent accusations of corruption in the AKP, the Dogan attacks may represent a broader shift in Government-media relations. Such shifts have been seen with other governments in the past. In earlier cases, however, the media did not generally escalate attacks until a government appeared at the end of its life, like sharks smelling blood in the water. With Erdogan's approval ratings still over 50 percent, it will be difficult to maintain such a criticism level absent hard evidence and actual convictions. Still, only six weeks after the conclusion of the AKP closure case, it is striking that media coverage is predicting the AKP could face closure again if these or additional corruption charges are substantiated.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey
Wilson
29 Kasım 2010 Pazartesi
WikiLeaks; TÜRKİYE İLE İLGİLİ ORİJİNAL BELGELER- 9
Reference ID Date Classification Origin
08ANKARA691 2008-04-11 12:12 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXRO9919
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #0691/01 1021244
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111244Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5884
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/39ABG INCIRLIK AB TU
RHMFISS/425ABG IZMIR TU//CC//
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU
RUEPGAB/MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ
RHMFISS/USCENTCOM SPECIAL HANDLING MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GEC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000691
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EUCOM PLEASE PASS TO POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: IMPLICATIONS OF AKP CLOSURE CASE AND OUR PUBLIC
POSTURE
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROSS WILSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
¶1. (c) Summary: The closure case against Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is a blow to this country's future. It reflects unresolved conflicts about the nature of Turkey, the state, the extent of popular democracy and the role of religion in society. It also results from failed leadership by PM Erdogan over the nine months since his re-election victory last July. The outcome is uncertain, but the crisis here must be viewed through the peculiar entity that is Turkish democracy -- imperfect, crabbed, but functional in its way. US priorities are sustaining our ability to work with this country on mutual interests and supporting its democratic process in a broad sense, but we should avoid opining on the specifics of Turkish politics. This approach will respect the raucous and historic debate and politicking among Turks taking place now about the futureof their country -- a vital process for democracy here to continue to mature. End Summary.
Implications of the Closure Case
--------------------------------
¶2. (c) Here is one way of looking at the AKP closure case. It is an attempted judicial coup, a Clausewitz-like extension of politics by legal means. The indictment reads like a political tract. It relies on newspaper clippings to justify excluding the party and 70-odd leaders from politics. Among more bizarre bits of proof that the AKP intends to undo secularism are press reports of Secretary Powell praising the country,s "moderate Muslim" government and on its support for BMENA. The propriety of banning parties is questionable in any democracy. A ban based on a legally weak indictment of a party which nine months ago received 47 percent of the vote nationally and pluralities in 76 out of Turkey's 85 constituencies looks like a travesty for democratic values and the rule of law.
¶3. (c) Another way of looking at the case focuses on its consistency with democracy Turkish style. The constitution and laws have long provided for banning politicians and dissolving parties, 26 of which have fallen victim. The AKP had many years in office to change this and other questionable policies (like Article 301 on insulting Turkishness), but did not. What looks to Western democracies like an unusual power in the judiciary to compromise the results of last July's election is one of Turkey's check and balancing mechanisms to protect the rights of the minority -- in this case secularists who feel threatened by the AKP.
¶4. (c) Some truth exists in both of these points of view. One clear thing is that PM Erdogan has stumbled badly. One blunder was failing to make political bans more difficult when relevant legislation was amended several years ago. As if dizzy with his own success, Erdogan failed to reassure the 53 percent who voted against his government last July that it would respect their interests too. He failed to use his re-election mandate to continue EU-related reforms that were the most formidable tools for calming fears of Islamization and untrammeled majority rule. He allowed himself to be goaded by the National Action Party (MHP) into putting the headscarf ban at the head of the reform queue. For this short-term populist win, he sacrificed a larger constitutional reform package that would have significantly strengthened Turkey's democracy. Effective, progressive governance that was the hallmark of early AKP years in office dried up in the 2007 election year, and no momentum returned after that. These and other missteps exacerbated fears among many that Erdogan was going too far, too fast; that there were no effective constraints on the AKP (especially after the military's botched intervention last spring); and that fundamentalists might soon dominate the bureaucracy, judiciary, universities, etc., to change Turkey in dangerous and permanent ways.
¶5. (c) The closure case on its face is a set-back for democracy and stability in Turkey. For many, especially the large swath of previously neglected voters who make up Turkey's emerging middle class and whom Erdogan's populism galvanized, the message is that Turkish democracy is too poorly developed to protect their interests against the traditional elite. This message is even more threatening to ANKARA 00000691 002 OF 003 those here who are still marginalized, especially Kurds. More broadly, the case looks like, and to some extent is, the revenge of an unelected and unaccountable bureaucracy against Erdogan and popular democracy. Turks fear the Deep State and many, including strong critics of the AKP, are deeply uncomfortable with the judiciary's attempt to manipulate the power balance. Associated turmoil also renders Turkey's vulnerable economy more uncertain at a time when global trends are already very negative; a big downturn would reinforce the sense of crisis here.
¶6. (c) Today, however, Turkey remains a secure, relatively stable emerging democracy. There is no serious violence on the streets, and the economy has not crashed. The closure case is not a catastrophe or the undoing of Turkey's peculiar and imperfect democracy, at least not now. It is better seen as one among many moves in a very long chess game that all sides here, including Erdogan and the AKP, are adept at playing. The mere fact of the indictment has already moderated the AKP's rhetoric and pushed it to emphasize effective governance and more consensual policies, especially EU accession-related reform. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that this is the way Turkey's crabbed, military-drafted constitution intended the system to work. Figures ranging from former President Demirel to former parliamentary Speaker Cetin have remarked to us recently that Turkey has seen worse and will come through these difficulties all right. At this point, at least, their reassurances seem more justified than not.
¶7. (c) How matters will play out in the short-medium term is uncertain.
-- A "victorious" AKP will still face intransigent opposition from one-third of the public, not to mention the courts, bureaucrats and generals.
-- A post-closure AKP will reorganize under a new name and almost certainly still have the votes among its un-banned MPs to form the next government alone. People already talk about plausible, post-closure scenarios that involve bringing Erdogan and other potentially banned figures back into the picture.
-- Banishing the AKP will not change the reality that the main opposition parties are weak, divided and ill-equipped for 21st century politics. Space may be created for a new centrist party, but credible leaders are not evident now, and the outlook for new elections that would propel them to prominence is uncertain. The Islamist fringe in and outside the AKP could coalesce and become more radical; tarikats like the Gulenists may become more significant power centers than they are now. Without broad constitutional reform to replace the current top-down state and better protect individual liberties, and without more consensus on the extent and limits of secularism in modern Turkey, this struggle is likely to continue.
¶8. (c) This episode will last at least six months and possibly a year or more. In the meantime, Turkey's leadership will be distracted and cautious. Unfortunately, this comes during a period of immense challenges to and opportunities for Turkish interests domestically and in the region that include the Kurdish issue, relations with Iraq and the KRG, energy security, Cyprus, Armenia, EU accession, terrorism, etc. Policy creativity, never Turkey's strong suit, will diminish. We also note that before the Constitutional Court decides the AKP's fate, it will likely rule on the headscarf amendments; reinstituting the ban at universities may actually calm matters and defuse the anti-AKP case. The Court may also rule on the closure of the Kurdish nationalist Democratic Society Party (DTP); this could prove more explosive than the AKP case, given that DTP leaders and constituents accept much less of the constitutional/legal order here than the AKP mainstream.
Our Public Posture
------------------
¶9. (c) None of this changes the reality that Turkey is an extremely important ally in a dangerous region and that it ANKARA 00000691 003 OF 003 is, despite many faults, more democratic and free than any other country in the Muslim world. We should not stifle, through our intervention, what should fundamentally be a debate by Turks about the future of their country that is essential if its democratic institutions are to mature. Doing so would make this a US issue in ways harmful to our interests, our influence and to democratic values here. We should stick to general principles, and let Turks sort out the details. At some point, as matters develop, our intervention to head off a political meltdown here may be necessary, but that moment isn't now and may well never come.
¶10. (c) With this in mind, our public comments should take a positive and high road. We should:
-- Make clear our strong support for Turkey, its democratic institutions and its commitment to democratic values and secular principles that define our alliance and partnership.
-- Urge Turkey's leaders and institutions to work for pragmatic solutions that reinforce stability and build consensus at a critical time for the country and in the region.
-- Emphasize support for Turkey's goal of accession to the EU and its need to legislate and implement comprehensive political and economic reforms that will sustain that goal and secure liberty and prosperity in the future.
-- Look forward to continuing to work with Turkey on behalf of common interests in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Caucasus, the Balkans, on terrorism, on energy security, on the Cyprus problem and elsewhere in the region and the world.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey
WILSON
08ANKARA691 2008-04-11 12:12 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXRO9919
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #0691/01 1021244
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111244Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5884
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/39ABG INCIRLIK AB TU
RHMFISS/425ABG IZMIR TU//CC//
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU
RUEPGAB/MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ
RHMFISS/USCENTCOM SPECIAL HANDLING MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GEC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000691
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EUCOM PLEASE PASS TO POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: IMPLICATIONS OF AKP CLOSURE CASE AND OUR PUBLIC
POSTURE
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROSS WILSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
¶1. (c) Summary: The closure case against Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is a blow to this country's future. It reflects unresolved conflicts about the nature of Turkey, the state, the extent of popular democracy and the role of religion in society. It also results from failed leadership by PM Erdogan over the nine months since his re-election victory last July. The outcome is uncertain, but the crisis here must be viewed through the peculiar entity that is Turkish democracy -- imperfect, crabbed, but functional in its way. US priorities are sustaining our ability to work with this country on mutual interests and supporting its democratic process in a broad sense, but we should avoid opining on the specifics of Turkish politics. This approach will respect the raucous and historic debate and politicking among Turks taking place now about the futureof their country -- a vital process for democracy here to continue to mature. End Summary.
Implications of the Closure Case
--------------------------------
¶2. (c) Here is one way of looking at the AKP closure case. It is an attempted judicial coup, a Clausewitz-like extension of politics by legal means. The indictment reads like a political tract. It relies on newspaper clippings to justify excluding the party and 70-odd leaders from politics. Among more bizarre bits of proof that the AKP intends to undo secularism are press reports of Secretary Powell praising the country,s "moderate Muslim" government and on its support for BMENA. The propriety of banning parties is questionable in any democracy. A ban based on a legally weak indictment of a party which nine months ago received 47 percent of the vote nationally and pluralities in 76 out of Turkey's 85 constituencies looks like a travesty for democratic values and the rule of law.
¶3. (c) Another way of looking at the case focuses on its consistency with democracy Turkish style. The constitution and laws have long provided for banning politicians and dissolving parties, 26 of which have fallen victim. The AKP had many years in office to change this and other questionable policies (like Article 301 on insulting Turkishness), but did not. What looks to Western democracies like an unusual power in the judiciary to compromise the results of last July's election is one of Turkey's check and balancing mechanisms to protect the rights of the minority -- in this case secularists who feel threatened by the AKP.
¶4. (c) Some truth exists in both of these points of view. One clear thing is that PM Erdogan has stumbled badly. One blunder was failing to make political bans more difficult when relevant legislation was amended several years ago. As if dizzy with his own success, Erdogan failed to reassure the 53 percent who voted against his government last July that it would respect their interests too. He failed to use his re-election mandate to continue EU-related reforms that were the most formidable tools for calming fears of Islamization and untrammeled majority rule. He allowed himself to be goaded by the National Action Party (MHP) into putting the headscarf ban at the head of the reform queue. For this short-term populist win, he sacrificed a larger constitutional reform package that would have significantly strengthened Turkey's democracy. Effective, progressive governance that was the hallmark of early AKP years in office dried up in the 2007 election year, and no momentum returned after that. These and other missteps exacerbated fears among many that Erdogan was going too far, too fast; that there were no effective constraints on the AKP (especially after the military's botched intervention last spring); and that fundamentalists might soon dominate the bureaucracy, judiciary, universities, etc., to change Turkey in dangerous and permanent ways.
¶5. (c) The closure case on its face is a set-back for democracy and stability in Turkey. For many, especially the large swath of previously neglected voters who make up Turkey's emerging middle class and whom Erdogan's populism galvanized, the message is that Turkish democracy is too poorly developed to protect their interests against the traditional elite. This message is even more threatening to ANKARA 00000691 002 OF 003 those here who are still marginalized, especially Kurds. More broadly, the case looks like, and to some extent is, the revenge of an unelected and unaccountable bureaucracy against Erdogan and popular democracy. Turks fear the Deep State and many, including strong critics of the AKP, are deeply uncomfortable with the judiciary's attempt to manipulate the power balance. Associated turmoil also renders Turkey's vulnerable economy more uncertain at a time when global trends are already very negative; a big downturn would reinforce the sense of crisis here.
¶6. (c) Today, however, Turkey remains a secure, relatively stable emerging democracy. There is no serious violence on the streets, and the economy has not crashed. The closure case is not a catastrophe or the undoing of Turkey's peculiar and imperfect democracy, at least not now. It is better seen as one among many moves in a very long chess game that all sides here, including Erdogan and the AKP, are adept at playing. The mere fact of the indictment has already moderated the AKP's rhetoric and pushed it to emphasize effective governance and more consensual policies, especially EU accession-related reform. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that this is the way Turkey's crabbed, military-drafted constitution intended the system to work. Figures ranging from former President Demirel to former parliamentary Speaker Cetin have remarked to us recently that Turkey has seen worse and will come through these difficulties all right. At this point, at least, their reassurances seem more justified than not.
¶7. (c) How matters will play out in the short-medium term is uncertain.
-- A "victorious" AKP will still face intransigent opposition from one-third of the public, not to mention the courts, bureaucrats and generals.
-- A post-closure AKP will reorganize under a new name and almost certainly still have the votes among its un-banned MPs to form the next government alone. People already talk about plausible, post-closure scenarios that involve bringing Erdogan and other potentially banned figures back into the picture.
-- Banishing the AKP will not change the reality that the main opposition parties are weak, divided and ill-equipped for 21st century politics. Space may be created for a new centrist party, but credible leaders are not evident now, and the outlook for new elections that would propel them to prominence is uncertain. The Islamist fringe in and outside the AKP could coalesce and become more radical; tarikats like the Gulenists may become more significant power centers than they are now. Without broad constitutional reform to replace the current top-down state and better protect individual liberties, and without more consensus on the extent and limits of secularism in modern Turkey, this struggle is likely to continue.
¶8. (c) This episode will last at least six months and possibly a year or more. In the meantime, Turkey's leadership will be distracted and cautious. Unfortunately, this comes during a period of immense challenges to and opportunities for Turkish interests domestically and in the region that include the Kurdish issue, relations with Iraq and the KRG, energy security, Cyprus, Armenia, EU accession, terrorism, etc. Policy creativity, never Turkey's strong suit, will diminish. We also note that before the Constitutional Court decides the AKP's fate, it will likely rule on the headscarf amendments; reinstituting the ban at universities may actually calm matters and defuse the anti-AKP case. The Court may also rule on the closure of the Kurdish nationalist Democratic Society Party (DTP); this could prove more explosive than the AKP case, given that DTP leaders and constituents accept much less of the constitutional/legal order here than the AKP mainstream.
Our Public Posture
------------------
¶9. (c) None of this changes the reality that Turkey is an extremely important ally in a dangerous region and that it ANKARA 00000691 003 OF 003 is, despite many faults, more democratic and free than any other country in the Muslim world. We should not stifle, through our intervention, what should fundamentally be a debate by Turks about the future of their country that is essential if its democratic institutions are to mature. Doing so would make this a US issue in ways harmful to our interests, our influence and to democratic values here. We should stick to general principles, and let Turks sort out the details. At some point, as matters develop, our intervention to head off a political meltdown here may be necessary, but that moment isn't now and may well never come.
¶10. (c) With this in mind, our public comments should take a positive and high road. We should:
-- Make clear our strong support for Turkey, its democratic institutions and its commitment to democratic values and secular principles that define our alliance and partnership.
-- Urge Turkey's leaders and institutions to work for pragmatic solutions that reinforce stability and build consensus at a critical time for the country and in the region.
-- Emphasize support for Turkey's goal of accession to the EU and its need to legislate and implement comprehensive political and economic reforms that will sustain that goal and secure liberty and prosperity in the future.
-- Look forward to continuing to work with Turkey on behalf of common interests in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Caucasus, the Balkans, on terrorism, on energy security, on the Cyprus problem and elsewhere in the region and the world.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey
WILSON
WikiLeaks; TÜRKİYE İLE İLGİLİ ORİJİNAL BELGELER- 8
Reference ID Date Classification Origin
08ANKARA536 2008-03-19 22:10 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXRO9728
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #0536/01 0792214
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 192214Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5641
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1154
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEUITH/TLO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY
RHMFISS/39ABG CP INCIRLIK AB TU PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/425ABG IZMIR TU//CC// PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITYC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000536
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2018
TAGS: PGOV TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: RULING AKP TO TRY TO OVERCOME CLOSURE CASE
BY AMENDING CONSTITUTION
REF: ANKARA 526 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: PolCouns Janice G Weiner, reasons 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is drafting a mini-constitutional amendment package to attempt to overcome the closure case filed against it in Constitutional Court. The package will include a temporary clause that would wipe out existing closure cases, including against the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP). If necessary, the GOT would be prepared to take the package to referendum. End summary.
¶2. (C) xxxxx told us March 19 the party is hard at work on a mini-constitutional amendment package. The party sees the closure case as political in nature. Its intent, he stated, is to decapitate the party and ban PM Erdogan from politics. By the weekend, a small AKP committee will have drafted a package to deal with future party closure cases; it will include a temporary article intended to eliminate existing closure cases, including the case against the DTP. AKP will then sit down and talk with the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) in parliament, which, according to MHP General Secretary Cihan Pacaci, is drafting its own package. Pacaci will speak to MHP's proposal on the floor of parliament March 20, in a manner designed to condemn party closures in general and avoid the specifics of existing cases.
¶3. (C) With respect to the concern voiced by many that the current case is “untouchable” because Article 138 of the Constitution prohibits legislative activity on ongoing cases, xxxxx said that much in the large body of legislation parliament has passed in AKP's five years in government has touched on issues before the courts. It is a basic principle of Turkish law that if a new provision works in someone's favor, the person may benefit from it; if it would work against the person, it does not apply. They will forge ahead.
¶4. (C) xxxxx AKP will work at a compromise with MHP; if that is not possible, AKP will push the package through parliament. AKP on its own (likely with DTP, which stands to benefit) has more than the 330 votes required to send a constitutional amendment package to referendum. Pacaci, who claimed to know the contents of the AKP package, said he did not like it. He confirmed that in the absence of agreement with MHP (which would give the package a vote total that would obviate the need for a referendum), AKP would likely send it to referendum.
¶5. (C) Asked whether AKP, in pushing such a package, was not playing with fire, xxxxx responded the party had concluded it would be more dangerous for the country to go through another prolonged period of political and economic instability and uncertainty than to face this head on. It was preferable to take abrupt, decisive action to cut off the closures cases; then the GOT could proceed with its agenda. He did not believe this was a matter in which the military would interfere. Both xxxxx to us that AKP had made mistakes, including failure actively to push its parliamentary agenda in recent months, and its failure when it dealt with Article 69 on party closures in 2005 to limit the Chief Prosecutor's sole discretion to file a closure case. But the party did not deserve to be closed, nor did the 47% of the people who had voted for AKP.
¶6. (C) Comment: The AKP appears determined to fight this head on. This is well-aligned with PM Erdogan's street-fighter instincts, and with the party's reaction to the April 27, 2007 e-coup. They are indeed playing with fire - but to be fair, the fire was lit under them first. If the package moves through parliament to referendum, it is hard to believe it would not garner a solid majority.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey
Ankara 00000536 002 of 002
Wilson
08ANKARA536 2008-03-19 22:10 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXRO9728
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #0536/01 0792214
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 192214Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5641
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1154
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEUITH/TLO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY
RHMFISS/39ABG CP INCIRLIK AB TU PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/425ABG IZMIR TU//CC// PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITYC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000536
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2018
TAGS: PGOV TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: RULING AKP TO TRY TO OVERCOME CLOSURE CASE
BY AMENDING CONSTITUTION
REF: ANKARA 526 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: PolCouns Janice G Weiner, reasons 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is drafting a mini-constitutional amendment package to attempt to overcome the closure case filed against it in Constitutional Court. The package will include a temporary clause that would wipe out existing closure cases, including against the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP). If necessary, the GOT would be prepared to take the package to referendum. End summary.
¶2. (C) xxxxx told us March 19 the party is hard at work on a mini-constitutional amendment package. The party sees the closure case as political in nature. Its intent, he stated, is to decapitate the party and ban PM Erdogan from politics. By the weekend, a small AKP committee will have drafted a package to deal with future party closure cases; it will include a temporary article intended to eliminate existing closure cases, including the case against the DTP. AKP will then sit down and talk with the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) in parliament, which, according to MHP General Secretary Cihan Pacaci, is drafting its own package. Pacaci will speak to MHP's proposal on the floor of parliament March 20, in a manner designed to condemn party closures in general and avoid the specifics of existing cases.
¶3. (C) With respect to the concern voiced by many that the current case is “untouchable” because Article 138 of the Constitution prohibits legislative activity on ongoing cases, xxxxx said that much in the large body of legislation parliament has passed in AKP's five years in government has touched on issues before the courts. It is a basic principle of Turkish law that if a new provision works in someone's favor, the person may benefit from it; if it would work against the person, it does not apply. They will forge ahead.
¶4. (C) xxxxx AKP will work at a compromise with MHP; if that is not possible, AKP will push the package through parliament. AKP on its own (likely with DTP, which stands to benefit) has more than the 330 votes required to send a constitutional amendment package to referendum. Pacaci, who claimed to know the contents of the AKP package, said he did not like it. He confirmed that in the absence of agreement with MHP (which would give the package a vote total that would obviate the need for a referendum), AKP would likely send it to referendum.
¶5. (C) Asked whether AKP, in pushing such a package, was not playing with fire, xxxxx responded the party had concluded it would be more dangerous for the country to go through another prolonged period of political and economic instability and uncertainty than to face this head on. It was preferable to take abrupt, decisive action to cut off the closures cases; then the GOT could proceed with its agenda. He did not believe this was a matter in which the military would interfere. Both xxxxx to us that AKP had made mistakes, including failure actively to push its parliamentary agenda in recent months, and its failure when it dealt with Article 69 on party closures in 2005 to limit the Chief Prosecutor's sole discretion to file a closure case. But the party did not deserve to be closed, nor did the 47% of the people who had voted for AKP.
¶6. (C) Comment: The AKP appears determined to fight this head on. This is well-aligned with PM Erdogan's street-fighter instincts, and with the party's reaction to the April 27, 2007 e-coup. They are indeed playing with fire - but to be fair, the fire was lit under them first. If the package moves through parliament to referendum, it is hard to believe it would not garner a solid majority.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey
Ankara 00000536 002 of 002
Wilson
WikiLeaks; TÜRKİYE İLE İLGİLİ ORİJİNAL BELGELER- 7
Reference ID Date Classification Origin
07ANKARA648 2007-03-21 15:03 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXRO1479
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #0648/01 0801533
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 211533Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1409
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEUITH/TLO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITYC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 000648
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON TU
SUBJECT: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE AKP'S "SECRET ISLAMIC AGENDA"
REF: A. ANKARA 0629
¶B. ANKARA 0610
Classified By: Political Counselor Janice G. Weiner for reasons 1.4(b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary. Ever since its victory in the 2002 general elections, rumours and suspicion have swirled around the ruling Justice and Development Party's (AKP) "secret" Islamist agenda. After more than four years in power, some doubters are relieved to find an AKP that appears conservative, Western- as well as Islam-oriented, reform minded and democratic. Others remain convinced that AKP is determined to impose Sharia law in Turkey and undermine the country's secular system once it gains control of the triple crown - the presidency, prime ministry and parliament - in this year's double elections. The evidence either way is circumstantial, but the issue is central to Turkey's future. Turkey's traditional secularists (including the civil service, judiciary and military), opposition parties and even ultra and neo-nationalists are resorting to increasingly desperate maneuvers, including rumour and innuendo, to counter the perceived "threat" of an AKP-dominated triumverate. Their concern is undoubtedly heightened by the realization that AKP's reform agenda threatens the established elite's traditional, top-down control. To keep the public's trust and minimize tension as Turkish society evolves, AKP leaders will need to continue to employ broad-reaching, moderate, balanced rhetoric. End summary.
The Origins of Suspicion
------------------------
¶2. (SBU) Those looking to brand the AKP as Islamists determined to undermine the Turkish Republic point first to the AKP's religious origins and PM Erdogan's political roots. AKP evolved from Necmettin Erbakan's Welfare Party (RP), an Islamist party founded in 1993. Critics focus on Erdogan, who in 1994 as Istanbul's mayor, called himself the "imam of Istanbul" and praised God that he was a servant of Sharia. Later, in 1998, Erdogan served four months of a 10-month sentence for inciting religious hatred by reading a religious poem at a rally. When the Constitutional Court outlawed the RP in 1998, Erdogan and other RP members formed the Islamic-oriented Virtue Party (FP). When FP was banned in 2001 for unconstitutional anti-secular activities, Erdogan split off from Erbakan and formed AKP with more pragmatic members willing to work within the existing political system. Erbakan and more hardcore Islamists formed Saadet (Felicity) Party. Erdogan moderated his rhetoric, making it easier for voters to turn to AKP in the 2002 elections as an alternative to traditional parties, mired in scandals, corruption and an economic crisis. AKP surged to power with 34 percent of the vote, one of the largest parliamentary majorities in Turkey's history.
For the Defense
---------------
¶3. (C) Those who view AKP as reform-minded and democratic are quick to cite AKP-backed reforms that strengthened freedoms and democracy. AKP legislation that reduced the military's influence in the National Secuity Council (MGK) and eliminated military membership in the security courts and the Board of Higher Education (YOK), among others, improved the civil-military equilibrium that had been heavily skewed toward military control. They cite as evidence of the party's western-oriented, free market approach AKP's liberal economic policies, which have stimulated the private sector, increased foreign investment, reduced inflation and stabilized the currency. AKP supporters argue that Turkey's traditional power centers (the military, judiciary, bureacracy) feel threatened by EU-linked human rights and rule of law reforms that enhance individual freedoms. By promoting EU membership, the AKP is slowly introducing more balance into Turkey's strictly secular, statist society. Supporters maintain that Erdogan's appointment of AKP loyalists to influential positions previously held by secularists has generated resentment against the AKP, further fueled by the party's popularity. They frame attacks against the party as desperate measures by entrenched secularists who fear that further democratization will undermine their traditional control and the economic benefits they derived from state intervention in the economy.
¶4. (C) Opponents charge that AKP only pushed a reform agenda ANKARA 00000648 002 OF 004 as far as necessary to convince the EU to begin accession talks. Even then, AKP focused on those reforms needed to dilute the military's power rather than those that might interfere with the party's Islamic agenda. They note Erdogan's support for greater freedom to express Islamic practices (such as wearing the headscarf), and point to his failure to allow Alevis, Kurds, Armenian and Greek Orthodox communities similar freedoms. Suspicious that the accession process is just a cover for the AKP's anti-secular Islamic agenda, some in the military and opposition are reconsidering the merits of EU membership. AKP officials admit reform efforts have slowed, but explain that Turkey's bureaucracy needs time to absorb and implement significant changes, such as the complete overhaul of the Penal Code, Criminal Procedure Code and Punishments Law passed between 2002 and ¶2004. They also note that parliament passed in November 2006 much of another major reform package, including legislation relating to minority foundations and schools, military audits, military courts and political party funding. In some cases, parliament has had to re-approve the legislation to overcome President Sezer's veto.
Circumstantial Evidence
-----------------------
¶5. (C) Conspiracy theorists and concerned secularists alike build the case against AKP using persuasive but largely circumstantial evidence. Many claim that Erdogan has used AKP's parliamentary majority to weaken Turkey's secular educational, financial and judicial institutions. They warn that an AKP troika of president, PM and parliament speaker would control the appointments process, transforming Turkey's secular system into something approaching an Islamic republic. They point to AKP-sponsored changes in the strictly secular education system to allow graduates of religious high schools (imam hatip) to compete for limited university seats and qualify for government jobs. Previously, imam hatip, like other vocational school graduates, advanced to the clergy or other appropriate professions. In addition, opponents charge that AKP has undermined state regulation of private Koranic schools by lifting age limits and extending hours of attendance. As a result, the number of Koranic schools has increased significantly, with correspondingly less government oversight.
¶6. (C) Erdogan is also frequently accused of trying to infiltrate the higher education system with Islamist-minded professors and administrators. After some university rectors resisted AKP efforts to introduce more Islam into the curriculum, AKP opponents claimed the government began a harrassment campaign. Police arrested one obstinate rector in Van twice in 2006; both times he was reinstated by court decision. Legislation creating 15 new universities gave the government authority to appoint the new rectors, rather than the usual procedure of approvals by YOK and the president. The law, pushed through over President Sezer's veto, is viewed as an end-run to allow Erdogan to select 15 new rectors of his mindset. Parliament currently is considering a proposal to establish another 17 new universities.
Green Money Seeping In
----------------------
¶7. (C) While many acknowledge AKP economic successes, some doubters flag the alleged influx of "green" money from Islamic sources as proof of the real direction AKP is taking Turkey's economy. AKP opponents note that Islamist capital is hard to track and question whether it is ultimately tied to more Islamist policies. Increased investments from the UAE and a promised doubling of trade with Saudi Arabia after the Saudi King's unprecedented 2006 visit raised suspicions among some western-oriented investors. The overall trend of increased foreign investor inflows actually counters insinuations of an Islamist take-over of Turkey's financial sector, however. Investments from Islamic sources pale in comparison to total foreign inflows and do not seem to be of economic or political significance.
¶8. (C) Erdogan reputedly has manipulated the political appointments process to place Islamist bankers in key economic positions. Along with Finance Minister Kemal Unakitan - a former board member of one of Turkey's leading Islamic banks (al-Baraka) - Erdogan's appointment of seven other al-Baraka officials to key positions in Turkey's Savings Deposit Insurance Fund is cited as support for an ANKARA 00000648 003 OF 004 Islamist take-over theory. In 2006, the PM virtually paralyzed financial policy when he tried to appoint an Islamist as head of the Central Bank against President Sezer's firm opposition. (The compromise candidate has demonstrated independent decision-making since his appointment.) To round out the "damning" evidence, critics cite FM Gul's background as a specialist at the Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah from 1983 to 1991 and his reported objections to state scrutiny of Islamic enterprises.
Packing the Court
------------------
¶9. (C) Erdogan is also accused of staging a take-over of the judiciary. The AKP pushed through legislation to lower the mandatory retirement age for technocrats, opening the way for Erdogan to name almost 4,000 of 9,000 judges and prosecutors. In a stand-off with the judiciary, AKP has threatened to refuse to implement high court rulings against the government for obstructing AKP-sponsored legislation. Similar struggles between AKP and President Sezer have caused Sezer to veto over 3,000 AKP appointments and send over 100 AKP-backed laws to the Constitutional Court for review. But for Sezer, Erdogan would already be implementing his "secret" agenda, worried secularists claim. Economic reformers, including the IMF, for their part, would be only too happy to see an AKP-inspired change in the judiciary, which has consistently blocked forward-looking economic reforms.
¶10. (C) Erdogan rebutted the secularists' charges in 2006 by noting that the AKP hadn't been in power long enough to reshape the judiciary. Rigid bureaucratic controls on promotions and a 15-20 year career path for judges limit the influence of any particular government on the judiciary's orientation. But critics note that Justice Ministry budgetary control over the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors, which oversees assignments within the judiciary, gives the AKP indirect influence that can have a long-term impact. The president appoints five of the seven council members. The Justice Minister, however, heads the council and controls its funding, which could discourage council members from voting against the Minister's proposed appointees. The most recent charge is that the Minister, by not attending Supreme Council sessions, is preventing 29 judicial positions from being filled.
Small Changes
--------------
¶11. (C) AKP's strategy to infiltrate its Islamist agenda into Turkey's secular institutions extends to the municipal level and beyond, according to AKP opponents. The party contro four of Turkey's five largest cities (Ankara, Istanbul, Bursa and Konya). Measures by some AKP mayors to ban alcohol on municipal property, establish women-only parks or equip ferries with prayer rooms are seen as Islamic encroachments on the secular system. Erdogan and other party leaders explained the alcohol restrictions as consistent with the state's obligation to protect children from alcohol, drugs and gambling, rather than a religious proscription. Municipalities are authorized to ban the sale and consumption of alcohol on municipal property and near schools, religious sites and related locations. Of the 62 provincial capitals that have such a ban, 18 have non-AKP mayors. Of the 19 without alcohol bans, 14 have AKP mayors. As another often-cited example of small but telling changes, critics note that employees at the Health Ministry and state-owned Turkish Airlines reported being questioned about their religious beliefs and attitudes toward the Koran, an unprecedented practice.
Internal Balancing Act
----------------------
¶12. (C) Erdogan has performed a delicate balancing act to maintain unity within the AKP, despite the sometimes conflicting interests of its competing factions. Many party faithful are pious; keeping their allegiance is central to the AKP's hold on power but Erdogan has won them few tangible successes. He has not upheld earlier pledges to lift the ban on headscarves in public buildings, though his strong objections when the European Court of Human Rights upheld the ban in public schools resonated with the party's more devout members. AKP's more conservation faction was disappointed by the failed attempt to criminalize adultery in 2004. Erdogan's attempts to put loyalists into government jobs can also be viewed through the prism of rewarding the party ANKARA 00000648 004 OF 004 faithful.
The Jury Is Out
---------------
¶12. (C) Comment. To date, AKP critics can only muster circumstantial evidence of an AKP Islamist agenda. Opposition leaders, some media outlets, the military and extreme nationalists have used this to play up fears that an AKP triumvirate will allow Erdogan to make significant, perhaps irreversible, changes that would undermine Turkey's secular system. Using dramatic ad campaigns and threatening rhetoric, they warn that Turkey may soon have an Islamist president with a head-scarf wearing wife ready to take the country back to the pre-republic "dark ages". President Sezer, military leaders and the MGK chief have all warned Erdogan against unconstitutional moves that might change Turkey's secular identity. The secular establishment's concern that AKP poses a genuine threat to Turkey's secular system is undoubtedly heightened by the realization that AKP's reform agenda threatens the established elite's traditional, top-down control.
¶13. (C) Those not convinced of a nefarious AKP plan contend that more than four years in power have matured the party. Erdogan has had to moderate his message to balance factions within AKP and lessen tensions with secularists threatened by AKP reforms. Much of the party's success stems from its image as being less corrupt ("AK" in Turkish means "clean", a dubious claim for any party here) and more effective than the opposition. Its record to date describes a center-right, conservative party with Islamic roots that has modestly advanced Kemal Ataturk's core principles of westernization and modernization. Some of the changes tied to that process will inevitably transform the traditional power balance and strengthen civilian leaders. To keep the public's trust and minimize tension as Turkish society evolves, AKP, and Erdogan in particular, will need to continue to employ broad-reaching, moderate, balanced rhetoric. End Comment.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/
WILSON
07ANKARA648 2007-03-21 15:03 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXRO1479
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #0648/01 0801533
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 211533Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1409
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEUITH/TLO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITYC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 000648
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON TU
SUBJECT: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE AKP'S "SECRET ISLAMIC AGENDA"
REF: A. ANKARA 0629
¶B. ANKARA 0610
Classified By: Political Counselor Janice G. Weiner for reasons 1.4(b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary. Ever since its victory in the 2002 general elections, rumours and suspicion have swirled around the ruling Justice and Development Party's (AKP) "secret" Islamist agenda. After more than four years in power, some doubters are relieved to find an AKP that appears conservative, Western- as well as Islam-oriented, reform minded and democratic. Others remain convinced that AKP is determined to impose Sharia law in Turkey and undermine the country's secular system once it gains control of the triple crown - the presidency, prime ministry and parliament - in this year's double elections. The evidence either way is circumstantial, but the issue is central to Turkey's future. Turkey's traditional secularists (including the civil service, judiciary and military), opposition parties and even ultra and neo-nationalists are resorting to increasingly desperate maneuvers, including rumour and innuendo, to counter the perceived "threat" of an AKP-dominated triumverate. Their concern is undoubtedly heightened by the realization that AKP's reform agenda threatens the established elite's traditional, top-down control. To keep the public's trust and minimize tension as Turkish society evolves, AKP leaders will need to continue to employ broad-reaching, moderate, balanced rhetoric. End summary.
The Origins of Suspicion
------------------------
¶2. (SBU) Those looking to brand the AKP as Islamists determined to undermine the Turkish Republic point first to the AKP's religious origins and PM Erdogan's political roots. AKP evolved from Necmettin Erbakan's Welfare Party (RP), an Islamist party founded in 1993. Critics focus on Erdogan, who in 1994 as Istanbul's mayor, called himself the "imam of Istanbul" and praised God that he was a servant of Sharia. Later, in 1998, Erdogan served four months of a 10-month sentence for inciting religious hatred by reading a religious poem at a rally. When the Constitutional Court outlawed the RP in 1998, Erdogan and other RP members formed the Islamic-oriented Virtue Party (FP). When FP was banned in 2001 for unconstitutional anti-secular activities, Erdogan split off from Erbakan and formed AKP with more pragmatic members willing to work within the existing political system. Erbakan and more hardcore Islamists formed Saadet (Felicity) Party. Erdogan moderated his rhetoric, making it easier for voters to turn to AKP in the 2002 elections as an alternative to traditional parties, mired in scandals, corruption and an economic crisis. AKP surged to power with 34 percent of the vote, one of the largest parliamentary majorities in Turkey's history.
For the Defense
---------------
¶3. (C) Those who view AKP as reform-minded and democratic are quick to cite AKP-backed reforms that strengthened freedoms and democracy. AKP legislation that reduced the military's influence in the National Secuity Council (MGK) and eliminated military membership in the security courts and the Board of Higher Education (YOK), among others, improved the civil-military equilibrium that had been heavily skewed toward military control. They cite as evidence of the party's western-oriented, free market approach AKP's liberal economic policies, which have stimulated the private sector, increased foreign investment, reduced inflation and stabilized the currency. AKP supporters argue that Turkey's traditional power centers (the military, judiciary, bureacracy) feel threatened by EU-linked human rights and rule of law reforms that enhance individual freedoms. By promoting EU membership, the AKP is slowly introducing more balance into Turkey's strictly secular, statist society. Supporters maintain that Erdogan's appointment of AKP loyalists to influential positions previously held by secularists has generated resentment against the AKP, further fueled by the party's popularity. They frame attacks against the party as desperate measures by entrenched secularists who fear that further democratization will undermine their traditional control and the economic benefits they derived from state intervention in the economy.
¶4. (C) Opponents charge that AKP only pushed a reform agenda ANKARA 00000648 002 OF 004 as far as necessary to convince the EU to begin accession talks. Even then, AKP focused on those reforms needed to dilute the military's power rather than those that might interfere with the party's Islamic agenda. They note Erdogan's support for greater freedom to express Islamic practices (such as wearing the headscarf), and point to his failure to allow Alevis, Kurds, Armenian and Greek Orthodox communities similar freedoms. Suspicious that the accession process is just a cover for the AKP's anti-secular Islamic agenda, some in the military and opposition are reconsidering the merits of EU membership. AKP officials admit reform efforts have slowed, but explain that Turkey's bureaucracy needs time to absorb and implement significant changes, such as the complete overhaul of the Penal Code, Criminal Procedure Code and Punishments Law passed between 2002 and ¶2004. They also note that parliament passed in November 2006 much of another major reform package, including legislation relating to minority foundations and schools, military audits, military courts and political party funding. In some cases, parliament has had to re-approve the legislation to overcome President Sezer's veto.
Circumstantial Evidence
-----------------------
¶5. (C) Conspiracy theorists and concerned secularists alike build the case against AKP using persuasive but largely circumstantial evidence. Many claim that Erdogan has used AKP's parliamentary majority to weaken Turkey's secular educational, financial and judicial institutions. They warn that an AKP troika of president, PM and parliament speaker would control the appointments process, transforming Turkey's secular system into something approaching an Islamic republic. They point to AKP-sponsored changes in the strictly secular education system to allow graduates of religious high schools (imam hatip) to compete for limited university seats and qualify for government jobs. Previously, imam hatip, like other vocational school graduates, advanced to the clergy or other appropriate professions. In addition, opponents charge that AKP has undermined state regulation of private Koranic schools by lifting age limits and extending hours of attendance. As a result, the number of Koranic schools has increased significantly, with correspondingly less government oversight.
¶6. (C) Erdogan is also frequently accused of trying to infiltrate the higher education system with Islamist-minded professors and administrators. After some university rectors resisted AKP efforts to introduce more Islam into the curriculum, AKP opponents claimed the government began a harrassment campaign. Police arrested one obstinate rector in Van twice in 2006; both times he was reinstated by court decision. Legislation creating 15 new universities gave the government authority to appoint the new rectors, rather than the usual procedure of approvals by YOK and the president. The law, pushed through over President Sezer's veto, is viewed as an end-run to allow Erdogan to select 15 new rectors of his mindset. Parliament currently is considering a proposal to establish another 17 new universities.
Green Money Seeping In
----------------------
¶7. (C) While many acknowledge AKP economic successes, some doubters flag the alleged influx of "green" money from Islamic sources as proof of the real direction AKP is taking Turkey's economy. AKP opponents note that Islamist capital is hard to track and question whether it is ultimately tied to more Islamist policies. Increased investments from the UAE and a promised doubling of trade with Saudi Arabia after the Saudi King's unprecedented 2006 visit raised suspicions among some western-oriented investors. The overall trend of increased foreign investor inflows actually counters insinuations of an Islamist take-over of Turkey's financial sector, however. Investments from Islamic sources pale in comparison to total foreign inflows and do not seem to be of economic or political significance.
¶8. (C) Erdogan reputedly has manipulated the political appointments process to place Islamist bankers in key economic positions. Along with Finance Minister Kemal Unakitan - a former board member of one of Turkey's leading Islamic banks (al-Baraka) - Erdogan's appointment of seven other al-Baraka officials to key positions in Turkey's Savings Deposit Insurance Fund is cited as support for an ANKARA 00000648 003 OF 004 Islamist take-over theory. In 2006, the PM virtually paralyzed financial policy when he tried to appoint an Islamist as head of the Central Bank against President Sezer's firm opposition. (The compromise candidate has demonstrated independent decision-making since his appointment.) To round out the "damning" evidence, critics cite FM Gul's background as a specialist at the Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah from 1983 to 1991 and his reported objections to state scrutiny of Islamic enterprises.
Packing the Court
------------------
¶9. (C) Erdogan is also accused of staging a take-over of the judiciary. The AKP pushed through legislation to lower the mandatory retirement age for technocrats, opening the way for Erdogan to name almost 4,000 of 9,000 judges and prosecutors. In a stand-off with the judiciary, AKP has threatened to refuse to implement high court rulings against the government for obstructing AKP-sponsored legislation. Similar struggles between AKP and President Sezer have caused Sezer to veto over 3,000 AKP appointments and send over 100 AKP-backed laws to the Constitutional Court for review. But for Sezer, Erdogan would already be implementing his "secret" agenda, worried secularists claim. Economic reformers, including the IMF, for their part, would be only too happy to see an AKP-inspired change in the judiciary, which has consistently blocked forward-looking economic reforms.
¶10. (C) Erdogan rebutted the secularists' charges in 2006 by noting that the AKP hadn't been in power long enough to reshape the judiciary. Rigid bureaucratic controls on promotions and a 15-20 year career path for judges limit the influence of any particular government on the judiciary's orientation. But critics note that Justice Ministry budgetary control over the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors, which oversees assignments within the judiciary, gives the AKP indirect influence that can have a long-term impact. The president appoints five of the seven council members. The Justice Minister, however, heads the council and controls its funding, which could discourage council members from voting against the Minister's proposed appointees. The most recent charge is that the Minister, by not attending Supreme Council sessions, is preventing 29 judicial positions from being filled.
Small Changes
--------------
¶11. (C) AKP's strategy to infiltrate its Islamist agenda into Turkey's secular institutions extends to the municipal level and beyond, according to AKP opponents. The party contro four of Turkey's five largest cities (Ankara, Istanbul, Bursa and Konya). Measures by some AKP mayors to ban alcohol on municipal property, establish women-only parks or equip ferries with prayer rooms are seen as Islamic encroachments on the secular system. Erdogan and other party leaders explained the alcohol restrictions as consistent with the state's obligation to protect children from alcohol, drugs and gambling, rather than a religious proscription. Municipalities are authorized to ban the sale and consumption of alcohol on municipal property and near schools, religious sites and related locations. Of the 62 provincial capitals that have such a ban, 18 have non-AKP mayors. Of the 19 without alcohol bans, 14 have AKP mayors. As another often-cited example of small but telling changes, critics note that employees at the Health Ministry and state-owned Turkish Airlines reported being questioned about their religious beliefs and attitudes toward the Koran, an unprecedented practice.
Internal Balancing Act
----------------------
¶12. (C) Erdogan has performed a delicate balancing act to maintain unity within the AKP, despite the sometimes conflicting interests of its competing factions. Many party faithful are pious; keeping their allegiance is central to the AKP's hold on power but Erdogan has won them few tangible successes. He has not upheld earlier pledges to lift the ban on headscarves in public buildings, though his strong objections when the European Court of Human Rights upheld the ban in public schools resonated with the party's more devout members. AKP's more conservation faction was disappointed by the failed attempt to criminalize adultery in 2004. Erdogan's attempts to put loyalists into government jobs can also be viewed through the prism of rewarding the party ANKARA 00000648 004 OF 004 faithful.
The Jury Is Out
---------------
¶12. (C) Comment. To date, AKP critics can only muster circumstantial evidence of an AKP Islamist agenda. Opposition leaders, some media outlets, the military and extreme nationalists have used this to play up fears that an AKP triumvirate will allow Erdogan to make significant, perhaps irreversible, changes that would undermine Turkey's secular system. Using dramatic ad campaigns and threatening rhetoric, they warn that Turkey may soon have an Islamist president with a head-scarf wearing wife ready to take the country back to the pre-republic "dark ages". President Sezer, military leaders and the MGK chief have all warned Erdogan against unconstitutional moves that might change Turkey's secular identity. The secular establishment's concern that AKP poses a genuine threat to Turkey's secular system is undoubtedly heightened by the realization that AKP's reform agenda threatens the established elite's traditional, top-down control.
¶13. (C) Those not convinced of a nefarious AKP plan contend that more than four years in power have matured the party. Erdogan has had to moderate his message to balance factions within AKP and lessen tensions with secularists threatened by AKP reforms. Much of the party's success stems from its image as being less corrupt ("AK" in Turkish means "clean", a dubious claim for any party here) and more effective than the opposition. Its record to date describes a center-right, conservative party with Islamic roots that has modestly advanced Kemal Ataturk's core principles of westernization and modernization. Some of the changes tied to that process will inevitably transform the traditional power balance and strengthen civilian leaders. To keep the public's trust and minimize tension as Turkish society evolves, AKP, and Erdogan in particular, will need to continue to employ broad-reaching, moderate, balanced rhetoric. End Comment.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/
WILSON
WikiLeaks; TÜRKİYE İLE İLGİLİ ORİJİNAL BELGELER- 6
Reference ID Date Classification Origin
06ANKARA4688 2006-08-11 14:02 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXYZ0015
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHAK #4688/01 2231453
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111453Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7906
INFO RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 5386
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0316
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 1549
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3053
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 5290
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0075
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 1083
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITYC O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 004688
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2021
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY SPLIT - THE PM'S CIRCLE TO
THE FORE
Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney, reasons 1.4 (b), (d)
1.(C) The long-standing split between the professional MFA diplomats and the tight circle of advisers around PM Erdogan has widened noticeably in recent weeks. This gap has existed under Erdogan,s Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, largely because of the close links that both PM Erdogan and FM Gul have with PM adviser Davutoglu, who has been willing to undertake numerous initiatives. Until recently, however, such strains have usually been more effectively papered over. This internal debate now affects every step the GOT takes on the international stage.
2.(C) The Turkish diplomatic corps is highly educated and well attuned to what will sell in the U.S. or Europe; less so on the domestic political front. PM Erdogan,s core of AKP advisers, including Davutoglu and the AKP vice chairs, understand what will play well with their constituencies. Their sense of how policy will play outside of Ankara is handicapped, however, by their Turkey- and Islam-centric vision of how they want the world to operate.
¶3. (C/NF) Decoupling MFA from the PM,s advisers can produce a greater willingness to take chances. At the same time, it can also create greater room for misunderstandings or wrongfooted efforts. In the run-up to the February 2006 Hamas visit to Ankara, for example, MFA was kept in the dark. The AKPers who dealt with the visit did so in a haphazard and uncoordinated manner. MFA, uninformed, was unable to preview it with us. The backlash from the U.S. in particular truly took AKP aback. It took weeks -) even months -) before limited understanding dawned on the depth of the displeasure the Hamas venture had spawned, and why. It did not (and still does not) fit within their frame of reference.
¶4. (C/NF) Most startling, perhaps, to AKP were those in the U.S. and elsewhere who, in the aftermath of the Hamas visit, asked how AKP would feel if we met with PKK leaders. For Erdogan,s circle, it is not analogous: for them, terrorism equals the PKK. It is difficult for PM Erdogan to believe that his philanthropist Islamic friend Al Kadi could be involved in terrorist financing, just as it is alien to their frame of reference to view specific Islamic groups as terrorists. Hamas and Hizballah are the result of western policies gone awry, a response from desperate people )- not truly terrorists. Allow them to talk reason to these people, exert Turkish influence, and the Hamases of the world will change. This has been evident in other Turkish efforts throughout the region as well -- with Iran (FM Mottaki,s visit here; Erdogan,s talks with Ahmedinejad on the margins of international conferences); with Syria (the Turks believe they were instrumental in getting Syria,s Asad to agree to pull troops out of Lebanon, and to certain aspects of the Hariri investigation); with the current conflict in Lebanon and the Gaza strip.
5.(C/NF) A more recent example of the PM circle-MFA disconnect involved Davutoglu,s trip to Damascus the first week of July, where he met not only with Asad but Misha,al as well. The MFA was cut out and furious (their Ambassador to Damascus reportedly cooled his heels outside while Davutoglu met with Asad).
6.(C) As the Israel-Lebanon crisis intensified, so has this tendency within Erdogan,s small circle. AKP sees own its back to the public opinion wall. Instead of exercising leadership, Erdogan -- in populist pre-election mode -- has followed. He is playing to AKP,s constituency; to those within the party who have never been positively inclined toward Israel; and to the greater regional Sunni audience that he is trying to court. Two early results, aimed at these audiences, were (1) the PM,s participation in the August 3 extraordinary OIC executive council meetin in Kuala Lumpur, where he again met with Irnian president Ahmedinejad and uttered strong anti-Israeli statements; and (2) FM Gul,s August 3 op-ed piece in the Washington Post, which aired GOT ire in an unhelpful way and blindsided the professional Turkish diplomats in Washington.
7.(C/NF) Complicit or not (we believe the former), Gul has had his name sullied by a number of these efforts. He will have to decide whether to give the MFA renewed weight -) Foreign Ministry officials could be key in bridging certain delicate issues, particularly Cyprus, with both the government and the military, for example -) or go with the PM,s circle.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/
WILSON
06ANKARA4688 2006-08-11 14:02 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXYZ0015
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHAK #4688/01 2231453
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111453Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7906
INFO RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 5386
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0316
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 1549
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3053
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 5290
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0075
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 1083
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITYC O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 004688
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2021
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY SPLIT - THE PM'S CIRCLE TO
THE FORE
Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney, reasons 1.4 (b), (d)
1.(C) The long-standing split between the professional MFA diplomats and the tight circle of advisers around PM Erdogan has widened noticeably in recent weeks. This gap has existed under Erdogan,s Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, largely because of the close links that both PM Erdogan and FM Gul have with PM adviser Davutoglu, who has been willing to undertake numerous initiatives. Until recently, however, such strains have usually been more effectively papered over. This internal debate now affects every step the GOT takes on the international stage.
2.(C) The Turkish diplomatic corps is highly educated and well attuned to what will sell in the U.S. or Europe; less so on the domestic political front. PM Erdogan,s core of AKP advisers, including Davutoglu and the AKP vice chairs, understand what will play well with their constituencies. Their sense of how policy will play outside of Ankara is handicapped, however, by their Turkey- and Islam-centric vision of how they want the world to operate.
¶3. (C/NF) Decoupling MFA from the PM,s advisers can produce a greater willingness to take chances. At the same time, it can also create greater room for misunderstandings or wrongfooted efforts. In the run-up to the February 2006 Hamas visit to Ankara, for example, MFA was kept in the dark. The AKPers who dealt with the visit did so in a haphazard and uncoordinated manner. MFA, uninformed, was unable to preview it with us. The backlash from the U.S. in particular truly took AKP aback. It took weeks -) even months -) before limited understanding dawned on the depth of the displeasure the Hamas venture had spawned, and why. It did not (and still does not) fit within their frame of reference.
¶4. (C/NF) Most startling, perhaps, to AKP were those in the U.S. and elsewhere who, in the aftermath of the Hamas visit, asked how AKP would feel if we met with PKK leaders. For Erdogan,s circle, it is not analogous: for them, terrorism equals the PKK. It is difficult for PM Erdogan to believe that his philanthropist Islamic friend Al Kadi could be involved in terrorist financing, just as it is alien to their frame of reference to view specific Islamic groups as terrorists. Hamas and Hizballah are the result of western policies gone awry, a response from desperate people )- not truly terrorists. Allow them to talk reason to these people, exert Turkish influence, and the Hamases of the world will change. This has been evident in other Turkish efforts throughout the region as well -- with Iran (FM Mottaki,s visit here; Erdogan,s talks with Ahmedinejad on the margins of international conferences); with Syria (the Turks believe they were instrumental in getting Syria,s Asad to agree to pull troops out of Lebanon, and to certain aspects of the Hariri investigation); with the current conflict in Lebanon and the Gaza strip.
5.(C/NF) A more recent example of the PM circle-MFA disconnect involved Davutoglu,s trip to Damascus the first week of July, where he met not only with Asad but Misha,al as well. The MFA was cut out and furious (their Ambassador to Damascus reportedly cooled his heels outside while Davutoglu met with Asad).
6.(C) As the Israel-Lebanon crisis intensified, so has this tendency within Erdogan,s small circle. AKP sees own its back to the public opinion wall. Instead of exercising leadership, Erdogan -- in populist pre-election mode -- has followed. He is playing to AKP,s constituency; to those within the party who have never been positively inclined toward Israel; and to the greater regional Sunni audience that he is trying to court. Two early results, aimed at these audiences, were (1) the PM,s participation in the August 3 extraordinary OIC executive council meetin in Kuala Lumpur, where he again met with Irnian president Ahmedinejad and uttered strong anti-Israeli statements; and (2) FM Gul,s August 3 op-ed piece in the Washington Post, which aired GOT ire in an unhelpful way and blindsided the professional Turkish diplomats in Washington.
7.(C/NF) Complicit or not (we believe the former), Gul has had his name sullied by a number of these efforts. He will have to decide whether to give the MFA renewed weight -) Foreign Ministry officials could be key in bridging certain delicate issues, particularly Cyprus, with both the government and the military, for example -) or go with the PM,s circle.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/
WILSON
WikiLeaks; TÜRKİYE İLE İLGİLİ ORİJİNAL BELGELER- 5
Reference ID Date Classification Origin
05ANKARA7215 2005-12-08 15:03 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 007215
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2015
TAGS: ECON PGOV PINR TU POLITICAL PARTIES
SUBJECT: NO SPLITS IN TURKEY'S GOVERNING AKP PARLIAMENTARY
GROUP -- FOR NOW
REF: A. ANKARA 6543
¶B. ANKARA 6251
¶C. ANKARA 6337
Classified By: PolCouns Janice G. Weiner, E.O. 12958, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Despite media reports and opposition rumors of splits among PM Erdogan's Justice and Development Party's (AKP) 357 parliamentarians, the group remains intact )- for now. Among AKP MPs, there are distinctive pious, pragmatic and nationalist currents, with crosscutting personal loyalties. Recent events in Turkey's heavily-Kurdish southeast have heightened tensions between AKP,s Kurdish-origin MPs and the rest of the parliamentary group. While AKP MPs, numbers may slowly erode over the next year (ref A), a major split is unlikely as long as AKP -- and in particular PM Erdogan -- retain power and popularity. End Summary.
Despite Wishful Thinking, AKP Not Crumbling Yet
--------------------------------------------- --
¶2. (C) Over the past year, the Turkish press has repeatedly predicted open splits in the 357-member AKP parliamentary group. While AKP has ideological and personality-based fault lines, there appears to be little chance of a major split while AKP remains Turkey,s number one party and Erdogan the country,s most popular politician. Even Ankara AKP MP Ersonmez Yarbay, a maverick frequently openly critical of his own party, downplayed to us the rumors of party splits, saying they have been fueled by the opposition to force early elections.
AKP,s Ideological Currents
--------------------------
¶3. (C) AKP,s parliamentary group is composed of politicians with widely differing viewpoints. There are three main ideological currents: pious, nationalist and pragmatic. Most AKP MPs do not fall neatly into any one category, and personal loyalties crosscut ideology, mostly among pious MPs.
Pious
-----
¶4. (C) Almost all AKP MPs are religiously observant to some degree; for example, the vast majority fast during Ramadan. However, there is a large and distinctively more pious group of MPs, comprising former members of the banned Islamist Virtue (Fazilet) Party, former members of the National View Islamist youth group, and members of a wide range of (officially banned) Muslim brotherhoods. Most of AKP,s top leaders fall into this group: PM Erdogan, DPM/FM Abdullah Gul, parliament Speaker Arinc, Vice Speaker Alptekin (former PM and Islamic Saadet Party head Erbakan's right-hand man) and all five of AKP,s parliamentary whips. Pious MPs generally represent the central Anatolian heartland, speak no English, and have traveled little.
¶5. (C) While most Turkish Islamists oppose the EU, AKP,s Islamist MPs toe the AKP line and support it, albeit less enthusiastically since October 3. Typical of Turkish Islamists, they dislike Turkey,s military and have no ties to it other than their required military service. Attitudes about the U.S. vary widely, from friendly to suspicious, but most favor better ties with the Muslim world. Although the GOT, under Erdogan,s leadership, has taken a politically courageous public stand favoring privatization and foreign investment, many pious MPs oppose both.
¶6. (C) AKP,s pious MPs are widely rumored to be deeply unhappy about PM Erdogan,s inability to ease restrictions on the wearing of headscarves and on religious schools. However, since AKP came to power in November 2002, no AKP MP has resigned and gone over to the Happiness (Saadet) Party, on AKP's Islamist flank.
Nationalists
------------
¶7. (C) It is hard to find a Turk who is not nationalistic. Yet a significant number of AKP MPs (as many as 50, according to one former MP), many of them former members of the ultra-nationalist National Action Party (MHP) or center-right True Path Party (DYP), are strong nationalists, even by Turkish standards. This group includes Justice Minister and party spokesman Cemil Cicek, Deputy PM Abdullatif Sener, State Minister Kursad Tuzmen, and parliament Vice Speaker Sadik Yakut.
¶8. (C) Among AKP MPs, nationalists take the hardest line against &concessions8 to the EU and on Cyprus. MFA officials have told us on several occasions that the GOT is delaying bringing the Ankara Agreement extension protocol to parliament for ratification out of concern for the reaction of nationalist AKP MPs (ref B). Nationalist AKP MPs are deeply suspicious about the motives of Turkey,s ethnic Kurds and were vocal critics of PM Erdogan,s August declaration in Diyarbakir that Turkey has a &Kurdish problem.8 Like their pious colleagues, nationalists, attitudes about the U.S. vary widely, from friendly to suspicious. However, even pro-U.S. nationalists become extremely prickly at any perceived U.S. slight to Turkish national honor.
Pragmatists
-----------
¶9. (C) AKP,s pragmatic MPs generally speak English, are foreign-educated, and tend to be better-traveled than their colleagues. They often come from large cosmopolitan areas, particularly Ankara or Istanbul; some were previously members of the center-right Motherland Party (ANAP). Three of AKP,s five vice chairs, who frequently deal with foreigners, are from the pragmatic wing: Bulent Gedikli, Reha Denemec and Saban Disli. All are U.S-educated and represent either Istanbul or Ankara. The same is true for pragmatic Erdogan translator and foreign policy advisor Egemen Bagis, who accompanies the PM on his trips to Europe and the U.S.
¶10. (C) Although the pragmatic MPs are often AKP,s most visible face to foreigners, they have less influence inside AKP than their pious and nationalist colleagues. In early 2005, there were signs of frustration among AKP,s moderates, when a spate of AKP MP resignations went mostly to ANAP. Culture Minister Mumcu, AKP,s highest-profile resignation who went on become ANAP,s Chairman, said publicly he had only felt like a &guest8 in AKP (ref C).
¶11. (C) Erdogan can ill afford to lose the pragmatists. In addition to giving AKP a reasonable, big-tent image that plays well in the U.S. and Europe, AKP,s pragmatists are links to Istanbul and Ankara elites. These MPs are AKP,s friendliest face toward the U.S. (Bagis heads parliament,s Turkey/U.S Friendship Committee), and most receptive to liberal political and open market economic reforms needed for EU accession.
Crosscutting Personal Loyalties
-------------------------------
¶12. (C) AKP MPS are as divided by personality as by politics, but personality-based fault lines crosscut ideological ones. PM Erdogan is the glue that holds AKP together; a chunk of AKP MPs were part of Erdogan,s team when he was Istanbul mayor and have followed him onto the national stage. They include Finance Minister Unakitan, Transportation Minister Yildirim, State Minister Cubukcu, AKP whip Irfan Gunduz, and Erdogan speechwriter Huseyin Besli. All are personally pious or, in Cubukcu,s case, at least have consistently supported positions of the party,s pious wing. Cubukcu, a female, was one of the few MPs who publicly supported Erdogan,s 2004 proposal to re-criminalize adultery.
¶13. (C) Erdogan has consistently protected all three "Istanbul" Ministers despite repeated calls for their resignation. Many other AKP MPs profess staunch loyalty to &Tayyip Bey8 and seek to stay close to him. One contact suggests that Erdogan's strategy is to keep subordinates competing with each other for his attention so they are too busy to be a threat to him.
¶14. (C) DPM/FM Gul remains Erdogan,s chief political rival within AKP. Their differences are not ideological ) Gul and Erdogan are both pious ) but spring from Gul,s ambitions for greater power. Gul, who represents the parliamentary faction of the banned Virtue Party, has a small, quiet following among AK MPs that includes whip Salih Kapusuz (from Gul,s home town of Kayseri), former AKP public relations vice chair Murat Mercan (sacked for incompetence by Erdogan earlier this year) and Taner Yildiz (also from Kayseri).
¶15. (C) Parliament Speaker Arinc is AKP,s third leading personality and potential future rival to Erdogan. However, Arinc is well behind Gul in influence and, according to our contacts, currently without a significant group of MP loyalists.
AKP's Kurdish MPs
----------------
¶16. (C) About 60 AKP MPs, mostly from Turkey,s southeast, are of Kurdish origin; Political and Legal Affairs Vice Chair Dengir Mir Firat is AKP's most visible Kurdish MP. The Kurds who joined AKP and were elected to parliament tend to be pious, stressing the common bonds among all Muslims over Kurdish nationalism. (The strongest Kurdish nationalists ran from the pro-Kurdish Democratic People,s Party (DEHAP) in 2002 elections and failed to enter parliament because DEHAP did not cross the ten percent electoral threshold.) One former Kurdish-origin MP, himself pious, has consistently told us even he considers AKP,s Kurdish MPs extraordinarily passive on Kurdish issues.
¶17. (C) Yet recent events in the southeast, including AKP nationalists' reaction against PM Erdogan,s August &Kurdish problem8 speech in Diyarbakir and alleged Jandarma involvement in a November bombing in the southeastern town of Semdinli, have created tension between AKP,s Kurdish-origin MPs and the rest of the parliamentary group. An Ankara provincial AKP official told us recently that tension with AKP,s Kurdish-origin MPs has infected AKP's pious wing, weakening it relative to other AKP factions.
¶18. (C) Comment: AKP's parliamentary strength, so far, springs from Erdogan's ability to keep such a diverse group of MPs united, and the lack of any viable opposition. The question is whether Erdogan can continue to keep the parliamentary group together without turning AKP into an internally-undemocratic, personality-based party in the classic Turkish tradition. AKP,s opposition will eventually come from inside AKP itself. However, for now, Erodgan appears well in control and there is no viable political alternative for dissatisfied AKP MPs. End Comment.
WILSON
05ANKARA7215 2005-12-08 15:03 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 007215
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2015
TAGS: ECON PGOV PINR TU POLITICAL PARTIES
SUBJECT: NO SPLITS IN TURKEY'S GOVERNING AKP PARLIAMENTARY
GROUP -- FOR NOW
REF: A. ANKARA 6543
¶B. ANKARA 6251
¶C. ANKARA 6337
Classified By: PolCouns Janice G. Weiner, E.O. 12958, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Despite media reports and opposition rumors of splits among PM Erdogan's Justice and Development Party's (AKP) 357 parliamentarians, the group remains intact )- for now. Among AKP MPs, there are distinctive pious, pragmatic and nationalist currents, with crosscutting personal loyalties. Recent events in Turkey's heavily-Kurdish southeast have heightened tensions between AKP,s Kurdish-origin MPs and the rest of the parliamentary group. While AKP MPs, numbers may slowly erode over the next year (ref A), a major split is unlikely as long as AKP -- and in particular PM Erdogan -- retain power and popularity. End Summary.
Despite Wishful Thinking, AKP Not Crumbling Yet
--------------------------------------------- --
¶2. (C) Over the past year, the Turkish press has repeatedly predicted open splits in the 357-member AKP parliamentary group. While AKP has ideological and personality-based fault lines, there appears to be little chance of a major split while AKP remains Turkey,s number one party and Erdogan the country,s most popular politician. Even Ankara AKP MP Ersonmez Yarbay, a maverick frequently openly critical of his own party, downplayed to us the rumors of party splits, saying they have been fueled by the opposition to force early elections.
AKP,s Ideological Currents
--------------------------
¶3. (C) AKP,s parliamentary group is composed of politicians with widely differing viewpoints. There are three main ideological currents: pious, nationalist and pragmatic. Most AKP MPs do not fall neatly into any one category, and personal loyalties crosscut ideology, mostly among pious MPs.
Pious
-----
¶4. (C) Almost all AKP MPs are religiously observant to some degree; for example, the vast majority fast during Ramadan. However, there is a large and distinctively more pious group of MPs, comprising former members of the banned Islamist Virtue (Fazilet) Party, former members of the National View Islamist youth group, and members of a wide range of (officially banned) Muslim brotherhoods. Most of AKP,s top leaders fall into this group: PM Erdogan, DPM/FM Abdullah Gul, parliament Speaker Arinc, Vice Speaker Alptekin (former PM and Islamic Saadet Party head Erbakan's right-hand man) and all five of AKP,s parliamentary whips. Pious MPs generally represent the central Anatolian heartland, speak no English, and have traveled little.
¶5. (C) While most Turkish Islamists oppose the EU, AKP,s Islamist MPs toe the AKP line and support it, albeit less enthusiastically since October 3. Typical of Turkish Islamists, they dislike Turkey,s military and have no ties to it other than their required military service. Attitudes about the U.S. vary widely, from friendly to suspicious, but most favor better ties with the Muslim world. Although the GOT, under Erdogan,s leadership, has taken a politically courageous public stand favoring privatization and foreign investment, many pious MPs oppose both.
¶6. (C) AKP,s pious MPs are widely rumored to be deeply unhappy about PM Erdogan,s inability to ease restrictions on the wearing of headscarves and on religious schools. However, since AKP came to power in November 2002, no AKP MP has resigned and gone over to the Happiness (Saadet) Party, on AKP's Islamist flank.
Nationalists
------------
¶7. (C) It is hard to find a Turk who is not nationalistic. Yet a significant number of AKP MPs (as many as 50, according to one former MP), many of them former members of the ultra-nationalist National Action Party (MHP) or center-right True Path Party (DYP), are strong nationalists, even by Turkish standards. This group includes Justice Minister and party spokesman Cemil Cicek, Deputy PM Abdullatif Sener, State Minister Kursad Tuzmen, and parliament Vice Speaker Sadik Yakut.
¶8. (C) Among AKP MPs, nationalists take the hardest line against &concessions8 to the EU and on Cyprus. MFA officials have told us on several occasions that the GOT is delaying bringing the Ankara Agreement extension protocol to parliament for ratification out of concern for the reaction of nationalist AKP MPs (ref B). Nationalist AKP MPs are deeply suspicious about the motives of Turkey,s ethnic Kurds and were vocal critics of PM Erdogan,s August declaration in Diyarbakir that Turkey has a &Kurdish problem.8 Like their pious colleagues, nationalists, attitudes about the U.S. vary widely, from friendly to suspicious. However, even pro-U.S. nationalists become extremely prickly at any perceived U.S. slight to Turkish national honor.
Pragmatists
-----------
¶9. (C) AKP,s pragmatic MPs generally speak English, are foreign-educated, and tend to be better-traveled than their colleagues. They often come from large cosmopolitan areas, particularly Ankara or Istanbul; some were previously members of the center-right Motherland Party (ANAP). Three of AKP,s five vice chairs, who frequently deal with foreigners, are from the pragmatic wing: Bulent Gedikli, Reha Denemec and Saban Disli. All are U.S-educated and represent either Istanbul or Ankara. The same is true for pragmatic Erdogan translator and foreign policy advisor Egemen Bagis, who accompanies the PM on his trips to Europe and the U.S.
¶10. (C) Although the pragmatic MPs are often AKP,s most visible face to foreigners, they have less influence inside AKP than their pious and nationalist colleagues. In early 2005, there were signs of frustration among AKP,s moderates, when a spate of AKP MP resignations went mostly to ANAP. Culture Minister Mumcu, AKP,s highest-profile resignation who went on become ANAP,s Chairman, said publicly he had only felt like a &guest8 in AKP (ref C).
¶11. (C) Erdogan can ill afford to lose the pragmatists. In addition to giving AKP a reasonable, big-tent image that plays well in the U.S. and Europe, AKP,s pragmatists are links to Istanbul and Ankara elites. These MPs are AKP,s friendliest face toward the U.S. (Bagis heads parliament,s Turkey/U.S Friendship Committee), and most receptive to liberal political and open market economic reforms needed for EU accession.
Crosscutting Personal Loyalties
-------------------------------
¶12. (C) AKP MPS are as divided by personality as by politics, but personality-based fault lines crosscut ideological ones. PM Erdogan is the glue that holds AKP together; a chunk of AKP MPs were part of Erdogan,s team when he was Istanbul mayor and have followed him onto the national stage. They include Finance Minister Unakitan, Transportation Minister Yildirim, State Minister Cubukcu, AKP whip Irfan Gunduz, and Erdogan speechwriter Huseyin Besli. All are personally pious or, in Cubukcu,s case, at least have consistently supported positions of the party,s pious wing. Cubukcu, a female, was one of the few MPs who publicly supported Erdogan,s 2004 proposal to re-criminalize adultery.
¶13. (C) Erdogan has consistently protected all three "Istanbul" Ministers despite repeated calls for their resignation. Many other AKP MPs profess staunch loyalty to &Tayyip Bey8 and seek to stay close to him. One contact suggests that Erdogan's strategy is to keep subordinates competing with each other for his attention so they are too busy to be a threat to him.
¶14. (C) DPM/FM Gul remains Erdogan,s chief political rival within AKP. Their differences are not ideological ) Gul and Erdogan are both pious ) but spring from Gul,s ambitions for greater power. Gul, who represents the parliamentary faction of the banned Virtue Party, has a small, quiet following among AK MPs that includes whip Salih Kapusuz (from Gul,s home town of Kayseri), former AKP public relations vice chair Murat Mercan (sacked for incompetence by Erdogan earlier this year) and Taner Yildiz (also from Kayseri).
¶15. (C) Parliament Speaker Arinc is AKP,s third leading personality and potential future rival to Erdogan. However, Arinc is well behind Gul in influence and, according to our contacts, currently without a significant group of MP loyalists.
AKP's Kurdish MPs
----------------
¶16. (C) About 60 AKP MPs, mostly from Turkey,s southeast, are of Kurdish origin; Political and Legal Affairs Vice Chair Dengir Mir Firat is AKP's most visible Kurdish MP. The Kurds who joined AKP and were elected to parliament tend to be pious, stressing the common bonds among all Muslims over Kurdish nationalism. (The strongest Kurdish nationalists ran from the pro-Kurdish Democratic People,s Party (DEHAP) in 2002 elections and failed to enter parliament because DEHAP did not cross the ten percent electoral threshold.) One former Kurdish-origin MP, himself pious, has consistently told us even he considers AKP,s Kurdish MPs extraordinarily passive on Kurdish issues.
¶17. (C) Yet recent events in the southeast, including AKP nationalists' reaction against PM Erdogan,s August &Kurdish problem8 speech in Diyarbakir and alleged Jandarma involvement in a November bombing in the southeastern town of Semdinli, have created tension between AKP,s Kurdish-origin MPs and the rest of the parliamentary group. An Ankara provincial AKP official told us recently that tension with AKP,s Kurdish-origin MPs has infected AKP's pious wing, weakening it relative to other AKP factions.
¶18. (C) Comment: AKP's parliamentary strength, so far, springs from Erdogan's ability to keep such a diverse group of MPs united, and the lack of any viable opposition. The question is whether Erdogan can continue to keep the parliamentary group together without turning AKP into an internally-undemocratic, personality-based party in the classic Turkish tradition. AKP,s opposition will eventually come from inside AKP itself. However, for now, Erodgan appears well in control and there is no viable political alternative for dissatisfied AKP MPs. End Comment.
WILSON
WikiLeaks; TÜRKİYE İLE İLGİLİ ORİJİNAL BELGELER- 4
Reference ID Date Classification Origin
05ANKARA3199 2005-06-08 15:03 SECRET Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
081545Z Jun 05S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003199
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2025
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PHUM TU
SUBJECT: CABINET SHUFFLES AND THE LONG SQUEEZE: PM ERDOGAN
SETS HIS SIGHTS ON FONMIN GUL
(U) Classified by Polcounselor John Kunstadter; reasons: E.O. 12958 1.4 (b,d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Long rumored to be considering a cabinet re-shuffle, PM Erdogan has made his first move suddenly and in limited fashion. However, more ministers in a cabinet which is still dominated by people loyal to Erdogan's chief internal rival FonMin Gul may be in Erdogan's sights as he tries slowly but surely to whittle down Gul's influence. End summary.
¶2. (C) In a trademark sudden move, PM Erdogan announced the replacement of three ministers in a mini-Cabinet shuffle June 4. Cabinet changes have been an intense subject of debate and waiting-for-Godot expectation in ruling AKP since Erdogan inherited the Cabinet from his internal arch-rival Abdullah Gul, now FonMin, in March 2003. Yet despite the heavy Gul influence (until this shuffle Erdogan could depend on only four of 22 ministers for internal political support) and despite his overriding popular support, Erdogan long appeared intimidated from making any changes. When Minister of Culture and Tourism Erkan Mumcu resigned in Feb. 2005, Erdogan remained in thrall to Gul for the abortive choice of current State Minister Besir Atalay and eventual choice of Atilla Koc to replace Mumcu.
¶3. (C) Now Erdogan appears to have overcome his indecision, spurred in part by what Minister of Energy Hilmi Guler told a close contact of ours June 6 is Erdogan's realization of how much damage to his policies Gul and his circle are wreaking. Finally dismissed are three prominent incompetents: Minister of Agriculture Sami Guclu, a barrier to progress on issues of concern to the U.S. and a Gul ally; Minister of Public Works Zeki Ergezen, infamous for his scornful remarks about “infidels” (gavurlar), surrounded by rumors of corruption, unable to finish Erdogan's 15,000 kilometer divided highway project on time, an ally of Minister of the Interior Abdulkadir Aksu, and reportedly close to Gul; and State Minister for Women's Affairs Guldal Aksit, daughter of Galip Demirel, a prominent follower of controversial Islamist sage Fethullah Gulen and a close associate of Aksu.
¶4. (U) Erdogan appointed as Minister of Agriculture Mehmet Mehdi 1), a Diyarbakir MP from a prominent local family with high status in the Naksibendi brotherhood. Born in Bismil (Diyarbakir province) 1956; graduate of Ankara U. veterinary faculty, MA in agricultural economics from Aberdeen U, PhD from Ankara U.'s health sciences institute. Veterinarian. Worked in upper-mid-level positions in the Agriculture Ministry and as director of veterinary affairs in the Greater Istanbul Municipality when Erdogan was mayor. Married, three children. Speaks English, but we haven't yet tested his level.
¶5. (C) An AKP xxxxx and two other long-term Embassy contacts with deep relations in AKP describe Eker as a decent but passive man, close to Erdogan. These contacts and Minister of Energy have described in detail how Eker was deeply involved in a plan to remove former Minister Guclu by concealing from him a Russian government note threatening six months ago to suspend imports of Turkish fruits and vegetables for phytosanitary reasons; the ban recently went into effect with Guclu looking ineffectual and uninformed. Embassy Ag Counselor's contacts note that Eker is unlikely to be able to override the Ministry's entrenched, protectionist bureaucracy.
¶6. (U) The new Minister of Public Works is Trabzon MP Faruk Nafiz 2) (umlaut over the O). Born Trabzon 1946. Civil engineering degree from Karadeniz technical University in Trabzon. Senior civil engineer. Former captain of premier league Trabzonspor football team. Chairman of the board of YAPISUN construction company. Chairman of the board of Trabzonspor. A founder of the Trabzon development Foundation. Married, two children. Reportedly speaks English.
¶7. (C) A fellow Trabzon contractor and Trabzonspor board member describes Ozak as coming from the Sufi (mystical) line of the Milli Gorus Islamist movement; he is a quiet, reserved, obedient Erdogan man. As part of Erdogan's strategy to use sports to maintain AKP's grassroots support, and in the wake of AKP's defeat in the Trabzon mayoral race in March 2004, the Istanbul-Black Sea axis which forms Erdogan's Istanbul power base reportedly subsequently succeeded in having Ozak appointed Trabzonspor chairman of the board. At the same time Erdogan reportedly agreed to transfer several million dollars from one of the Prime Ministry's hidden reserves to permit Trabzonspor under Ozak to purchase better players. Our contacts expect Ozak to be relatively more upright than Ergezen was (not a high bar).
¶8. (U) Istanbul Second District MP Nimet 3) is the new State Minister for Women's Affairs. Born Ayranci (Ankara) 1965. Grew up in relatively well-to-do circumstances with a family summer home on Heybeliada, one of the Princes' Islands off Istanbul. Law degree from Istanbul U. law faculty. Worked as an independent attorney, most recently representing the Islamist businessmen's association MUSIAD. A founding member of AKP. Married, one child.
¶9. (C) Cubukcu is focused, highly ambitious, and months ago made clear to us she sought the state minister position. She has ensured that she stays close to Erdogan's wife Emine, which appears to have been a major factor in her selection, according to what party deputy chairman Saban Disli told us June 7. Her businesslike approach and relative openness in private about problems in AKP brought her to our attention early in AKP's tenure; she participated in Embassy's NATO tour for MPs in Feb. 2004 and in the NDI-sponsored democracy commission trip to Washington in Spring 2005. Responding to the bitter complaints of many women from AKP's grassroots in the northeast Black Sea region who have seen their husbands take Russian and other Black Sea-littoral women as second wives, Cubukcu vigorously argued for criminalization of adultery during a controversy over adultery in autumn 2004. On the other hand, although she talks about her son, she rarely mentions her husband and there are persistent questions among some observers of AKP about her attitude toward her own marriage.
¶10. (C) With the dismissal of Guclu and these appointments Erdogan has shown more clearly that he intends to whittle down Gul's influence. By dismissing Aksit and Ergezen and appointing Eker, whose family status in Diyarbakir makes him a powerful rival to Interior Minister Aksu, Erdogan has also drawn the noose around Aksu. Aksu has most recently served Erdogan's purposes by dismissing Hanefi Avci, an leading Gulenist who as National Police (TNP) department head for organized crime was starting to push corruption investigations that were leading to the heart of AKP. However, Erdogan has long been troubled by Aksu, whom he suspects of being ready to bolt from AKP with a number of disgruntled MPs. Aksu's Kurdish favoritism, reported ties to the heroin trade, well-known predilection for teenage girls, and his son's open Mafia links make him a weak link in the Cabinet, one Erdogan knows the core institutions of the Turkish State could exploit at any time.
¶11. (C) Contacts such as Prime Ministry advisor xxxxx who has provided a wealth of accurate insights into AKP, foresee a high possibility that Erdogan will continue to shuffle his cabinet in stages. In addition to Aksu, those who appear to be most in his sights are Minister of Labor Murat Basesgioglu, a former ANAPer who has a poor record of responding to AKP MPs' queries and requests; Minister of Trade and Industry Ali Coskun, who appears to be deeply implicated in a major corruption scandal at the Turkish Standards Institute (TSE) – involving payoffs of $500 million for certifications, according to the TSE director's statement in the June 7 press; and State Minister for Foreign Trade Kursad Tuzmen, a former (ultra-nationalist) MHPer who was implicated in the Iraq oil for food payoffs and is described by multiple contacts as open to every type of kickback.
¶12. (C) Erdogan may also be aiming over time to remove Gul's close associate State Minister Atalay and Minister of Justice and government spokesman Cemil Cicek, who has not bothered to hide his prime ministerial and presidential ambitions and his disrespect for Erdogan. MOORE
05ANKARA3199 2005-06-08 15:03 SECRET Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
081545Z Jun 05S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003199
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2025
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PHUM TU
SUBJECT: CABINET SHUFFLES AND THE LONG SQUEEZE: PM ERDOGAN
SETS HIS SIGHTS ON FONMIN GUL
(U) Classified by Polcounselor John Kunstadter; reasons: E.O. 12958 1.4 (b,d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Long rumored to be considering a cabinet re-shuffle, PM Erdogan has made his first move suddenly and in limited fashion. However, more ministers in a cabinet which is still dominated by people loyal to Erdogan's chief internal rival FonMin Gul may be in Erdogan's sights as he tries slowly but surely to whittle down Gul's influence. End summary.
¶2. (C) In a trademark sudden move, PM Erdogan announced the replacement of three ministers in a mini-Cabinet shuffle June 4. Cabinet changes have been an intense subject of debate and waiting-for-Godot expectation in ruling AKP since Erdogan inherited the Cabinet from his internal arch-rival Abdullah Gul, now FonMin, in March 2003. Yet despite the heavy Gul influence (until this shuffle Erdogan could depend on only four of 22 ministers for internal political support) and despite his overriding popular support, Erdogan long appeared intimidated from making any changes. When Minister of Culture and Tourism Erkan Mumcu resigned in Feb. 2005, Erdogan remained in thrall to Gul for the abortive choice of current State Minister Besir Atalay and eventual choice of Atilla Koc to replace Mumcu.
¶3. (C) Now Erdogan appears to have overcome his indecision, spurred in part by what Minister of Energy Hilmi Guler told a close contact of ours June 6 is Erdogan's realization of how much damage to his policies Gul and his circle are wreaking. Finally dismissed are three prominent incompetents: Minister of Agriculture Sami Guclu, a barrier to progress on issues of concern to the U.S. and a Gul ally; Minister of Public Works Zeki Ergezen, infamous for his scornful remarks about “infidels” (gavurlar), surrounded by rumors of corruption, unable to finish Erdogan's 15,000 kilometer divided highway project on time, an ally of Minister of the Interior Abdulkadir Aksu, and reportedly close to Gul; and State Minister for Women's Affairs Guldal Aksit, daughter of Galip Demirel, a prominent follower of controversial Islamist sage Fethullah Gulen and a close associate of Aksu.
¶4. (U) Erdogan appointed as Minister of Agriculture Mehmet Mehdi 1), a Diyarbakir MP from a prominent local family with high status in the Naksibendi brotherhood. Born in Bismil (Diyarbakir province) 1956; graduate of Ankara U. veterinary faculty, MA in agricultural economics from Aberdeen U, PhD from Ankara U.'s health sciences institute. Veterinarian. Worked in upper-mid-level positions in the Agriculture Ministry and as director of veterinary affairs in the Greater Istanbul Municipality when Erdogan was mayor. Married, three children. Speaks English, but we haven't yet tested his level.
¶5. (C) An AKP xxxxx and two other long-term Embassy contacts with deep relations in AKP describe Eker as a decent but passive man, close to Erdogan. These contacts and Minister of Energy have described in detail how Eker was deeply involved in a plan to remove former Minister Guclu by concealing from him a Russian government note threatening six months ago to suspend imports of Turkish fruits and vegetables for phytosanitary reasons; the ban recently went into effect with Guclu looking ineffectual and uninformed. Embassy Ag Counselor's contacts note that Eker is unlikely to be able to override the Ministry's entrenched, protectionist bureaucracy.
¶6. (U) The new Minister of Public Works is Trabzon MP Faruk Nafiz 2) (umlaut over the O). Born Trabzon 1946. Civil engineering degree from Karadeniz technical University in Trabzon. Senior civil engineer. Former captain of premier league Trabzonspor football team. Chairman of the board of YAPISUN construction company. Chairman of the board of Trabzonspor. A founder of the Trabzon development Foundation. Married, two children. Reportedly speaks English.
¶7. (C) A fellow Trabzon contractor and Trabzonspor board member describes Ozak as coming from the Sufi (mystical) line of the Milli Gorus Islamist movement; he is a quiet, reserved, obedient Erdogan man. As part of Erdogan's strategy to use sports to maintain AKP's grassroots support, and in the wake of AKP's defeat in the Trabzon mayoral race in March 2004, the Istanbul-Black Sea axis which forms Erdogan's Istanbul power base reportedly subsequently succeeded in having Ozak appointed Trabzonspor chairman of the board. At the same time Erdogan reportedly agreed to transfer several million dollars from one of the Prime Ministry's hidden reserves to permit Trabzonspor under Ozak to purchase better players. Our contacts expect Ozak to be relatively more upright than Ergezen was (not a high bar).
¶8. (U) Istanbul Second District MP Nimet 3) is the new State Minister for Women's Affairs. Born Ayranci (Ankara) 1965. Grew up in relatively well-to-do circumstances with a family summer home on Heybeliada, one of the Princes' Islands off Istanbul. Law degree from Istanbul U. law faculty. Worked as an independent attorney, most recently representing the Islamist businessmen's association MUSIAD. A founding member of AKP. Married, one child.
¶9. (C) Cubukcu is focused, highly ambitious, and months ago made clear to us she sought the state minister position. She has ensured that she stays close to Erdogan's wife Emine, which appears to have been a major factor in her selection, according to what party deputy chairman Saban Disli told us June 7. Her businesslike approach and relative openness in private about problems in AKP brought her to our attention early in AKP's tenure; she participated in Embassy's NATO tour for MPs in Feb. 2004 and in the NDI-sponsored democracy commission trip to Washington in Spring 2005. Responding to the bitter complaints of many women from AKP's grassroots in the northeast Black Sea region who have seen their husbands take Russian and other Black Sea-littoral women as second wives, Cubukcu vigorously argued for criminalization of adultery during a controversy over adultery in autumn 2004. On the other hand, although she talks about her son, she rarely mentions her husband and there are persistent questions among some observers of AKP about her attitude toward her own marriage.
¶10. (C) With the dismissal of Guclu and these appointments Erdogan has shown more clearly that he intends to whittle down Gul's influence. By dismissing Aksit and Ergezen and appointing Eker, whose family status in Diyarbakir makes him a powerful rival to Interior Minister Aksu, Erdogan has also drawn the noose around Aksu. Aksu has most recently served Erdogan's purposes by dismissing Hanefi Avci, an leading Gulenist who as National Police (TNP) department head for organized crime was starting to push corruption investigations that were leading to the heart of AKP. However, Erdogan has long been troubled by Aksu, whom he suspects of being ready to bolt from AKP with a number of disgruntled MPs. Aksu's Kurdish favoritism, reported ties to the heroin trade, well-known predilection for teenage girls, and his son's open Mafia links make him a weak link in the Cabinet, one Erdogan knows the core institutions of the Turkish State could exploit at any time.
¶11. (C) Contacts such as Prime Ministry advisor xxxxx who has provided a wealth of accurate insights into AKP, foresee a high possibility that Erdogan will continue to shuffle his cabinet in stages. In addition to Aksu, those who appear to be most in his sights are Minister of Labor Murat Basesgioglu, a former ANAPer who has a poor record of responding to AKP MPs' queries and requests; Minister of Trade and Industry Ali Coskun, who appears to be deeply implicated in a major corruption scandal at the Turkish Standards Institute (TSE) – involving payoffs of $500 million for certifications, according to the TSE director's statement in the June 7 press; and State Minister for Foreign Trade Kursad Tuzmen, a former (ultra-nationalist) MHPer who was implicated in the Iraq oil for food payoffs and is described by multiple contacts as open to every type of kickback.
¶12. (C) Erdogan may also be aiming over time to remove Gul's close associate State Minister Atalay and Minister of Justice and government spokesman Cemil Cicek, who has not bothered to hide his prime ministerial and presidential ambitions and his disrespect for Erdogan. MOORE
WikiLeaks; TÜRKİYE İLE İLGİLİ ORİJİNAL BELGELER- 3
Reference ID Date Classification Origin
05ANKARA1730 2005-03-25 09:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001730
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS MARR TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY ADRIFT
REF: A. ANKARA 1074
¶B. ANKARA 1231
¶C. ANKARA 1275
¶D. ANKARA 1511
¶E. ANKARA 1342
¶F. ANKARA 944
¶G. ANKARA 1102
(U) Classified by CDA Robert Deutsch; E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Turkey is stuck in a domestic and foreign policy drift stemming from leadership and structural problems in ruling AKP. A long-overdue healthy debate over Turkey's identity and AKP, including its handling of relations with the U.S., has started. But AKP's policy muddle is leaving a vacuum that resurgent nationalism is seeking to fill. This period of drift could be extended, making EU reforms and bilateral cooperation more difficult. The drift may well continue until the next crisis creates new political alternatives in a day of reckoning. End Summary.
AKP Government Adrift
-----------------------
¶2. (C) As the AKP government confronts the arduous task of EU harmonization, it is manifestly adrift on domestic political and economic reform. Implementation of reform legislation passed in 2003-2004 is seriously deficient (refs A and B). The AKP government has a poor working relationship with the military, the Presidency and the largely-secular state bureaucracy. It is failing to control corruption in the AK party. It has been slow to introduce the banking, tax administration and social security legislation required by the IMF as a pre-condition for a new stand-by program. It is neglecting relations with the EU. Erdogan has delayed appointing a chief negotiator for EU accession negotiations; both Erdogan and FM Gul have made statements which have disturbed EU officials and politicians. Erdogan has still not decided on a much-anticipated cabinet reshuffle.
¶3. (C) AK party officials publicly deny the government's obvious drift and we see no sign it has yet begun to undermine Erdogan's voter base. AKP's ability to get back on track is compromised by its Islamist/neo-Ottoman reflexes and single-party-state spoils system. We doubt this government will be able to refocus or move our bilateral relationship – which remains strong in some areas – back to a more strategic level.
¶4. (C) PM Erdogan is isolated. He has lost touch with his Cabinet and parliamentary group. We hear MPs and Ministers alike, xxxxx who is close to Erdogan, complain they no longer have comfortable access, or feel obliged to kowtow for fear of incurring Erdogan's wrath. Business associations, strong advocates of AKP economic policies, tell us they feel they have lost the PM's ear. Erdogan has cut himself off from his closest spiritual advisors in the Iskender Pasa Naksibendi brotherhood in which he grew up, as we have heard directly from xxxxx.
¶5. (C) According to a broad range of our contacts, Erdogan reads minimally, mainly the Islamist-leaning press. According to others with broad and deep contacts throughout the establishment, Erdogan refuses to draw on the analyses of the MFA, and the military and National Intelligence Organization have cut him off from their reports. He never had a realistic world view, but one key touchstone is a fear of being outmaneuvered on the Islamist side by “Hoca” Erbakan's Saadet Party. Instead, he relies on his charisma, instincts, and the filterings of advisors who pull conspiracy theories off the Web or are lost in neo-Ottoman Islamist fantasies, e.g., Islamist foreign policy advisor and Gul ally Ahmet Davutoglu.
¶6. (C) Inside the AKP, the more ideological Deputy PM/FonMin Gul continues behind-the-scenes machinations, especially during Erdogan's foreign junkets. Gul seems to be trying to undermine Erdogan and take on more party control. He may hope to reclaim the Prime Ministership, which he was forced to cede to Erdogan four months after AKP acceded to power. With his relatively good English, Gul works to project an image of being “moderate”, or “modern”. In fact, Gul's peers say he has a far more ideologized anti-Western worldview than Erdogan. Gul, reflecting his pragmatic streak, has made some constructive statements on bilateral relations and on Turkey's Iraq policy since the Iraqi elections. However, we understand that Gul and a group of like-minded MPs and journalists continue to see fomenting anti-American attitudes as one way to get at Erdogan while also being moved by emotions of Islamic/Sunni solidarity.
¶7. (C) AKP's disarray has generated significant internal unease from those who support Erdogan, but also from some of the other tendencies forming AK. xxxxx that Erdogan does not know how to proceed, either on domestic policy or on rebuilding relations with the U.S. xxxxx, a bellwether of Islamist sentiment, has told two of our insider contacts that he is about to resign in disgust at the party's rampant corruption. xxxxx one of Erdogan's closest business and brotherhood friends and advisors from Istanbul, says he sees no future for this government and thinks it is time for a more flexible and open leader. Leading member xxxxx has expressed to us the Gulenists' sense that Erdogan cannot hack it. Long Overdue Healthy Debate
-----------------------------
¶8. (C) The ferment is not all bad. It is beginning to force some to question the real roots of inertia and stasis in a Turkey that needs to accelerate its transition. We are encouraged by the determination of some to open a long-overdue, healthy debate on AKP and its handling of Turkey's relations with the U.S. Secretary Rice's February 6 visit and subsequent U.S. media coverage helped ignite the debate. Another catalyst was Deputy CHOD Basbug's January 26 press briefing, in which he coolly analyzed Turkish concerns about Iraq and repeatedly emphasized that one cannot reduce broad and comprehensive U.S.-Turkish relations to a single issue. It was not until late February, that Erdogan – albeit without conviction in his voice – expressed anything similar to Basbug's assessment of the importance of bilateral relations.
¶9. (C) The debate has now produced some sustained trenchant criticism of AKP's domestic and foreign policies from several insightful mainstream commentators. However, mainstream commentators are seen as too “pro-American” to be persuasive among AKP or its supporters. Perhaps more important have been the decisions of some pro-AKP Islamist columnists to write unusually blunt warnings that the AKP government must pull itself together or risk a fall. The Parliamentary opposition has continued its anti-American 60's leftist rhetoric as it winds its merry way to irrelevance.
Resurgent Nationalism
----------------------
¶10. (C) There is a more disturbing consequence of AKP's weakness: resurgent nationalism. Two of the hottest selling books in Turkey are “Metal Storm”, a conspiracy novel that feeds the worst instincts of Turks with its tale of a U.S. invasion of Turkey followed by Turkish nuclear counter-strike with the help of the Russians; and “Mein Kampf” (ref C). Under instructions from the Directorate of Religious Affairs, imams across Turkey delivered a March 11 sermon against Christian missionaries (ref D), claiming they aim to “steal the beliefs of our young people and children.” We are receiving increased reports of anti-Christian activity in different regions of Turkey (e.g., ref E). The Central Bank Governor told us that nationalist/isolationist forces are behind the problems with the IMF (ref F). An attempt to burn the Turkish flag during a Newroz celebration in Mersin has drawn strong nationalistic statements from across the spectrum, including a statement from the General Staff that “the Turkish nation and the Turkish armed forces are ready to sacrifice their blood to protect their country and their flag.” The decision to memorialize, after a 47-year hiatus, the killing by British forces of several Ottoman soldiers during the Allies' W.W.I occupation of Istanbul also bespeaks the national mood.
¶11. (U) The Turkish media have given prominent coverage to what appears to be a growth in street crime and to a parallel refusal of the police, angry at limitations on their operational abilities under the new EU-inspired criminal code, to patrol aggressively. In a March 18 column, Ertugrul Ozkok, managing editor of Turkey's leading newspaper “Hurriyet” and one of the most authoritative press voices of the Establishment, noted that the Turkish public is deeply disturbed by what it perceives as a breakdown of law and order. Ozkok, in what would appear to be an overstatement, closed with a warning to Erdogan that, when democratic forces cannot ensure safety in the streets (sic), then the public and political space is left to other forces. In a March 4 column, Umit Ozdag, now in the running for chairmanship of the right-wing nationalist MHP, cited increased crime as one reason for the current popularity of “Mein Kampf.”
¶12. (C) Resurgent nationalist feelings probably also played a role in the press and government reactions to comments from EU Ambassador Kretschmer about the government's loss of momentum and EU accession, to the EU Troika's worry about the police violence against a March 6 Istanbul demonstration, and the press feeding frenzy over Ambassador Edelman's innocent remarks on Syria.
Comment
------
¶13. (C) Having reached one of its primary goals – a date to begin EU accession negotiations – Erdogan's AKP government is out of ideas and energy. For now, EU- and IMF-required reforms will face tougher opposition from re-energized nationalists, the government will be tempted to delay difficult decisions in any realm, and resistance to change will be the default mode. Bilateral cooperation will be more difficult, more vulnerable to characterization as unreasonable U.S. “demands” that infringe upon Turkish “sovereignty.”
¶14. (C) This period of drift could last a long time. AKP's Parliamentary majority is eroding, but only slowly (ref G). Despite the unhappiness inside AKP, there is currently no political alternative and there are risks to anyone who actually forces a split. Erdogan still has a “nuclear” option in hand – early elections. The danger is that tough decisions and the settling out of the political system will be put off until a real new crisis emerges which will either energize the AKP or bring new political alternatives. Waiting bears a real cost, since Turkey needs to be more nimble in pursuing the political, economic, social and foreign policy agendas many Turks, the EU and the U.S., have been supporting, than this type of static drift will permit.
DEUTSCH
05ANKARA1730 2005-03-25 09:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001730
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS MARR TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY ADRIFT
REF: A. ANKARA 1074
¶B. ANKARA 1231
¶C. ANKARA 1275
¶D. ANKARA 1511
¶E. ANKARA 1342
¶F. ANKARA 944
¶G. ANKARA 1102
(U) Classified by CDA Robert Deutsch; E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Turkey is stuck in a domestic and foreign policy drift stemming from leadership and structural problems in ruling AKP. A long-overdue healthy debate over Turkey's identity and AKP, including its handling of relations with the U.S., has started. But AKP's policy muddle is leaving a vacuum that resurgent nationalism is seeking to fill. This period of drift could be extended, making EU reforms and bilateral cooperation more difficult. The drift may well continue until the next crisis creates new political alternatives in a day of reckoning. End Summary.
AKP Government Adrift
-----------------------
¶2. (C) As the AKP government confronts the arduous task of EU harmonization, it is manifestly adrift on domestic political and economic reform. Implementation of reform legislation passed in 2003-2004 is seriously deficient (refs A and B). The AKP government has a poor working relationship with the military, the Presidency and the largely-secular state bureaucracy. It is failing to control corruption in the AK party. It has been slow to introduce the banking, tax administration and social security legislation required by the IMF as a pre-condition for a new stand-by program. It is neglecting relations with the EU. Erdogan has delayed appointing a chief negotiator for EU accession negotiations; both Erdogan and FM Gul have made statements which have disturbed EU officials and politicians. Erdogan has still not decided on a much-anticipated cabinet reshuffle.
¶3. (C) AK party officials publicly deny the government's obvious drift and we see no sign it has yet begun to undermine Erdogan's voter base. AKP's ability to get back on track is compromised by its Islamist/neo-Ottoman reflexes and single-party-state spoils system. We doubt this government will be able to refocus or move our bilateral relationship – which remains strong in some areas – back to a more strategic level.
¶4. (C) PM Erdogan is isolated. He has lost touch with his Cabinet and parliamentary group. We hear MPs and Ministers alike, xxxxx who is close to Erdogan, complain they no longer have comfortable access, or feel obliged to kowtow for fear of incurring Erdogan's wrath. Business associations, strong advocates of AKP economic policies, tell us they feel they have lost the PM's ear. Erdogan has cut himself off from his closest spiritual advisors in the Iskender Pasa Naksibendi brotherhood in which he grew up, as we have heard directly from xxxxx.
¶5. (C) According to a broad range of our contacts, Erdogan reads minimally, mainly the Islamist-leaning press. According to others with broad and deep contacts throughout the establishment, Erdogan refuses to draw on the analyses of the MFA, and the military and National Intelligence Organization have cut him off from their reports. He never had a realistic world view, but one key touchstone is a fear of being outmaneuvered on the Islamist side by “Hoca” Erbakan's Saadet Party. Instead, he relies on his charisma, instincts, and the filterings of advisors who pull conspiracy theories off the Web or are lost in neo-Ottoman Islamist fantasies, e.g., Islamist foreign policy advisor and Gul ally Ahmet Davutoglu.
¶6. (C) Inside the AKP, the more ideological Deputy PM/FonMin Gul continues behind-the-scenes machinations, especially during Erdogan's foreign junkets. Gul seems to be trying to undermine Erdogan and take on more party control. He may hope to reclaim the Prime Ministership, which he was forced to cede to Erdogan four months after AKP acceded to power. With his relatively good English, Gul works to project an image of being “moderate”, or “modern”. In fact, Gul's peers say he has a far more ideologized anti-Western worldview than Erdogan. Gul, reflecting his pragmatic streak, has made some constructive statements on bilateral relations and on Turkey's Iraq policy since the Iraqi elections. However, we understand that Gul and a group of like-minded MPs and journalists continue to see fomenting anti-American attitudes as one way to get at Erdogan while also being moved by emotions of Islamic/Sunni solidarity.
¶7. (C) AKP's disarray has generated significant internal unease from those who support Erdogan, but also from some of the other tendencies forming AK. xxxxx that Erdogan does not know how to proceed, either on domestic policy or on rebuilding relations with the U.S. xxxxx, a bellwether of Islamist sentiment, has told two of our insider contacts that he is about to resign in disgust at the party's rampant corruption. xxxxx one of Erdogan's closest business and brotherhood friends and advisors from Istanbul, says he sees no future for this government and thinks it is time for a more flexible and open leader. Leading member xxxxx has expressed to us the Gulenists' sense that Erdogan cannot hack it. Long Overdue Healthy Debate
-----------------------------
¶8. (C) The ferment is not all bad. It is beginning to force some to question the real roots of inertia and stasis in a Turkey that needs to accelerate its transition. We are encouraged by the determination of some to open a long-overdue, healthy debate on AKP and its handling of Turkey's relations with the U.S. Secretary Rice's February 6 visit and subsequent U.S. media coverage helped ignite the debate. Another catalyst was Deputy CHOD Basbug's January 26 press briefing, in which he coolly analyzed Turkish concerns about Iraq and repeatedly emphasized that one cannot reduce broad and comprehensive U.S.-Turkish relations to a single issue. It was not until late February, that Erdogan – albeit without conviction in his voice – expressed anything similar to Basbug's assessment of the importance of bilateral relations.
¶9. (C) The debate has now produced some sustained trenchant criticism of AKP's domestic and foreign policies from several insightful mainstream commentators. However, mainstream commentators are seen as too “pro-American” to be persuasive among AKP or its supporters. Perhaps more important have been the decisions of some pro-AKP Islamist columnists to write unusually blunt warnings that the AKP government must pull itself together or risk a fall. The Parliamentary opposition has continued its anti-American 60's leftist rhetoric as it winds its merry way to irrelevance.
Resurgent Nationalism
----------------------
¶10. (C) There is a more disturbing consequence of AKP's weakness: resurgent nationalism. Two of the hottest selling books in Turkey are “Metal Storm”, a conspiracy novel that feeds the worst instincts of Turks with its tale of a U.S. invasion of Turkey followed by Turkish nuclear counter-strike with the help of the Russians; and “Mein Kampf” (ref C). Under instructions from the Directorate of Religious Affairs, imams across Turkey delivered a March 11 sermon against Christian missionaries (ref D), claiming they aim to “steal the beliefs of our young people and children.” We are receiving increased reports of anti-Christian activity in different regions of Turkey (e.g., ref E). The Central Bank Governor told us that nationalist/isolationist forces are behind the problems with the IMF (ref F). An attempt to burn the Turkish flag during a Newroz celebration in Mersin has drawn strong nationalistic statements from across the spectrum, including a statement from the General Staff that “the Turkish nation and the Turkish armed forces are ready to sacrifice their blood to protect their country and their flag.” The decision to memorialize, after a 47-year hiatus, the killing by British forces of several Ottoman soldiers during the Allies' W.W.I occupation of Istanbul also bespeaks the national mood.
¶11. (U) The Turkish media have given prominent coverage to what appears to be a growth in street crime and to a parallel refusal of the police, angry at limitations on their operational abilities under the new EU-inspired criminal code, to patrol aggressively. In a March 18 column, Ertugrul Ozkok, managing editor of Turkey's leading newspaper “Hurriyet” and one of the most authoritative press voices of the Establishment, noted that the Turkish public is deeply disturbed by what it perceives as a breakdown of law and order. Ozkok, in what would appear to be an overstatement, closed with a warning to Erdogan that, when democratic forces cannot ensure safety in the streets (sic), then the public and political space is left to other forces. In a March 4 column, Umit Ozdag, now in the running for chairmanship of the right-wing nationalist MHP, cited increased crime as one reason for the current popularity of “Mein Kampf.”
¶12. (C) Resurgent nationalist feelings probably also played a role in the press and government reactions to comments from EU Ambassador Kretschmer about the government's loss of momentum and EU accession, to the EU Troika's worry about the police violence against a March 6 Istanbul demonstration, and the press feeding frenzy over Ambassador Edelman's innocent remarks on Syria.
Comment
------
¶13. (C) Having reached one of its primary goals – a date to begin EU accession negotiations – Erdogan's AKP government is out of ideas and energy. For now, EU- and IMF-required reforms will face tougher opposition from re-energized nationalists, the government will be tempted to delay difficult decisions in any realm, and resistance to change will be the default mode. Bilateral cooperation will be more difficult, more vulnerable to characterization as unreasonable U.S. “demands” that infringe upon Turkish “sovereignty.”
¶14. (C) This period of drift could last a long time. AKP's Parliamentary majority is eroding, but only slowly (ref G). Despite the unhappiness inside AKP, there is currently no political alternative and there are risks to anyone who actually forces a split. Erdogan still has a “nuclear” option in hand – early elections. The danger is that tough decisions and the settling out of the political system will be put off until a real new crisis emerges which will either energize the AKP or bring new political alternatives. Waiting bears a real cost, since Turkey needs to be more nimble in pursuing the political, economic, social and foreign policy agendas many Turks, the EU and the U.S., have been supporting, than this type of static drift will permit.
DEUTSCH
WikiLeaks; TÜRKİYE İLE İLGİLİ ORİJİNAL BELGELER- 2
Reference ID Date Classification Origin
04ANKARA7211 2004-12-30 05:05 SECRET Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 007211
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2029
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS ECON TU
SUBJECT: ERDOGAN AND AK PARTY AFTER TWO YEARS IN POWER:
TRYING TO GET A GRIP ON THEMSELVES, ON TURKEY, ON EUROPE
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: E.O.
12958 1.4 (a,b,c,d).
¶1. (C) Summary: PM Erdogan and his ruling AK Party seem to have a firm grip on power -- if for no other reasons that there is currently no viable alternative and inertia weighs heavily in politics. Nevertheless, Erdogan and his party face enormous challenges if they are successfully to embrace core principles of open society, carry out EU harmonization, and develop and implement foreign policies in harmony with core U.S. interests. End summary.
¶2. (C) As PM Erdogan strode through the EU corridors of power
Dec. 16-17 with his semi-pro soccer player's swagger and phalanx of sycophantic advisors, he may have seemed a strong candidate for European leader of the year. A regional leader to be reckoned with for a decade to come. The man who won Turkey the beginning of accession negotiations with the EU. Who broke loose three decades of frozen Turkish policy on
Cyprus. Who drove major human rights reforms through parliament and through constitutional amendments. Whose rhetorical skill, while etched with populist victimhood, is redolent with traditional and religious allusions that resonate deeply in the heartland, deeply in the anonymous exurban sprawls. Who remains the highly popular tribune of the people, without a viable or discernible political rival...outside his own ruling AKP.
¶3. (C) In short, Erdogan looks unbeatable. But is he? And is he willing to give relations with the U.S. the leadership and momentum they need from the Turkish side?
¶4. (C) Erdogan has a two-thirds majority in parliament. Main opposition left-of-center CHP amounts to no more than a bunch of elitist ankle-biters. There is currently no serious, broad-based political alternative, owing to Erdogan's rhetorical dominance and control of the debate on social questions close to the hearts of the center-right majority in Turkey; other party leaders' political bankruptcy; and the stultifying effect of current party and election laws on entry for younger, untainted political aspirants. AKP argues that the economy, at least from the perspective of macro indicators and continued willingness of emerging-market portfolio investors to buy the expectations and sell the facts, appears to have stabilized. Moreover, the authority of AKP's nationwide party machine is blurring with the Turkish State's executive power at the provincial and district level and with municipal functions to an extent not seen since the days of the one-party state. These factors seem set to continue for the foreseeable future.
¶5. (C) Yet Erdogan and AKP face politically fateful challenges in three areas: foreign policy (EU, Iraq, Cyprus); quality and sustainability of leadership and governance; and resolution of questions fundamental to creation of an open, prosperous society integrated with the broader world (place of religion; identity and history; rule of law).
EU
--
¶6. (U) Erdogan indexed his political survival to getting a negotiation date from the EU. He achieved that goal. The Wall Street Journal and other Western and Turkish media have opined that the EU owes Turkey a fair negotiating process leading to accession, with the Journal even putting the onus on the EU by asserting that while Turkey is ready the question is whether Europeans are ready for Turkey.
¶7. (C) But there's always a Monday morning and the debate on the ground here is not so neat. With euphoria at getting a date having faded in 48 hours, Erdogan's political survival and the difficulty of the tasks before him have become substantially clearer. Nationalists on right and left have resumed accusations that Erdogan sold out Turkish national interests (Cyprus) and Turkish traditions. Core institutions of the Turkish state, which remain at best wary of AKP, have once again begun to probe for weaknesses and to feed insinuations into the press in parallel with the nationalists' assertions. In the face of this Euro-aversion, neither Erdogan nor his government has taken even minimal steps to prepare the bureaucracy or public opinion to begin tackling the fundamental -- some Turks would say insidious -- legal, social, intellectual and spiritual changes that must occur to turn harmonization on paper into true reform. The road ahead will surely be hard.
¶8. (U) High-profile naysayers like main opposition CHP chairman Baykal, former Ambassador Gunduz Aktan, and political scientist Hasan Unal continue to castigate Erdogan. But theirs is a routine whine. More significant for us is that many of our contacts cloak their lack of self-confidence at Turkey's ability to join in expressions of skepticism that the EU will let Turkey in. And there is parallel widespread skepticism that the EU will be around in attractive form in ten years.
¶9. (C) The mood in AKP is no brighter, with one of FonMin Gul's MFA advisors having described to UK polcounselor how bruised Turkey feels at the EU's inconsistency during the final negotiations leading to Dec. 17 (EU diplomats in Ankara have given us the other side of the story). Gul was noticeably harder-line than Erdogan in public comments in the lead-up to the Summit, and was harder-line in pre-Summit negotiations in Brussels, according to UK polcounselor. There was noticeable tension between Erdogan and Gul in Brussels according to "Aksam" Ankara bureau chief Nuray Basaran. She also noted to us that when negotiations seeme to have frozen up on Dec. 17, Erdogan's advisors got phone calls from Putin advisors urging Turkey to walk. Basaran says that at least some of Erdogan's advisors urged him to do so.
¶10. (C) AKP's lack of cohesion as a party and lack of openness as a government is reflected in the range of murky, muddled motives for wanting to join the EU we have encountered among those AKPers who say they favor pursuing membership...or at least the process. Some see the process as the way to marginalize the Turkish military and what remains of the arid "secularism" of Kemalism. We have also run into the rarely openly-spoken, but widespread belief among adherents of the Turk-Islam synthesis that Turkey's role is to spread Islam in Europe, "to take back Andalusia and avenge the defeat at the siege of Vienna in 1683" as one participant in a recent meeting at AKP's main think tank put it. This thinking parallels the logic behind the approach of FonMin Gul ally and chief foreign policy advisor in the Prime Ministry Ahmet Davutoglu, whose muddy opinion piece in the Dec. 13 International Herald Tribune is in essence a call for one-way multi-cultural tolerance, i.e., on the part of the EU.
¶11. (C) Those from the more overtly religious side of AKP whinge that the EU is a Christian club. While some assert that it is only through Turkish membership and spread of Turkish values that the world can avoid the clash of civilizations they allege the West is fomenting, others express concern that harmonization and membership will water down Islam and associated traditions in Turkey. Indeed, as AKP whip Sadullah Ergin confided to us recently, "If the EU says yes, everything will look rosy for a short while. Then the real difficulties will start for AKP. If the EU says no, it will be initially difficult, but much easier over the long run."
¶12. (C) AKP also faces the nuts-and-bolts issue of how to prepare for harmonization. In choosing a chief negotiator Erdogan will need to decide whether the risks that the man he taps will successfully steal his political limelight outweigh the political challenge his choice will face since it will be the Turkish chief negotiator's responsibility to sell the EU position to a recalcitrant Turkish cabinet. It is because the chief negotiator is likely to be ground down between EU demands and a prickly domestic environment that some observers speculate Erdogan might give the job to his chief internal rival Gul.
¶13. (C) At the same time the government must reportedly hire a couple thousand people skilled in English or other major EU languages and up to the bureaucratic demands of interfacing with the Eurocrats who descend on ministries as harmonization starts. If the government continues to hire on the basis of "one of us", i.e., from the Sunni brotherhood and lodge milieu that has been serving as the pool for AKP's civil service hiring, lack of competence will be a problem. If the government hires on the base of competence, its new hires will be frustrated by the incompetence of AKP's previous hires at all levels.
Questions About AKP Leadership and Governance
---------------------------------------------
¶14. (C) Several factors will continue to degrade Erdogan's and AKP's ability to effect fair and lasting reforms or to take timely, positive decisions on issues of importance to the U.S.
¶15. (C) First is Erdogan's character.
¶16. (C) In our contacts in Anatolia we have not yet detected that Erdogan's hunger for absolute power and for the material benefits of power have begun to erode his grassroots popularity. Others disagree. Pollster and political analyst Ismail Yildiz has asserted in three lengthy expositions to us late in Dec. that the erosion has started. We note that (1) Yildiz expressed frustration to us that the AKP leadership did not respond to his offer to provide political strategy services; (2) he is currently connected to mainstream opposition figures; and (3) he also runs a conspiracy-theory web site. So we treat his view cautiously. However, judging by his references and past experience in the Turkish State, he appears to have maintained conncetions with the State apparatus and to have a network of observers and data collectors in all 81 provinces.
¶17. (C) Inside the party, Erdogan's hunger for power reveals itself in a sharp authoritarian style and deep distrust of others: as a former spiritual advisor to Erdogan and his wife Emine put it, "Tayyip Bey believes in God...but doesn't trust him." In surrounding himself with an iron ring of sycophantic (but contemptuous) advisors, Erdogan has isolated himself from a flow of reliable information, which partially explains his failure to understand the context -- or real facts -- of the U.S. operations in Tel Afar, Fallujah, and elsewhere and his susceptibility to Islamist theories. With regard to Islamist influences on Erdogan, DefMin Gonul, who is a conservative but worldly Muslim, recently described Gul associate Davutoglu to us as "exceptionally dangerous." Erdogan's other foreign policy advisors (Cuneyd Zapsu, Egemen Bagis, Omer Celik, along with Mucahit Arslan and chef de cabinet Hikmet Bulduk) are despised as inadequate, out of touch and corrupt by all our AKP contacts from ministers to MPs and party intellectuals.
¶18. (C) Erdogan's pragmatism serves him well but he lacks vision. He and his principal AKP advisors, as well as FonMin Gul and other ranking AKP officials, also lack analytic depth. He relies on poor-quality intel and on media disinformation. With the narrow world-view and wariness that lingers from his Sunni brotherhood and lodge background, he ducks his public relations responsibilities. He (and those around him, including FonMin Gul) indulge in pronounced pro-Sunni prejudices and in emotional reactions that prevent the development of coherent, practical domestic or foreign policies.
¶19. (C) Erdogan has compounded his isolation by constantly traveling abroad -- reportedly 75 foreign trips in the past two years -- with a new series of trips planned for 2005 to Russia, "Eurasia", the Middle East and Africa. Indeed, his staff says 2005 is the "year of Africa", but they provide no coherent reason why. This grueling cycle of travel has exhausted him and his staff and disrupted his ability to keep his hand on the tiller of party, parliamentary group, and government. He has alienated many in the AKP parliamentary group by his habit of harshly chewing out MPs. Moreover, we understand that MUSIAD, an Anatolia-wide group of businessmen influential in Islamist circles who gave Erdogan key financial support as AKP campaigned prior to the 2002 elections, is disaffected by Erdogan's unapproachability. Judging by comments to us of insiders in the influential Islamist lodge of Fethullah Gulen such as publicist Abdurrahman Celik, the lodge, which has made some inroads into AKP (Minister of Justice Cicek, Minister of Culture and Tourism Mumcu; perhaps 60-80 of 368 MPs; some appointments to the bureaucracy), has resumed the ambivalent attitude it initially had toward Erdogan and AKP.
¶20. (C) Second is the coalition nature of AKP, the limited number of ministers whom Erdogan trusts, and the efforts of some -- principally FonMin Gul but from time to time Cicek -- to undermine Erdogan. No one else in AKP comes close to Erdogan in grassroots popularity. However, Gul's readiness to deprecate Erdogan within AKP and even to foreign visitors
(e.g., Israeli deputy PM Olmert) and his efforts to reduceErdogan's maneuvering room with hard-line criticisms of U.S. policy in Iraq or EU policy on Cyprus have forced Erdogan constantly to look over his shoulder and in turn to prove his credentials by making statements inimical to good U.S.-Turkish relations. We expect Erdogan to carry out a partial cabinet reshuffle early in 2005, but he will be unable to remove the influence of Gul.
¶21. (S) Third is corruption. AKP swept to power by promising to root out corruption. However, in increasing numbers AKPers from ministers on down, and people close to the party, are telling us of conflicts of interest or serious corruption in the party at the national, provincial and local level and among close family members of ministers. We have heard from two contacts that Erdogan has eight accounts in Swiss banks; his explanations that his wealth comes from the wedding presents guests gave his son and that a Turkish businessman is paying the educational expenses of all four Erdogan children in the U.S. purely altruistically are lame.
¶22. (S) Among the many figures mentioned to us as prominently involved in corruption are Minister of Interior Aksu, Minister of Foreign Trade Tuzmen, and AKP Istanbul provincial chairman Muezzinoglu. As we understand it from a contact in the intel directorate of Turkish National Police, a continuing investigation into Muezzinoglu's extortion racket and other activities has already produced evidence incriminating Erdogan. In our contacts across Anatolia we have detected no willingness yet at the grassroots level to look closely at Erdogan or the party in this regard, but the trend is a time bomb.
¶23. (S) Fourth is the poor quality of Erdogan's and AKP's appointments to the Turkish bureaucracy, at party headquarters, and as party mayoral candidates. A broad range of senior career civil servants, including DefMin Gonul, former Undersecretary of Customs Nevzat Saygilioglu, former Forestry DirGen Abdurrahman Sagkaya, and many others, has expressed shock and dismay to us at the incompetence, prejudices and ignorance of appointees such as Omer Dincer, an Islamist academic whom Erdogan appointed Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry, THE key position in the government/state bureaucracy. Dincer is despised by the TGS. Many interlocutors also point to the weakness of Erdogan's deputy party chairmen. The result is that, unlike former leaders such as Turgut Ozal or Suleyman Demirel, both of whom appointed skilled figures who could speak authoritatively for their bosses as their party general secretary and as Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry, Erdogan has left himself without people who can relieve him of the burden of day-to-day management or who can ensure effective, productive channels to the heart of the party and the heart of the Turkish state.
Two Big Questions
-----------------
¶24. (C) Turkey's EU bid has brought forth reams of pronouncements and articles -- Mustafa Akyol's Gulenist-tinged "Thanksgiving for Turkey" in Dec. 27 Weekly Standard is one of the latest -- attempting to portray Islam in Turkey as distinctively moderate and tolerant with a strong mystical (Sufi) underpinning. Certainly, one can see in Turkey's theology faculties some attempts to wrestle with the problems of critical thinking, free will, and precedent (ictihad), attempts which, compared to what goes on in theology faculties in the Arab world, may appear relatively progressive.
¶25. (C) However, the broad, rubber-meets-the-road reality is that Islam in Turkey is caught in a vise of (1) 100 years of "secular" pressure to hide itself from public view, (2) pressure and competition from brotherhoods and lodges to follow their narrow, occult "true way", and (3) the faction- and positivism-ridden aridity of the Religious Affairs Directorate (Diyanet). As a result, Islam as it is lived in Turkey is stultified, riddled with hypocrisy, ignorant and intolerant of other religions' presence in Turkey, and unable to eject those who would politicize it in a radical, anti-Western way. Imams are for the most part poorly educated and all too ready to insinuate anti-Western, anti-Christian or anti-Jewish sentiments into their sermons. Exceptionally few Muslims in Turkey have the courage to challenge conventional Sunni thinking about jihad or, e.g., verses in the Repentance shura of the Koran which have for so long been used to justify violence against "infidels".
¶26. (C) The problem is compounded by the willingness of politicians such as Gul to play elusively with politicized Islam. Until Turkey ensures that the humanist strain in Islam prevails here, Islam in Turkey will remain a troubled, defensive force, hypocritical to an extreme degree and unwilling to adapt to the challenges of open society.
¶27. (C) A second question is the relation of Turkey and its citizens to history -- the history of this land and citizens' individual history. Subject to rigid taboos, denial, fears, and mandatory gross distortions, the study of history and practice of historiography in the Republic of Turkey remind one of an old Soviet academic joke: the faculty party chief assembles his party cadres and, warning against various ideological threats, proclaims, "The future is certain. It's only that damned past that keeps changing."
¶28. (C) Until Turkey can reconcile itself to its past, including the troubling aspects of its Ottoman past, in free and open debate, how will Turkey reconcile itself to the concept and practice of reconciliation in the EU? How will it have the self confidence to take decisions and formulate policies responsive to U.S. interests? Some in AKP are joining what is still only a handful of others to take tentative, but nonetheless inspiring, steps in this regard. However, the road ahead will require a massive overhaul of education, the introduction and acceptance of rule of law, and a fundamental redefinition of the relation between citizen and state. In the words of the great (Alevi) Anatolian bard Asik Veysel, this is a "long and delicate road."
¶29. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
EDELMAN
04ANKARA7211 2004-12-30 05:05 SECRET Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 007211
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2029
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS ECON TU
SUBJECT: ERDOGAN AND AK PARTY AFTER TWO YEARS IN POWER:
TRYING TO GET A GRIP ON THEMSELVES, ON TURKEY, ON EUROPE
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: E.O.
12958 1.4 (a,b,c,d).
¶1. (C) Summary: PM Erdogan and his ruling AK Party seem to have a firm grip on power -- if for no other reasons that there is currently no viable alternative and inertia weighs heavily in politics. Nevertheless, Erdogan and his party face enormous challenges if they are successfully to embrace core principles of open society, carry out EU harmonization, and develop and implement foreign policies in harmony with core U.S. interests. End summary.
¶2. (C) As PM Erdogan strode through the EU corridors of power
Dec. 16-17 with his semi-pro soccer player's swagger and phalanx of sycophantic advisors, he may have seemed a strong candidate for European leader of the year. A regional leader to be reckoned with for a decade to come. The man who won Turkey the beginning of accession negotiations with the EU. Who broke loose three decades of frozen Turkish policy on
Cyprus. Who drove major human rights reforms through parliament and through constitutional amendments. Whose rhetorical skill, while etched with populist victimhood, is redolent with traditional and religious allusions that resonate deeply in the heartland, deeply in the anonymous exurban sprawls. Who remains the highly popular tribune of the people, without a viable or discernible political rival...outside his own ruling AKP.
¶3. (C) In short, Erdogan looks unbeatable. But is he? And is he willing to give relations with the U.S. the leadership and momentum they need from the Turkish side?
¶4. (C) Erdogan has a two-thirds majority in parliament. Main opposition left-of-center CHP amounts to no more than a bunch of elitist ankle-biters. There is currently no serious, broad-based political alternative, owing to Erdogan's rhetorical dominance and control of the debate on social questions close to the hearts of the center-right majority in Turkey; other party leaders' political bankruptcy; and the stultifying effect of current party and election laws on entry for younger, untainted political aspirants. AKP argues that the economy, at least from the perspective of macro indicators and continued willingness of emerging-market portfolio investors to buy the expectations and sell the facts, appears to have stabilized. Moreover, the authority of AKP's nationwide party machine is blurring with the Turkish State's executive power at the provincial and district level and with municipal functions to an extent not seen since the days of the one-party state. These factors seem set to continue for the foreseeable future.
¶5. (C) Yet Erdogan and AKP face politically fateful challenges in three areas: foreign policy (EU, Iraq, Cyprus); quality and sustainability of leadership and governance; and resolution of questions fundamental to creation of an open, prosperous society integrated with the broader world (place of religion; identity and history; rule of law).
EU
--
¶6. (U) Erdogan indexed his political survival to getting a negotiation date from the EU. He achieved that goal. The Wall Street Journal and other Western and Turkish media have opined that the EU owes Turkey a fair negotiating process leading to accession, with the Journal even putting the onus on the EU by asserting that while Turkey is ready the question is whether Europeans are ready for Turkey.
¶7. (C) But there's always a Monday morning and the debate on the ground here is not so neat. With euphoria at getting a date having faded in 48 hours, Erdogan's political survival and the difficulty of the tasks before him have become substantially clearer. Nationalists on right and left have resumed accusations that Erdogan sold out Turkish national interests (Cyprus) and Turkish traditions. Core institutions of the Turkish state, which remain at best wary of AKP, have once again begun to probe for weaknesses and to feed insinuations into the press in parallel with the nationalists' assertions. In the face of this Euro-aversion, neither Erdogan nor his government has taken even minimal steps to prepare the bureaucracy or public opinion to begin tackling the fundamental -- some Turks would say insidious -- legal, social, intellectual and spiritual changes that must occur to turn harmonization on paper into true reform. The road ahead will surely be hard.
¶8. (U) High-profile naysayers like main opposition CHP chairman Baykal, former Ambassador Gunduz Aktan, and political scientist Hasan Unal continue to castigate Erdogan. But theirs is a routine whine. More significant for us is that many of our contacts cloak their lack of self-confidence at Turkey's ability to join in expressions of skepticism that the EU will let Turkey in. And there is parallel widespread skepticism that the EU will be around in attractive form in ten years.
¶9. (C) The mood in AKP is no brighter, with one of FonMin Gul's MFA advisors having described to UK polcounselor how bruised Turkey feels at the EU's inconsistency during the final negotiations leading to Dec. 17 (EU diplomats in Ankara have given us the other side of the story). Gul was noticeably harder-line than Erdogan in public comments in the lead-up to the Summit, and was harder-line in pre-Summit negotiations in Brussels, according to UK polcounselor. There was noticeable tension between Erdogan and Gul in Brussels according to "Aksam" Ankara bureau chief Nuray Basaran. She also noted to us that when negotiations seeme to have frozen up on Dec. 17, Erdogan's advisors got phone calls from Putin advisors urging Turkey to walk. Basaran says that at least some of Erdogan's advisors urged him to do so.
¶10. (C) AKP's lack of cohesion as a party and lack of openness as a government is reflected in the range of murky, muddled motives for wanting to join the EU we have encountered among those AKPers who say they favor pursuing membership...or at least the process. Some see the process as the way to marginalize the Turkish military and what remains of the arid "secularism" of Kemalism. We have also run into the rarely openly-spoken, but widespread belief among adherents of the Turk-Islam synthesis that Turkey's role is to spread Islam in Europe, "to take back Andalusia and avenge the defeat at the siege of Vienna in 1683" as one participant in a recent meeting at AKP's main think tank put it. This thinking parallels the logic behind the approach of FonMin Gul ally and chief foreign policy advisor in the Prime Ministry Ahmet Davutoglu, whose muddy opinion piece in the Dec. 13 International Herald Tribune is in essence a call for one-way multi-cultural tolerance, i.e., on the part of the EU.
¶11. (C) Those from the more overtly religious side of AKP whinge that the EU is a Christian club. While some assert that it is only through Turkish membership and spread of Turkish values that the world can avoid the clash of civilizations they allege the West is fomenting, others express concern that harmonization and membership will water down Islam and associated traditions in Turkey. Indeed, as AKP whip Sadullah Ergin confided to us recently, "If the EU says yes, everything will look rosy for a short while. Then the real difficulties will start for AKP. If the EU says no, it will be initially difficult, but much easier over the long run."
¶12. (C) AKP also faces the nuts-and-bolts issue of how to prepare for harmonization. In choosing a chief negotiator Erdogan will need to decide whether the risks that the man he taps will successfully steal his political limelight outweigh the political challenge his choice will face since it will be the Turkish chief negotiator's responsibility to sell the EU position to a recalcitrant Turkish cabinet. It is because the chief negotiator is likely to be ground down between EU demands and a prickly domestic environment that some observers speculate Erdogan might give the job to his chief internal rival Gul.
¶13. (C) At the same time the government must reportedly hire a couple thousand people skilled in English or other major EU languages and up to the bureaucratic demands of interfacing with the Eurocrats who descend on ministries as harmonization starts. If the government continues to hire on the basis of "one of us", i.e., from the Sunni brotherhood and lodge milieu that has been serving as the pool for AKP's civil service hiring, lack of competence will be a problem. If the government hires on the base of competence, its new hires will be frustrated by the incompetence of AKP's previous hires at all levels.
Questions About AKP Leadership and Governance
---------------------------------------------
¶14. (C) Several factors will continue to degrade Erdogan's and AKP's ability to effect fair and lasting reforms or to take timely, positive decisions on issues of importance to the U.S.
¶15. (C) First is Erdogan's character.
¶16. (C) In our contacts in Anatolia we have not yet detected that Erdogan's hunger for absolute power and for the material benefits of power have begun to erode his grassroots popularity. Others disagree. Pollster and political analyst Ismail Yildiz has asserted in three lengthy expositions to us late in Dec. that the erosion has started. We note that (1) Yildiz expressed frustration to us that the AKP leadership did not respond to his offer to provide political strategy services; (2) he is currently connected to mainstream opposition figures; and (3) he also runs a conspiracy-theory web site. So we treat his view cautiously. However, judging by his references and past experience in the Turkish State, he appears to have maintained conncetions with the State apparatus and to have a network of observers and data collectors in all 81 provinces.
¶17. (C) Inside the party, Erdogan's hunger for power reveals itself in a sharp authoritarian style and deep distrust of others: as a former spiritual advisor to Erdogan and his wife Emine put it, "Tayyip Bey believes in God...but doesn't trust him." In surrounding himself with an iron ring of sycophantic (but contemptuous) advisors, Erdogan has isolated himself from a flow of reliable information, which partially explains his failure to understand the context -- or real facts -- of the U.S. operations in Tel Afar, Fallujah, and elsewhere and his susceptibility to Islamist theories. With regard to Islamist influences on Erdogan, DefMin Gonul, who is a conservative but worldly Muslim, recently described Gul associate Davutoglu to us as "exceptionally dangerous." Erdogan's other foreign policy advisors (Cuneyd Zapsu, Egemen Bagis, Omer Celik, along with Mucahit Arslan and chef de cabinet Hikmet Bulduk) are despised as inadequate, out of touch and corrupt by all our AKP contacts from ministers to MPs and party intellectuals.
¶18. (C) Erdogan's pragmatism serves him well but he lacks vision. He and his principal AKP advisors, as well as FonMin Gul and other ranking AKP officials, also lack analytic depth. He relies on poor-quality intel and on media disinformation. With the narrow world-view and wariness that lingers from his Sunni brotherhood and lodge background, he ducks his public relations responsibilities. He (and those around him, including FonMin Gul) indulge in pronounced pro-Sunni prejudices and in emotional reactions that prevent the development of coherent, practical domestic or foreign policies.
¶19. (C) Erdogan has compounded his isolation by constantly traveling abroad -- reportedly 75 foreign trips in the past two years -- with a new series of trips planned for 2005 to Russia, "Eurasia", the Middle East and Africa. Indeed, his staff says 2005 is the "year of Africa", but they provide no coherent reason why. This grueling cycle of travel has exhausted him and his staff and disrupted his ability to keep his hand on the tiller of party, parliamentary group, and government. He has alienated many in the AKP parliamentary group by his habit of harshly chewing out MPs. Moreover, we understand that MUSIAD, an Anatolia-wide group of businessmen influential in Islamist circles who gave Erdogan key financial support as AKP campaigned prior to the 2002 elections, is disaffected by Erdogan's unapproachability. Judging by comments to us of insiders in the influential Islamist lodge of Fethullah Gulen such as publicist Abdurrahman Celik, the lodge, which has made some inroads into AKP (Minister of Justice Cicek, Minister of Culture and Tourism Mumcu; perhaps 60-80 of 368 MPs; some appointments to the bureaucracy), has resumed the ambivalent attitude it initially had toward Erdogan and AKP.
¶20. (C) Second is the coalition nature of AKP, the limited number of ministers whom Erdogan trusts, and the efforts of some -- principally FonMin Gul but from time to time Cicek -- to undermine Erdogan. No one else in AKP comes close to Erdogan in grassroots popularity. However, Gul's readiness to deprecate Erdogan within AKP and even to foreign visitors
(e.g., Israeli deputy PM Olmert) and his efforts to reduceErdogan's maneuvering room with hard-line criticisms of U.S. policy in Iraq or EU policy on Cyprus have forced Erdogan constantly to look over his shoulder and in turn to prove his credentials by making statements inimical to good U.S.-Turkish relations. We expect Erdogan to carry out a partial cabinet reshuffle early in 2005, but he will be unable to remove the influence of Gul.
¶21. (S) Third is corruption. AKP swept to power by promising to root out corruption. However, in increasing numbers AKPers from ministers on down, and people close to the party, are telling us of conflicts of interest or serious corruption in the party at the national, provincial and local level and among close family members of ministers. We have heard from two contacts that Erdogan has eight accounts in Swiss banks; his explanations that his wealth comes from the wedding presents guests gave his son and that a Turkish businessman is paying the educational expenses of all four Erdogan children in the U.S. purely altruistically are lame.
¶22. (S) Among the many figures mentioned to us as prominently involved in corruption are Minister of Interior Aksu, Minister of Foreign Trade Tuzmen, and AKP Istanbul provincial chairman Muezzinoglu. As we understand it from a contact in the intel directorate of Turkish National Police, a continuing investigation into Muezzinoglu's extortion racket and other activities has already produced evidence incriminating Erdogan. In our contacts across Anatolia we have detected no willingness yet at the grassroots level to look closely at Erdogan or the party in this regard, but the trend is a time bomb.
¶23. (S) Fourth is the poor quality of Erdogan's and AKP's appointments to the Turkish bureaucracy, at party headquarters, and as party mayoral candidates. A broad range of senior career civil servants, including DefMin Gonul, former Undersecretary of Customs Nevzat Saygilioglu, former Forestry DirGen Abdurrahman Sagkaya, and many others, has expressed shock and dismay to us at the incompetence, prejudices and ignorance of appointees such as Omer Dincer, an Islamist academic whom Erdogan appointed Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry, THE key position in the government/state bureaucracy. Dincer is despised by the TGS. Many interlocutors also point to the weakness of Erdogan's deputy party chairmen. The result is that, unlike former leaders such as Turgut Ozal or Suleyman Demirel, both of whom appointed skilled figures who could speak authoritatively for their bosses as their party general secretary and as Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry, Erdogan has left himself without people who can relieve him of the burden of day-to-day management or who can ensure effective, productive channels to the heart of the party and the heart of the Turkish state.
Two Big Questions
-----------------
¶24. (C) Turkey's EU bid has brought forth reams of pronouncements and articles -- Mustafa Akyol's Gulenist-tinged "Thanksgiving for Turkey" in Dec. 27 Weekly Standard is one of the latest -- attempting to portray Islam in Turkey as distinctively moderate and tolerant with a strong mystical (Sufi) underpinning. Certainly, one can see in Turkey's theology faculties some attempts to wrestle with the problems of critical thinking, free will, and precedent (ictihad), attempts which, compared to what goes on in theology faculties in the Arab world, may appear relatively progressive.
¶25. (C) However, the broad, rubber-meets-the-road reality is that Islam in Turkey is caught in a vise of (1) 100 years of "secular" pressure to hide itself from public view, (2) pressure and competition from brotherhoods and lodges to follow their narrow, occult "true way", and (3) the faction- and positivism-ridden aridity of the Religious Affairs Directorate (Diyanet). As a result, Islam as it is lived in Turkey is stultified, riddled with hypocrisy, ignorant and intolerant of other religions' presence in Turkey, and unable to eject those who would politicize it in a radical, anti-Western way. Imams are for the most part poorly educated and all too ready to insinuate anti-Western, anti-Christian or anti-Jewish sentiments into their sermons. Exceptionally few Muslims in Turkey have the courage to challenge conventional Sunni thinking about jihad or, e.g., verses in the Repentance shura of the Koran which have for so long been used to justify violence against "infidels".
¶26. (C) The problem is compounded by the willingness of politicians such as Gul to play elusively with politicized Islam. Until Turkey ensures that the humanist strain in Islam prevails here, Islam in Turkey will remain a troubled, defensive force, hypocritical to an extreme degree and unwilling to adapt to the challenges of open society.
¶27. (C) A second question is the relation of Turkey and its citizens to history -- the history of this land and citizens' individual history. Subject to rigid taboos, denial, fears, and mandatory gross distortions, the study of history and practice of historiography in the Republic of Turkey remind one of an old Soviet academic joke: the faculty party chief assembles his party cadres and, warning against various ideological threats, proclaims, "The future is certain. It's only that damned past that keeps changing."
¶28. (C) Until Turkey can reconcile itself to its past, including the troubling aspects of its Ottoman past, in free and open debate, how will Turkey reconcile itself to the concept and practice of reconciliation in the EU? How will it have the self confidence to take decisions and formulate policies responsive to U.S. interests? Some in AKP are joining what is still only a handful of others to take tentative, but nonetheless inspiring, steps in this regard. However, the road ahead will require a massive overhaul of education, the introduction and acceptance of rule of law, and a fundamental redefinition of the relation between citizen and state. In the words of the great (Alevi) Anatolian bard Asik Veysel, this is a "long and delicate road."
¶29. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
EDELMAN
WikiLeaks; TÜRKİYE İLE İLGİLİ ORİJİNAL BELGELER- 1
Reference ID Date Classification Origin
04ANKARA348 2004-01-20 12:12 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
201247Z Jan 04C o n f i d e n t i a l section 01 of 04 ankara 000348
Sipdis
E.o. 12958: decl: 01/07/2014 Tags: prel, pgov, pins, tu Subject: turkish p.m. Erdogan goes to washington: how strong a leader in the face of strong challenges?
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: 1.5 (b,d).
¶1. (C) Summary: P.M. Erdogan expects Washington to focus on Cyprus, economic reform, and anti-terrorism cooperation among other issues. In turn he will press for (1) concrete U.S. actions to block what Turks believe is the formation by accretion of a de facto Kurdish state in n. Iraq; (2) concrete U.S. actions against the PKK in Iraq; and (3) clear USG support for his government. While the Turkish side sees the visit as mainly about developing our broad common strategy, Erdogan is also looking for a public outcome he can characterize as concrete results. At the same time, although Erdogan is currently unchallenged as the paramount political figure in Turkey, he and his party face deep challenges which, if he cannot rise to them, will affect his longevity in government, Turkey's democratic development, and U.S.-Turkish cooperation. End summary.
¶2. (C) P.M. Erdogan appears to be riding a political high and uncommon luck as he prepares for his Jan. 28-29 visit to Washington, where he hopes to demonstrate the Administration recognizes him as an equal partner.
¶3. (C) Erdogan has been primed to hear plainspoken expressions of U.S. interest in Turkish action (1) to reach a Cyprus settlement by May 1; (2) to hew to credible economic reform and macro policies; (3) to cooperate unreservedly against terrorist groups of all stripes, including Islamist ones (he rejects the term “Islamic terrorism”); (4) to cooperate on Iraq; (5) to open the border with Armenia; and (6) to reopen the Ecumenical Patriarchate's Halki seminary in a way acceptable to the Patriarchate.
¶4. (C) In turn Erdogan will argue that raising U.S.-Turkish relations to a higher level depends directly on (1) clear USG political and diplomatic actions to dispel the conviction and consequent resentment among Turks of all political stripes that the U.S. is tolerating step-by-step formation of a de facto independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq; (2) concrete USG actions to remove the PKK threat from Iraq; (3) high-level, sustained USG support for the GOT's new Cyprus initiative; and (4) the clearest possible signal that the U.S. stands behind the democratically-elected government.
Who are we dealing with?
¶5. (C) Charismatic, and possessing a common touch and phenomenal memory for faces and functions of thousands of party members across the country, Erdogan has a strong pragmatic core. His pragmatism has led him away from the radical Islamist milieu of his past, a point noted to us unhappily by his (radical) former spiritual leader Kemal Hoca. His pragmatism has also led him to avoid precipitously pushing Islamic agenda items such as the wearing of Islamist headscarves while using his outstanding preacher skills and persona as someone persecuted by the secularist Establishment to maintain his hold on the hearts of his more religious supporters.
¶6. (C) In short, a natural politician, Erdogan has a common touch and an ability to communicate his empathy for the plight and aspirations of the common citizen. He projects the image of the Tribune of Anatolia, ready to take on corruption and privilege and to defend conservative traditions. As a result his AK Party won a two-thirds parliamentary majority in Nov. 2002 national elections. Owing to AK's image as the party of change at the national level, good record in providing services at the municipal level, and lack of viable political alternatives, AK could gain around 50% of the vote in March 28 nationwide local elections. Party insiders project that such a result would give AK control of 65% or more of the 3,200 municipalities in Turkey, including probably Istanbul and Ankara and perhaps even Izmir, where AK has not done well to date, plus most of the other large cities. Every step by the Turkish Establishment to try to diminish him – whether by blocking legislation or attacking his motives – cements his popularity in Turkey's urban sprawls and across the Anatolian heartland. While opposition to him remains bitter in various loci of the State apparatus, Erdogan currently faces no credible political opponent or party.
¶7. (C) Moreover, Erdogan knows his government has gained credit well beyond AK supporters, as well as in the EU, for political reforms which, if fully implemented, will substantially strengthen democracy in Turkey. His government's inability to pass legislation or regulations favored by AK supporters – land registry reform, Supreme Education Board (YOK) reform, Koran course reform – has not eroded support. Indeed, even right-of-center Turks who remain wary of AK readily tell us the Establishment's opposition to such reforms is counterproductive. Even if one can attribute Turkey's lowest inflation and interest rates in 30 years to luck, Central Bank skill, and global emerging market trends rather than to the AK government's actions, Erdogan has reaped the political benefit.
¶8. (C) Taking a high-profile approach in pursuing Turkey's EU candidacy through direct campaigning in EU capitals, Erdogan has relished being feted by EU leaders for the past year. He will have had positive visits by EU Commission President Prodi and German FonMin Fischer before his Washington trip and looks forward to the February visit by German Chancellor Schroeder. He sees himself at this point as one of (if not the) most important leaders of the Muslim world. Erdogan's view of relations with the u.s.
¶9. (C) Erdogan recognizes that U.S. support can be important for Turkey's economy and EU aspirations. He sees his task as managing Turks's ambivalence toward us; at the same time he wants to avoid being labeled pro-American. From the low point in bilateral relations in March 2003 he has taken several supportive steps, while being careful not to be too closely associated with us since opening Turkish airspace for the Iraq war. Erdogan agreed to a ground line of communication for Coalition forces in Iraq. He pushed through authorization for a Turkish deployment in support of the Coalition. He agreed to U.S. troop rotation through Incirlik airbase. In line with long-standing U.S. desires, he took a bold step in Nov. 2002 to try to move Turkey away from its no-solution stance on Cyprus and may be prepared now to do more. He seems to be more open than any previous Prime Minister to a re-opening of the Ecumenical Patriarchate's Halki seminary.
¶10. (C) On the other hand he has made public his discomfort with what most fellow Turks also see as American complicity in creation of a de facto independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq and lack of concrete U.S. action against the PKK/KADEK/KHK. He has not controlled anti-American suspicions among the AK parliamentary group or within the Cabinet (DefMin Gonul told us recently on the margins of a symposium in Istanbul that in closed meetings FonMin Gul continues to praise the Parliament's March 1, 2003 turndown of U.S. deployment and to advocate a more Arab/Islamic foreign policy orientation as a counter to relations with the U.S.). Nevertheless, Erdogan and Ministers like Gonul and Justice Minister Cicek see U.S. support for his government as essential to his survival, and he wants a successful visit.
The deeper challenges for erdogan
¶11. (C) Erdogan, AK, and his government face half a dozen serious domestic challenges which, if he does not manage them well, will begin to put a severe strain on his ability to govern by late 2004 and on his and our ability to maintain dynamic, deep U.S.-Turkish cooperation:
–Erdogan's character: Erdogan has traits which render him seriously vulnerable to miscalculating the political dynamic, especially in foreign affairs, and vulnerable to attacks by those who would disrupt his equilibrium. First, overbearing pride. Second, unbridled ambition stemming from the belief God has anointed him to lead Turkey (Mustafa Bilginer, a close confidant of Erdogan and his wife Emine from 1997-2003, has analyzed this trait in a draft book on Erdogan's character; Erdogan used Koranic allusion in his speech to the AK Congress in Oct. 2003 to make the point about his God-appointed mission). Third, an authoritarian loner streak which prevents growth of a circle of strong and skillful advisors, a broad flow of fresh information to him, or development of effective communications among the party headquarters, government, and parliamentary group. This streak also makes him exceptionally thin-skinned. Fourth, an overweening desire to stay in power which, despite his macho image, renders him fearful and prone to temporizing even at moments which call for swift and resolute decisions. Fifth, a distrust of women which manifests itself not only in occasional harsh public comments but also in his unwillingness to give women any meaningful decision-making authority in AK.
–Rival centers of power: Cabinet Ministers, Erdogan advisors and a raft of M.P.s constantly tell us of the tensions between Erdogan and Gul, with the latter appearing repeatedly to try to undercut Erdogan. Parliamentary Speaker Bulent Arinc, who has a strong following among more Islamist AK M.P.s, has also caused problems for Erdogan on controversial questions like pushing the right to wear headscarves at State functions. Although Arinc has kept a low profile for the past seven months, he remains a locus of troublemaking, especially on questions involving the U.S. (e.g., troop rotation through Incirlik).
–Lack of technocratic depth: While some AK appointees appear to be capable of learning on the job, others are incompetent or seem to be pursuing private or lodge (cemaat) interests. AK is far from bringing the bureaucracy under control or making it work efficiently. We hear constant anecdotal evidence, not only from those on the secularist left who have deep prejudices against AK but also from contacts on the right, that AK appointees, at the national and provincial levels, are incompetent or narrow-minded Islamists. AK officials – from Cabinet Ministers to local-level party activists across the country – admit to us that the party's choice of competent and broadly acceptable candidates for the March local elections will be exceptionally difficult and the election of controversial or inept AK candidates would complicate AK's ability to govern both at the local and national level.
–Weakness of public relations and the image of hidden agendas: Erdogan lacks advisors who are able to pre-empt or handle the news cycle; none of his advisors has good working relations with the Turkish military. His government has failed continually to consult broadly and openly or to prepare public opinion for legislative initiatives, long-overdue reforms, or foreign policy steps (e.g., pre-war U.S. troop deployment or troop rotation). As a result AK creates the impression, exploited by the Establishment, that it harbors an anti-republican, deep Islamist agenda or is selling out the country, leading to Establishment (dis)information campaigns which cause the government to retreat.
–Corruption: AK rode to power on the common citizen's revulsion against corruption. Charges that Erdogan amassed his fortune through kickbacks as mayor of Istanbul have never been proven but we now hear more and more from insiders that close advisors such as private secretary Hikmet Bulduk, Mucahit Arslan, and Cuneyd Zapsu are engaging in wholesale influence peddling. xxxxx that Erdogan and he benefited “directly” from the award of the Tupras (state petroleum refinery) privatization to a consortium including a Russian partner. Erdogan's direct acquisition of a significant interest in a food distribution company has become a public controversy.
–Islamist complexes and prejudices: Some appointments, such as Prime Ministry Undersecretary Dincer (who stands by his 1995 article calling into question the relevance of the Republic), Education Ministry Undersecretary Birinci (who in the past called himself an “ummetci”, i.e., a follower of a greater Islamic order and an opponent of the Republic), and head of State-run Turkish Radio and Television Demiroz (who once paid homage to Afghan fundamentalist Hekmatyar), have made the core of the State Establishment – Armed Forces, Presidency, and Judiciary – profoundly uneasy. Erdogan's refusal to condemn these positions, the question of the level of influence of Islamic brotherhoods and groups (including the followers of Fethullah Gulen) on the government, and the presence of Turkish Hizbullah supporters in AK Party provincial structures in the Southeast have also raised deep concerns among many long-standing Embassy contacts who themselves are pious. Erdogan himself recognizes the pernicious effect of a “closed brotherhood mentality” (cemaatcilik) in political affairs, as reflected in his Jan. 10 speech to a symposium in Istanbul, but how well he can control the phenomenon remains a very open question.
Comment
¶12. (C) As Erdogan rides the twin desires for reform in Turkey and for wider prosperity, he challenges those who have traditionally reserved power and wealth for themselves at least to yield pride of place to a different elite. While his ultimate direction and success remain to be seen, at this time Erdogan is the only partner capable of advancing toward the U.S. vision of a successful, democratic Turkey integrated into Europe. Edelman
04ANKARA348 2004-01-20 12:12 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
201247Z Jan 04C o n f i d e n t i a l section 01 of 04 ankara 000348
Sipdis
E.o. 12958: decl: 01/07/2014 Tags: prel, pgov, pins, tu Subject: turkish p.m. Erdogan goes to washington: how strong a leader in the face of strong challenges?
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: 1.5 (b,d).
¶1. (C) Summary: P.M. Erdogan expects Washington to focus on Cyprus, economic reform, and anti-terrorism cooperation among other issues. In turn he will press for (1) concrete U.S. actions to block what Turks believe is the formation by accretion of a de facto Kurdish state in n. Iraq; (2) concrete U.S. actions against the PKK in Iraq; and (3) clear USG support for his government. While the Turkish side sees the visit as mainly about developing our broad common strategy, Erdogan is also looking for a public outcome he can characterize as concrete results. At the same time, although Erdogan is currently unchallenged as the paramount political figure in Turkey, he and his party face deep challenges which, if he cannot rise to them, will affect his longevity in government, Turkey's democratic development, and U.S.-Turkish cooperation. End summary.
¶2. (C) P.M. Erdogan appears to be riding a political high and uncommon luck as he prepares for his Jan. 28-29 visit to Washington, where he hopes to demonstrate the Administration recognizes him as an equal partner.
¶3. (C) Erdogan has been primed to hear plainspoken expressions of U.S. interest in Turkish action (1) to reach a Cyprus settlement by May 1; (2) to hew to credible economic reform and macro policies; (3) to cooperate unreservedly against terrorist groups of all stripes, including Islamist ones (he rejects the term “Islamic terrorism”); (4) to cooperate on Iraq; (5) to open the border with Armenia; and (6) to reopen the Ecumenical Patriarchate's Halki seminary in a way acceptable to the Patriarchate.
¶4. (C) In turn Erdogan will argue that raising U.S.-Turkish relations to a higher level depends directly on (1) clear USG political and diplomatic actions to dispel the conviction and consequent resentment among Turks of all political stripes that the U.S. is tolerating step-by-step formation of a de facto independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq; (2) concrete USG actions to remove the PKK threat from Iraq; (3) high-level, sustained USG support for the GOT's new Cyprus initiative; and (4) the clearest possible signal that the U.S. stands behind the democratically-elected government.
Who are we dealing with?
¶5. (C) Charismatic, and possessing a common touch and phenomenal memory for faces and functions of thousands of party members across the country, Erdogan has a strong pragmatic core. His pragmatism has led him away from the radical Islamist milieu of his past, a point noted to us unhappily by his (radical) former spiritual leader Kemal Hoca. His pragmatism has also led him to avoid precipitously pushing Islamic agenda items such as the wearing of Islamist headscarves while using his outstanding preacher skills and persona as someone persecuted by the secularist Establishment to maintain his hold on the hearts of his more religious supporters.
¶6. (C) In short, a natural politician, Erdogan has a common touch and an ability to communicate his empathy for the plight and aspirations of the common citizen. He projects the image of the Tribune of Anatolia, ready to take on corruption and privilege and to defend conservative traditions. As a result his AK Party won a two-thirds parliamentary majority in Nov. 2002 national elections. Owing to AK's image as the party of change at the national level, good record in providing services at the municipal level, and lack of viable political alternatives, AK could gain around 50% of the vote in March 28 nationwide local elections. Party insiders project that such a result would give AK control of 65% or more of the 3,200 municipalities in Turkey, including probably Istanbul and Ankara and perhaps even Izmir, where AK has not done well to date, plus most of the other large cities. Every step by the Turkish Establishment to try to diminish him – whether by blocking legislation or attacking his motives – cements his popularity in Turkey's urban sprawls and across the Anatolian heartland. While opposition to him remains bitter in various loci of the State apparatus, Erdogan currently faces no credible political opponent or party.
¶7. (C) Moreover, Erdogan knows his government has gained credit well beyond AK supporters, as well as in the EU, for political reforms which, if fully implemented, will substantially strengthen democracy in Turkey. His government's inability to pass legislation or regulations favored by AK supporters – land registry reform, Supreme Education Board (YOK) reform, Koran course reform – has not eroded support. Indeed, even right-of-center Turks who remain wary of AK readily tell us the Establishment's opposition to such reforms is counterproductive. Even if one can attribute Turkey's lowest inflation and interest rates in 30 years to luck, Central Bank skill, and global emerging market trends rather than to the AK government's actions, Erdogan has reaped the political benefit.
¶8. (C) Taking a high-profile approach in pursuing Turkey's EU candidacy through direct campaigning in EU capitals, Erdogan has relished being feted by EU leaders for the past year. He will have had positive visits by EU Commission President Prodi and German FonMin Fischer before his Washington trip and looks forward to the February visit by German Chancellor Schroeder. He sees himself at this point as one of (if not the) most important leaders of the Muslim world. Erdogan's view of relations with the u.s.
¶9. (C) Erdogan recognizes that U.S. support can be important for Turkey's economy and EU aspirations. He sees his task as managing Turks's ambivalence toward us; at the same time he wants to avoid being labeled pro-American. From the low point in bilateral relations in March 2003 he has taken several supportive steps, while being careful not to be too closely associated with us since opening Turkish airspace for the Iraq war. Erdogan agreed to a ground line of communication for Coalition forces in Iraq. He pushed through authorization for a Turkish deployment in support of the Coalition. He agreed to U.S. troop rotation through Incirlik airbase. In line with long-standing U.S. desires, he took a bold step in Nov. 2002 to try to move Turkey away from its no-solution stance on Cyprus and may be prepared now to do more. He seems to be more open than any previous Prime Minister to a re-opening of the Ecumenical Patriarchate's Halki seminary.
¶10. (C) On the other hand he has made public his discomfort with what most fellow Turks also see as American complicity in creation of a de facto independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq and lack of concrete U.S. action against the PKK/KADEK/KHK. He has not controlled anti-American suspicions among the AK parliamentary group or within the Cabinet (DefMin Gonul told us recently on the margins of a symposium in Istanbul that in closed meetings FonMin Gul continues to praise the Parliament's March 1, 2003 turndown of U.S. deployment and to advocate a more Arab/Islamic foreign policy orientation as a counter to relations with the U.S.). Nevertheless, Erdogan and Ministers like Gonul and Justice Minister Cicek see U.S. support for his government as essential to his survival, and he wants a successful visit.
The deeper challenges for erdogan
¶11. (C) Erdogan, AK, and his government face half a dozen serious domestic challenges which, if he does not manage them well, will begin to put a severe strain on his ability to govern by late 2004 and on his and our ability to maintain dynamic, deep U.S.-Turkish cooperation:
–Erdogan's character: Erdogan has traits which render him seriously vulnerable to miscalculating the political dynamic, especially in foreign affairs, and vulnerable to attacks by those who would disrupt his equilibrium. First, overbearing pride. Second, unbridled ambition stemming from the belief God has anointed him to lead Turkey (Mustafa Bilginer, a close confidant of Erdogan and his wife Emine from 1997-2003, has analyzed this trait in a draft book on Erdogan's character; Erdogan used Koranic allusion in his speech to the AK Congress in Oct. 2003 to make the point about his God-appointed mission). Third, an authoritarian loner streak which prevents growth of a circle of strong and skillful advisors, a broad flow of fresh information to him, or development of effective communications among the party headquarters, government, and parliamentary group. This streak also makes him exceptionally thin-skinned. Fourth, an overweening desire to stay in power which, despite his macho image, renders him fearful and prone to temporizing even at moments which call for swift and resolute decisions. Fifth, a distrust of women which manifests itself not only in occasional harsh public comments but also in his unwillingness to give women any meaningful decision-making authority in AK.
–Rival centers of power: Cabinet Ministers, Erdogan advisors and a raft of M.P.s constantly tell us of the tensions between Erdogan and Gul, with the latter appearing repeatedly to try to undercut Erdogan. Parliamentary Speaker Bulent Arinc, who has a strong following among more Islamist AK M.P.s, has also caused problems for Erdogan on controversial questions like pushing the right to wear headscarves at State functions. Although Arinc has kept a low profile for the past seven months, he remains a locus of troublemaking, especially on questions involving the U.S. (e.g., troop rotation through Incirlik).
–Lack of technocratic depth: While some AK appointees appear to be capable of learning on the job, others are incompetent or seem to be pursuing private or lodge (cemaat) interests. AK is far from bringing the bureaucracy under control or making it work efficiently. We hear constant anecdotal evidence, not only from those on the secularist left who have deep prejudices against AK but also from contacts on the right, that AK appointees, at the national and provincial levels, are incompetent or narrow-minded Islamists. AK officials – from Cabinet Ministers to local-level party activists across the country – admit to us that the party's choice of competent and broadly acceptable candidates for the March local elections will be exceptionally difficult and the election of controversial or inept AK candidates would complicate AK's ability to govern both at the local and national level.
–Weakness of public relations and the image of hidden agendas: Erdogan lacks advisors who are able to pre-empt or handle the news cycle; none of his advisors has good working relations with the Turkish military. His government has failed continually to consult broadly and openly or to prepare public opinion for legislative initiatives, long-overdue reforms, or foreign policy steps (e.g., pre-war U.S. troop deployment or troop rotation). As a result AK creates the impression, exploited by the Establishment, that it harbors an anti-republican, deep Islamist agenda or is selling out the country, leading to Establishment (dis)information campaigns which cause the government to retreat.
–Corruption: AK rode to power on the common citizen's revulsion against corruption. Charges that Erdogan amassed his fortune through kickbacks as mayor of Istanbul have never been proven but we now hear more and more from insiders that close advisors such as private secretary Hikmet Bulduk, Mucahit Arslan, and Cuneyd Zapsu are engaging in wholesale influence peddling. xxxxx that Erdogan and he benefited “directly” from the award of the Tupras (state petroleum refinery) privatization to a consortium including a Russian partner. Erdogan's direct acquisition of a significant interest in a food distribution company has become a public controversy.
–Islamist complexes and prejudices: Some appointments, such as Prime Ministry Undersecretary Dincer (who stands by his 1995 article calling into question the relevance of the Republic), Education Ministry Undersecretary Birinci (who in the past called himself an “ummetci”, i.e., a follower of a greater Islamic order and an opponent of the Republic), and head of State-run Turkish Radio and Television Demiroz (who once paid homage to Afghan fundamentalist Hekmatyar), have made the core of the State Establishment – Armed Forces, Presidency, and Judiciary – profoundly uneasy. Erdogan's refusal to condemn these positions, the question of the level of influence of Islamic brotherhoods and groups (including the followers of Fethullah Gulen) on the government, and the presence of Turkish Hizbullah supporters in AK Party provincial structures in the Southeast have also raised deep concerns among many long-standing Embassy contacts who themselves are pious. Erdogan himself recognizes the pernicious effect of a “closed brotherhood mentality” (cemaatcilik) in political affairs, as reflected in his Jan. 10 speech to a symposium in Istanbul, but how well he can control the phenomenon remains a very open question.
Comment
¶12. (C) As Erdogan rides the twin desires for reform in Turkey and for wider prosperity, he challenges those who have traditionally reserved power and wealth for themselves at least to yield pride of place to a different elite. While his ultimate direction and success remain to be seen, at this time Erdogan is the only partner capable of advancing toward the U.S. vision of a successful, democratic Turkey integrated into Europe. Edelman
Kaydol:
Kayıtlar
(
Atom
)