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26 Mayıs 2012 Cumartesi

2005 tarihli bir Wikileaks kriptosu’nagöre, üç yüksek rütbeli emniyet görevlisi, Amerikan Konsolosluğu’ndan Gülen’in “green card” müracaatı için yardım istiyor. Somut bir talepleri de var: FBI’in Gülen hakkında “temizdir” raporu çıkarmasını istiyorlar (“clean bill of health”).

ID 05ISTANBUL1336



SUBJECT RALLYING SUPPORT FOR THE HOCA


DATE 2005-08-04 00:00:00


CLASSIFICATION SECRET


ORIGIN Consulate ISTANBUL


TEXT S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISTANBUL 001336


SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2015


TAGS: CVIS, PHUM, PREL, TU, ISTANBUL


SUBJECT: RALLYING SUPPORT FOR THE HOCA


Classified By: Acting Consul General Stuart Smith. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). This message was coordinated with Embassy Ankara.


1. (C) Summary: In a farewell luncheon for Consul General, ISTANBULChief Rabbi Ishak Haleva noted that he is wrestling with a difficult request from a local foundation for a letter in support of FETHULLAHGulen, the Turkish-Muslim spiritual leader of a major Islamist lodge who is currently residing in the United States. Haleva said that those who approached him indicated that Gulen will soon seek to adjust his immigration status in the United States, and needs the testimonial to address the belief in parts of the U.S. government that he is a "radical Islamist" whose moderate message cloaks a more sinister and radical agenda. This concern apparently stems in part from FBIdocuments that Gulen supporters received through a recent FOIA request in the U.S.. Separately, business contacts with links to Gulen confirmed the fact that they are soliciting such testimonials at Gulen's personal request, while ISTANBUL Legat was also approached by POLICE  contacts with Gulenist links who asked that the bureau provide a "clean bill of health" for Gulen. End Summary.


2. (C) Foundation Approach: In his luncheon with the Consul General, Haleva emphasized the quandary the Foundation  request had created for him. While he did not wish to provide an open-ended "to whom it may concern" testimonial  that could be used broadly (text of the foundation's proposed letter is in para 6), given his own lack of certainty of Gulen's ultimate intentions, he also could not simply turn the request aside, given the assistance Gulen has provided to Turkey's Jewish Community in the past. While no final decision has been made, Haleva indicated he is leaning towards providing a more limited letter, addressed to U.S. immigration officials (he asked that we provide the name of an appropriate addressee), and limited to the community's specific interactions with Gulen and his movement. Subsequently, after learning that the Ecumenical Patriarch and Armenian Patriarch had been similarly approached, but had demurred, Haleva told Consul General that he was rethinking whether even a limited letter is appropriate.


3. (C) Encomiums: Haleva's and his Orthodox and Armenian colleagues' wary attitude is similar to that of much of Turkish officialdom and of our best contacts among conservative Turks with a deep knowledge of Islam and of Turkis brotherhoods/lodges, but contrasts with the praise Gulen has received in other quarters. Most notably, the Vatican Nuncio surprised a visiting Congressional delegation during a recent breakfast meeting here by not just enthusiastically praising Gulen, but also presenting the delegation's chairman with a book about him. (Gulen's meeting with Pope John Paul II several years ago excited much controversy in Turkey, with some rival brotherhoods/lodges accusing Gulen of selling out while other pious Turks who have been among our best contacts assessed the move as the ultimate in hypocrisy.) Gulen has also attracted steady interest among commentators. Some writers, mainly those who write for the Gulenist daily "Zaman" or who teach at the Gulenist Fatih University in ISTANBUL, or who have otherwise identified themselves with his movement, assert that Gulen's public message of "dialogue" is a more mature expression of Islam. Given the Gulenists' penetration of the National POLICE(TNP) and many media outlets and their record of going after anyone who criticizes Gulen, others who are skeptical about Gulen's intentions feel intimidated from expressing their views publicly. Privately they note: (1) Gulen's sharply radical past as a fiery Islamist preacher in the 1970's-1980's; (2) his ruthlessness in banishing people from his more inner circles (Gulenists have admitted to us that they are petrified of making a "mistake"); (3) his and his inner circles' insistence that followers of Gulen mediate their study of Islam totally through his writings, i.e. no tolerance of dissent or critical thinking; and (4) the cult-like obedience and conformity that he and the layers of his movement insist on in his global network of schools, his media outlets, and his business associations.


4. (C) Confirmation: The specific Gulenist concern about negative U.S. attitudes towards Gulen apparently stems in part from a November 2004 FBIreport that Gulen's lawyer obtained through a FOIA request. Three ranking Turkish National POLICEcontacts recently raised the issue in a meeting with ISTANBULlegat, in which they also provided material on Gulen and asked if the FBI could provide some sort of "clean bill of health" for him. (Note: Legat demurred, given the apparent intention to mount a public relations campaign with such material.) In a separate farewell call on the Consul General, Mustafa Gunay, Secretary General of the Gulen-linked Business Life Association (ISHAD) confirmed that a general effort is underway to solicit testimonials attesting to Gulen's good character. He noted that the initiative stems from Gulen himself, who is concerned that some in the U.S. may doubt his good faith, given a decision by U.S. immigration authorities this year that for the first time denied him the right to travel outside of the country.


5. (C) Comment: Given Gulen's public message of tolerance and "dialogue," and his parallel effort to reconcile Islam and  science and modernity, a number of Western observers have latched on to him as a Muslim teacher (or "hoca") who they  prefer to see as a voice of "moderate Islam." He has spoken frequently against terrorism (although he is careful not to  explore the link between some readings of the Koran and terrorist violence in the name of Islam). He has also acted in ways which the Jewish community interprets as supportive of its existence.


6. (C) Deep and widespread doubts remain, however, about his movement's ultimate intentions. We have anecdotal evidence of the pressure that the various circles of his movement put on people they have drawn in, for instance severe pressure on businessmen to continue to give money to support Gulenist schools or other activities. We have multiple reliable reports that the Gulenists use their school network (including dozens of schools in the U.S.) to cherry-pic students they think are susceptible to being molded as proselytizers and we have steadily heard reports about how the schools indoctrinate boarding students.


7. (S) These facts, when coupled with the Gulenists' penetration of state institutions, including the TNP (as reflected in ISTANBUL legat's meeting-- Ankara septel will address the impact this development has had on POLICE anti-terrorism efforts), hint that a much harder line, a sense of world-wide Islamist proselytizing mission, lies just under the surface. In short, the Gulenists' efforts to mold future generations through their international school network (which exists throughout Turkey, Asia (e.g., Afghanistan and Pakistan), and Africa, in addition to the U.S.) and their documented effort to infiltrate not just Turkish business circles but governmental institutions as well have raised questions about whether their moderation would continue if they gained a preponderant voice in Turkish Islam. Haleva's caution thus appears well-judged. End Comment.


8. (C) Draft letter text (as proposed by the Gulenist Foundation) but NOT/NOT accepted by the Chief Rabbi:


To Whom It May Concern:


As the world has been suffering from violence, hostility, and tyranny, mankind became painfully aware of an absence of an environment in which people can realize the value of understanding of each other, passion, and generosity.


I would like to take this opportunity to talk with you about Mr. FETHULLAH Gulen, who is a Turkish-Muslim scholar and a spiritual leader of a global faith-based movement. Mr. Gulen has influenced many people toward creating tolerance and dialogue environment through which we can effectively respond to world's troubles, including violence and tyranny. To my knowledge he is one of the leading figures who can bring people together to achieve what I called "world of peace." Mr. Gulen emphasized the necessity of dialogue among Muslims. However, Mr. Gulen's ideas about tolerance and dialogue are not restricted to Muslims but also extend to Christians, Jews and members of other faiths. Mr. Gulen maintains that there are more bonds bringing people together, even from different faiths, than separating them. As one of the founding members of the Foundation of Journalists and Writers, a group that promotes dialogue and tolerance among
all social strata. Mr. Gulen has received welcome from almost all segments of life. With this perspective of dialogue he has visited and received leading Turkish and international figures including Pope John Paul II, the Vatican Ambassador to Turkey, the Patriarchs of Turkey's Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, and Armenian community, myself as the Chief Rabbi of Turkey's Jewish community, leading journalists, columnists, television and movie stars, and intellectuals.


I would like to thank you for taking your time to talk to you about the mission of Mr. Gulen who dedicated himself for the good of others regardless of their beliefs and opinions, and embraced them.


Thank you very much for your attention, and I wish God will help us on our mission to create peaceful world.


Respectfully,


Ishak Haleva


Chief Rabbi of Jews Community in Turkey


SMITH




26 Nisan 2012 Perşembe

ABD BÜYÜKELÇİSİ'NİN AMERİKA'YA GÖNDERDİĞİ 22 MART 2003 TARİHLİ "GİZLİ" İBARELİ KRİPTO

"...(TÜRK GENERALLER) TAYYİP ERDOĞAN'IN DAVRANIŞLARINDAN BÜYÜK RAHATSIZLIK DUYMAKTADIR.
   R.TAYYİP ERDOĞAN GÜÇLÜ BİR MÜTTEFİĞİMİZDİR.
  
 ORGENERALLERİN TUTUM VE DURUŞU, AMERİKAN MENFAATLERİNİN KORUNMASI VE DEVAMI AÇISINDAN ENGELLEYİCİ OLMAKTADIR...

 ORGENERAL HİLMİ ÖZKÖK'ÜN SADAKATLİ DURUŞU MUTLAKA SAHİPLENİLMELİDİR. MUHALİF ORGENERALLER, ORGENERAL HİLMİ ÖZKÖK'ÜN ÇİZGİSİNE İTİRAZ ETMEKTEDİRLER...

 TAYYİP ERDOĞAN'IN SİYASİ KAVRAYIŞI VE BÖLGE ÜLKELERİ İLE TÜRKİYE İÇİNDEKİ YÜKSEK ORANDAKİ HALK DESTEĞİNİN KALICI DESTEĞE DÖNÜŞMESİ MUTLAK DESTEK OLARAK DEĞERLENDİRİLMELİDİR.

 ERDOĞAN, KENDİSİNE DESTEĞİN DEVAMI HALİNDE, ABD'NİN BİR MÜTEFİĞİ OLARAK, ORTADOĞU VE IRAK DAHİL OLMAK ÜZERE TÜRK HAVA SAHASINI, KARA VE DEMİR YOLLARI İLE MERSİN VE İSKENDERUN LİMANLARINI KULLANIMIMIZA AÇACAĞINI TAAHHÜT ETMEKTEDİR.

  ZATEN ZAMAN İÇERİSİNDE BU İMKANLARIN BÜYÜK BÖLÜMÜ GERÇEKLEŞTİ. BÖLGEDEKİ HAVA HAREKETİMİZE YETERİNCE KATKI SAĞLANDI. ANCAK TÜRK ORDUSUNDAKİ ÜST RÜTBELİ SUBAYLAR TARAFINDAN SÜREKLİ ENGELLENMEK İSTENMEKTEYİZ. BU SUBAYLARLA İLGİLİ ÖZEL KAYNAK VERİLERİMİZ CRT (KRİPTO) OLARAK GÖNDERİLMİŞTİR. BU DOSYA İLE İLGİLİ VERİ TOPLAMALARIMIZ DEVAM ETMEKTEDİR.

  AMERİKAN MENFAATLERİNE KARŞI ÇIKAN ORG.AYTAÇ YALMAN, ORG.ŞENER ERUYGUR, ORG.ÇETİN DOĞAN, ORG.HURŞİT TOLON, ORG.FEVZİ TÜRKERİ, ORG.TUNCER KILIÇ, ORG.YAŞAR BÜYÜKANIT, GENELKURMAY BAŞKANI HİLMİ ÖZKÖK'ÜN EMİR VE TALİMATLARINA UYMADIKLARI GİBİ, ORG.HİLMİ ÖZKÖK'E HER AN MUHTURA VEREBİLİRLER.

   BU BAKIMDAN DEĞERLENDİRİLDİĞİNDE GÜÇLÜ BİR MEDYA GRUBUNUN OLUŞTURULMASINA ACİLEN İHTİYAÇ DUYULMAKTADIR. BU İHTİYAÇ ACİLEN GİDERİLMELİDİR.

  BU KONU RECEP TAYYİP ERDOĞAN İLE PAYLAŞILMIŞ OLUP "GEREĞİNİN DEĞERLENDİRİLECEĞİ HAKKINDA OLUMLU DEĞERLENDİRMELERİN YAPILDIĞI VE YAPILACAĞI TEYİDİ ALINMIŞTIR.

  17 NO'LU KLASÖRDEKİ MEVCUT BİLGİ VE BELGELERİN İNCELENEREK DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİNDE BÜYÜK YARAR VARDIR. YAŞAR BÜYÜKANIT HAKKINDAKİ BİLGİ VE BELGELERİN R.TAYYİP ERDOĞAN'A ULAŞTIRILMASININ ONAYI GEREKMEKTEDİR.

  GELİŞMELERİN IŞIĞINDA VERİLER DEĞERLENDİRİLECEKTİR. A,B,C,D,E,F,G KODLU KLASÖRLERİN İÇERİĞİNİN TENSİBİ VE UYGULANMASI İÇİN 500 KİŞİLİK ÖZEL ADAMLARIN DEVREYE SOKULMASI GELİŞMELERE GÖRE DEĞERLENDİRİLMELİDİR.

  ONAY BEKLİYORUM."

                                                                                                                                                              PEARSON
  

18 Kasım 2011 Cuma

WIKILEAKS 2009 'In a meeting between the CHP's Kemal Kilicdaroglu and the DTP's Fatma Kurtulan, the AKP government's "democratic move" was discussed.

Viewing cable 09ANKARA1218, TURKISH MEDIA REACTION
Created 2009-08-19 11:24
Released 2011-08-30 01:44
Classification UNCLASSIFIED
Origin Embassy Ankara

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001218

SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EUR/SE, EUR/PD, NEA/PD, DRL
JCS PASS J-5/CDR S. WRIGHT
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC KMDR TU PREL KPAO

SUBJECT: TURKISH MEDIA REACTION

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 19, 2009

In Today's Papers

Atalay Meets DISK, TUSIAD Under 'Kurdish Initiative' Media outlets report that under the frame of the ruling AKP government's 'Kurdish Initiative,' Interior Minister Besir Atalay visited Tuesday the leftist labor union DISK and Turkey's leading business grouping TUSIAD. Atalay said after his meeting with DISK officials, "This process, which is full of painful experiences, is not only the problem of the AKP or the government but is the responsibility of all of us." Atalay later met with TUSIAD board members. Speaking after the meeting, Atalay said the association had contributed to a number of social issues, adding the government attached significant importance to the contributions of TUSIAD.
TUSIAD chairperson Arzuhan Dogan Yalcindag said the democratization process and public consensus were essential in solving the problem.

Erdogan May Meet Baykal, Bahceli On 'Kurdish Move' (Hurriyet) Mainstream Hurriyet the AKP government will also consult its 'Kurdish Initiative' with the military General Staff (TGS) and the National Security Council (MGK). The issue will be discussed at the MGK meeting if requested by the military members of the council. The government has reportedly taken into consideration the messages coming from opposition CHP leader Deniz Baykal, and sources say Prime Minister Erdogan was likely to meet Baykal as part of the "democratic move." Erdogan may also meet Devlet Bahceli, leader of  the MHP, after the party's congress scheduled in November, comments Hurriyet.

CHP Holds 'Secret Talks' With Opinion Leaders On Kurdish Question  (Zaman)  Islamist-oriented Zaman says on its front page the opposition CHP has launched a "secret initiative" and that it meets with opinion leaders regarding Turkey's Kurdish question. CHP met with over 20 opinion leaders and tribal leaders last week, and will make public a  report next week. The last touches on the report will be made after examining the roadmap to be released by the PKK leader Ocalan, according to Zaman. Islamist-oriented Yeni Safak says in spite of its criticism of Prime Minister Erdogan's recent meeting with the Kurdish DTP leader Ahmet Turk, CHP was now holding "secret meetings with the DTP. In a meeting between the CHP's Kemal Kilicdaroglu and the DTP's Fatma Kurtulan, the AKP government's "democratic move" was discussed. The DTP asked CHP to support the new process, says Yeni Safak.

Ocalan's Road Map Will Be Revealed At Conrad Hotel Mainstream Vatan reports that jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan's
lawyers will go to Imrali today to collect Ocalan's "road map" for the Kurdish issue. It has been learned that the lawyers are
planning to have press conference at the Conrad Hotel in Istanbul tomorrow and press, including the foreign press have been informed about the event. Reportedly, Ocalan's lawyers contacted some other hotels for the press even arrangements but, none of the hotels accepted to host this event. According to Kanal D, agreement with Conrad has not finalized yet but the media already started to get accredited to the event.

President Gul Gives Message Of Unity All papers: At a reception given by the Foreign Ministry, President Gul said that the country's unity was the top priority. Gul interrupted a journalist's question regarding the road map of jailed  PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan and said "Forget Imrali (where Ocalan is serving life imprisonment). They are not our interlocutor. Every
country should solve its problem by itself. Turkey's unitary structure must be strengthened as a result of all works under way, there should be no threat to this structure."

Editorial Debate on Kurdish Initiative

Taha Akyol wrote in mainstream Milliyet: "What imprisoned leader Ocalan has been talking about is about a project of division based

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on ethnic differences. Instead of focusing on impossible ideas, the DTP and others should take the reaching out EU standards as a main goal to achieve which will certainly be a facilitative tool in this process."

Mehmet Yilmaz wrote in mainstream Hurriyet: "The way Ocalan acts looks as if he is a commander with achieved victory who offers a peace plan. This kind of approach, along with some inflammatory remarks by DTP members will not be helping the process at all. Instead PKK has started to sabotage it already."

Hakan Albayrak wrote in Islamist oriented Yeni Safak: "There are sensible statements coming from the DTP while Ocalan statements work in the opposite direction. However it is a healthy thing to be able to discuss every opinion in a complete free platform. This is the very time to address the Kurdish issue because it is backed by people strongly."

Bejan Matur wrote in Islamist oriented Zaman: "Turkey's Kurds are in a struggle for their existence which will make Turkey a more democratized country in the end. This process will have an impact not only on Kurds' relations with the state but also it will transform relations of Alevis, religious and minority groups with the state. In addition to that, Iraqi Kurds are also in need of getting closer to Turkey."

Muharrem Sarikaya wrote in tabloid HaberTurk: "The best description regarding the Kurdish initiative came from Minister Babacan who underlined the parliament as the venue for solution process."

Foreign Minister Davutoglu: "There Is No Special Request For Afghanistan" Mainstream Hurriyet quotes Foreign Minister Davutoglu as saying "Turkish military performs duties in Afghanistan under the ISAF. Naturally, when Turkey takes over the commanding duties, there will be an increase on the troop numbers. However, there is absolutely no request received for the combatant troops to be sent to Afghanistan."

Afghan Elections

Media outlets note the elections in Afghanistan will be taking place under the shadows of the Taliban, terror, bombs, poverty, and weapons. Mainstream Sabah headlines, "An Election in the Shadow of The Taliban," and the article reports, "The Afghan public is going to the polls for the second time to select a president," but, "However, the Taliban has killed 19 people in attacks over the past 72 hours and they have threatened those who go to vote." Sabah also comments, "A war-weary Afghanistan is electing a president amid the bombings." Mainstream Milliyet headlines, "An Election in the Shadow of Terror," and notes, "The radically Islamist Taliban are hoping there will be a low turnout." Islamist-oriented Zaman headlines, "An Election in the Shadow of Weapons," and the paper notes, "Afghanistan has been at war for the last 30 years," and "Afghans are heading to the polls for the second time in the country's history." Mainstream Haberturk headlines sarcastically, "It's Democracy Time for Afghanistan," next to a photo of the wreckage from a suicide bomb in Kabul.

Liberal Radikal carries a photo next to the headline, "This is The Afghanistan-Type Electoral System."

Next to this photo, mainstream Haberturk headlines, "It's Democracy Time for Afghanistan."

Khamenei: "Muslims - Let's Unite, Mahdi Is Coming" (Radikal)  Media outlets note Iran's religious leader has called on the Muslim world to form an army in anticipation of the coming of Mahdi, Islam's messianic savior. Mainstream Hurriyet reports on its front page that Iran's Ali Hosseini-Khamenei called on "Muslim countries" including Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, to "unite and form an army" for the "imminent coming" of Islam's

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messianic savior, Mahdi. Hurriyet notes "Khamanei made a call to the Islamic World," to "fight the U.S. and Israel."

U.S. Prepares A New Peace Plan for A Palestinian State (Zaman)  Islamist-oriented Zaman reports, "Barack Obama has a new plan to solve the crisis in the Middle East," as Israel's PM Netanyahu is considering "an un-armed Palestinian state" in which "Jerusalem will be a capital shared between Palestine and Israel." Leftist-nationalist Cumhuriyet headlines, "A Plan for An Unarmed Palestine," and notes, "Washington is greeting (Egyptian President) Mubarek by preparing a new plan," for the establishment of a Palestinian state.

TV News (CNN Turk)

Domestic

- Turkey's National Security Council (MGK) will convene Thursday. President Gul said the government's Kurdish initiative will be discussed at the meeting.

- On Wednesday, the religious affairs directorate (Diyanet) will hold the third Alevi Workshop in Ankara with the participation of  theologians and government officials.

- A 16-year old drug dealer is killed in a children's penitentiary in Pozanti in Adana. The parents of the boy have applied to the authorities, awaiting an explanation about the murder.

- Jordan's Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh will visit Turkey on Wednesday. Judeh will be received by President Gul.

- The second round of collective bargaining talks between the government and civil servants' unions will be kicked off Wednesday.

- Around 1,000 teahouse owners rallied in Ankara to protest the expanded smoking restrictions introduced by the government.

World

- Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki visits Damascus for security talks with Syrian President Assad.

- Iranian President Ahmadinejad will submit his new cabinet list to the parliament on Wednesday.

- Georgia's parliament votes unanimously to leave the Commonwealth

of Independent States.

- A Turk who owns a construction company in the Netherlands has been stabbed to death in the fifth slaying of a Turk in the country over the last one month.

- The IMF says global recession is now over and a recovery has begun.

- South Korea is preparing to launch its first space rocket.

SILLIMAN

30 Ekim 2011 Pazar

Prof. Dr. Yalçın Küçük 'ün "Appeasement & Şantaj " Yazısında "Sızan Belgeler" üzerine

Önce, Sn. Yalçın Küçük'ün 28,10,2011 tarihinde "Aydınlık" Gazetesi'nde yayınlanan "Appeasement & Şantaj " başlıklı yazısından bir bölüm aktarmak istiyorum:

Hediye politikası

Yalnız, bizde yüksek komutanların appeasement tuzağına kolaylıkla düştüklerini biliyoruz. Bu sözcük "teskin etme", ilk önce 1939 Münich Mutabakatı vesilesiyle kullanılmıştı; Hitler'i appease etmek için ülkeler verdiler.


Bizde Yaşar ve İlker Paşalar'ın askeri mahkemeleri hediye etmeleri, Birinci Ordu'da "Binbaşı Ahmet Vakası" ve hele hele İlker Paşa'nın Seferberlik Dairesi'ni teslimi, "bize güvenirler" demişti, vahim işlerdir, işaret ettikten sonra "chantage" meselesine geliyorum.


Sızan belgeler
Wikileaks belgesi, "FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA" ve "TO RUEHC'/SECSTATE WASHDCIMMEDIATE 8110" işaretlerini taşıyor. Ankara'da Amerikan Büyükelçiliği'nden Washington'daki Dışişleri Bakanlığı'na gitmektedir. TNP, Turkish National Police, Amerikan Büyükelçiliğine, "briefing" veriyor; "an extensive briefing on their investigation into Ergenekon", Ergenekon soruşturmaları üzerine geniş çaplı açıklama yapıyor, yapan Türk Emniyeti'dir. Sağlam, güvenilir, inanılmaz diyorum ve "ölmüşüz de habarımız yokmuş", ekliyorum. Şimdilik iki nokta üzerinde durabiliriz.


Bir, TNP has told Legatt that the Ergenekon investigation could snare current Constitutional Court judges as well as several active-duty high-ranking military generals, Türk Polis Şefleri, Anayasa Mahkemesi üyeleri ile halen görevde bulunan, çok yüksek rütbeli birçok generali tuzağa düşürebileceklerini söylediler. Güzel, "snare" sözcüğünü "başlarına çorap örmek" olarak anlayabiliriz ve "military" sözcüğü Amerikan İngilizcesi'nde, sadece kara kuvvetlerini anlatmaktadır. Buradayım.


İki, They had discovered photos and documents relating to the sexual activities of former... Polisler, bazı çok yüksek görevli generallerin aileleriyle ilgili cinsel fotoğraf ve dokümanlara sahiptirler. Bu bilgileri Washington ile "paylaşmış" olduklarını anlıyoruz, isimler var, saklıyorum. Ayrıntıya girmiyorum.


Şantaj halleri
Burada duruyorum. Tabii bu fotoğraf, film de olabilir ve dokümanların ilgili yüksek görevdeki generallere, görevde oldukları zamanda, gönderilmiş olduğunu tahmin ediyoruz. Yüksek Komutanlığın bilgilerine arz ediyorum. Hasdal’a soruyorum, bir de bu haller var. Bazı gazetelerde olduğunu sanıyorum."


   Sn.Küçük'ün durduğu yerden devam edelim.. Belge, "Türk Ulusal Polisi"nin 21 Kasım 2008 tarihinde Amerikan Büyükelçiliği'ne, Ergenekon soruşturması üzerine kapsamlı bir brifing verdiğini haber veriyor. Belge "gizlilik" niteliğine sahip, 24 Kasım 2008 tarihinde ABD'e geçiliyor ve Wikileaks tarafından 1 Eylül 2011 tarihinde serbestleştiriliyor. Belge'nin "özet" bölümünde, brifingin bilgilendirici mükemmel genel bir bakış sunduğu haber veriliyor , brifingi verenlerin emekli general "Veli Küçük"ün ve ASAM'ın önceki başkanı "Ümit Özdağ"ın anahtar rol oynadıklarını vurguladıklarını, bu soruşturma'da Türk Adaleti'ne güvenemediklerini not ettiklerini bildirmekte ve brifingin, Ergenekon'un "ABD karşıtlığı" üzerinde odaklaştığını, bunun da Türk Ulusal Polisi'nin kendi gayretlerine açık ya da örtülü ABD desteğini sağlamayı umduğu izlenimi yarattığını bildirmektedir. Bu bölüm, Türk Ulusal Polisi'nin Türk Halkı'ın Ergenekon Davası'na olan ilgisini hızla yitirdiğinin de kesinlikle farkında olduğunu haber vererek bitiyor.

   Şimdi de sayın "Küçük"ün söz konusu ettiği bölümleri orjinal belge'den aktaralım:
"
They had found evidence about a bribe paid to CHP leader Baykal. They had also found information that seemed to implicate the Neuman and Adenauer Foundations. They had discovered photos and documents relating to the sexual activities of former CHOD Buyukanit's daughter."

Yani, ABD'nin desteğine talip olan "Ulusal Polisimiz!", o zamanki CHP Lideri Baykal'ın rüşvet aldığına dair deliller bulduklarını ve önceki Genelkurmay Başkanı Büyükanıt'ın kızına ait cinsel içerikli fotoğraf ve belgelere sahip olduklarını ABD'li AMİRLERİ'ne ! haber veriyor.

  Belgenin son bölümü "YORUM" bölümü ve elçi'nin bu görüşme üzerindeki kanaatini ABD'ye bildirmesini içeriyor. Elçi'nin yorumundan bir bölüm:

"....but the TNP (Turkish National Police)  briefers appeared strikingly confident that they have compiled the necessary proof for a successful prosecution. Still, they also appeared relatively resigned to the prospect that the Turkish judiciary, whether manipulated or simply erratic, might prove unconvinced. The briefing's emphasis on Ergenekon's anti-West and anti-U.S. messages seemed designed to enlist USG support, whether tacit or direct, of the prosecution effort. This might reflect TNP's perception that media coverage of the trial's various fumbles has produced a negative impact on Turkish public opinion -- which recent polls confirm..."

10 Aralık 2010 Cuma

Sırdaş hesaplar yüzünden Türkiye’yi kaç defa sattılar?

AYDINLIK-*5,12,2010- SAYI:1216
DOĞU PERİNÇEK

ABD DIŞİŞLERİNİN İÇ YAZIŞMALARI


Wikileaks belgelerinin önemi, ABD Dışişleri Bakanlığı’nın iç yazışmaları olmasındadır. Devletlerin dışarıda bilgi toplayan kurumlarından en önemlisi, dışişleri örgütlenmesidir.

ABD, emperyalist devletlerin de ağasıdır; bir süper devlettir. Bütün devletler gibi, bilgiye dayanılarak yönetilir. Her devlet, çıkarlarını hayata geçirebilmek için, gerçeklere ulaşmaya çalışır. Hele dünya ölçeğinde politika yapan bir devlet, doğru bilgilere dayanarak, doğru hesaplar yapmak zorundadır. İç yazışmalarda, bilgi karartma, bilgi bozma amacı pek yoktur. Bir devlet içindeki farklı siyasetler, kuşkusuz toplanan bilgilere de yansır. O nedenle dışişleri memurunun görevi, kendi devletini doğru bilgilendirmesidir. Belgeler gizli kalacağı için, kamuoyu kaygısı da yoktur. O nedenle gönderilen raporlar, çıplak bilgilerdir. Üstüne elbise giydirilmeden, içine katkı maddesi konmadan gönderilmesi ilkedir. Bilginin nasıl kullanılacağına, karartma ve bozma işlemlerine veya üstünün örtülmesine karar verecek olan makam var!

YURTDIŞINDAKİ BANKA HESAPLARI “DEDİKODU” MU?

Bu bilgileri, “dedikodu” diye önemsizleştirmek isteyenler, AKP’nin “özel” birimleridir; bir de daha önce ABD Büyükelçiliği’ne bilgi taşıdığı için, her an bu görevinin ortaya çıkması korkusu içinde olanlardır.

ABD’nin Türkiye raporlarında yer alan bilgilere tek tek “dedikodu” mu diye bakılmalıdır. Hangisi dedikodudur?

-Türkiye’nin AB kapısına bağlanıp, orada denetim altına alınması mı dedikodu?

-Tayyip Erdoğan’ın yabancı bankalarındaki “sırdaş hesapları” mı dedikodu?

-İncirlik’teki nükleer silahlar mı dedikodu?

-Tayyip Erdoğan’ın milyarlarca dolarlık “birikimleri” mi dedikodu?

-Remzi Gür’lerin Tayyip Erdoğan’ın yurtdışındaki gizli kasası olduğu mu dedikodu?

-Tüpraş’ın özelleştirilmesinde ceplere indirilen 400 milyon dolar mı dedikodu?

-ABD ile PKK arasındaki işbirliği mi dedikodu?

-Türkiye’nin bir mafya tarafından yönetildiği mi dedikodu?

-AKP ricalinin ABD Büyükelçiliğine bilgi taşıdığı mı dedikodu?

-Tayyip Erdoğan ile Abdullah Gül arasındaki “kadim dostluk” mu dedikodu?

SIZINTI MI? TERTİP Mİ?

Bu belgeler, ABD devletinin kontrolü dışındaki güçlerce mi yayınlanıyor, yoksa ABD’nin hakim güçleri içinde bir grubun planlı bir tertibi mi söz konusudur?

Bu konuda sağlıklı saptamalarda bulunmak için, devamına bakmak gerekiyor.

Ancak ne olursa olsun, Cumhuriyetin çöküşünü sergileyen gerçeklere hiçbir yurtsever kayıtsız kalamaz.

AYNI ZAMANDA ŞANTAJ MALZEMESİ

Yalanlarla şantaj yapılamaz. Şantaj ve tehdidin malzemesi gerçeklerdir.

ABD Büyükelçiliklerinin Türkiye’de şantaj malzemesi toplamakta üstün bir gayret içinde olduğu görülüyor.

Soru şudur:

İsviçre bankalarındaki gizli hesaplar, yolsuzluklar, işlenen en ağır suçlar nedeniyle Türkiye acaba kaç kez satılmıştır?

Herkes bilmelidir ki, Türkiye’yi yönetenlerin vurgunları, yolsuzlukları, yalnızca suça ve ahlaki çözülmeye işaret etmez.

Yolsuzluğa ve ahlaksızlığa batan bu yöneticiler, acaba ABD’nin hangi dayatmalarına boyun eğdiler, Türkiye’yi kaç kez pazarladılar?

BUNLAR MI MÜSLÜMAN?

ABD Büyükelçiliğine bilgi yetiştirenler, kendi liderlerini ve arkadaşlarını emperyalistlere gammazlamak ve çekiştirmek, çıkarcılık, yiyicilik, ahlaki çöküntü ve dağılma manzaraları, toplumu düşünen herkese hüzün verdi.

Herkes, bunlar mı devleti yönetiyor diye soruyor ve yazıklanıyor.

Müslümanlığın temel ahlakı açısından bakıldığı zaman, “bunlar mı Müslüman” sorusu da dile geliyor.

Hz. Muhammed, “Yöneticileri yoksul ölen milletler zengin olur. Yöneticileri zengin olan milletler fakirlik çeker” diyordu.

MAFYA REJİMİ

Bu belgeler, emperyalist-kapitalist sistemin son manzaralarıdır. Sistemin merkezindeki ABD veya sistemin kenarındaki Türkiye, mafyalar tarafından yönetilmektedir. Kaynakların kâr esasına göre dağıldığı sistem gitmiş, yerini mafya rantları diyebileceğimiz bir sömürü tipi almıştır. Devlet mekanizması da, mafya rantlarını paylaştıran ve koruyan bir örgüte dönüşmüştür. Halk üzerinde Gladyo tertip, şantaj ve baskılarıyla ayakta kalmaya çabalayan bir şiddet aygıtı kurulmuştur. “Demokrasi”, Mafya-Gladyo rejiminin örtüsüdür.

Gladyo-Mafya-Tarikat rejimlerinin devlet adamları olmuyor; Sözleşmeli Personeli oluyor.

Daha belgelerin binde biri yayımlandı. Bunların hepsi ciddi bilgilerdir. ABD Büyükelçilerinin, AKP yöneticileri hakkında “Tayyip Erdoğan’ın buldog köpeği”, “yalakalar”, “AB koridorlarında futbolcu edasıyla dolaşanlar” gibi “değerlendirmeleri”, tarih boyunca efendilerin köleleri hakkındaki aşağılamalarıdır. Spartaküs dizisinde pek çok örneği ilgiyle izleniyor.

Erdoğan’a WikiLeaks yanıtı

Cumhuriyet 09.12.2010
WASHINGTON (Cumhuriyet) - ABD Dışişleri Bakanlığı Sözcüsü Philip Crowley, Başbakan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’ın, WikiLeaks belgeleriyle ilgili olarak, “ABD’li diplomatların dedikodu, magazin, iddia ve iftiralardan oluşan gayri ciddi yazışmaları” demesi hakkında, “Diplomatlarımız ülkelerde yaşanan gelişmelerle ilgili samimi ve dürüst değerlendirmelerini sunarlar. Bu faydalı ve önemli” dedi.

Crowley, düzenlediği basın toplantısında Erdoğan’ın açıklamalarıyla ilgili bir soru üzerine, “Diplomatlarımız bunu yapmaya devam edecek. Diğer ülkelerin diplomatları da aynısını yaparlar” diye konuştu. Bir gazetecinin, “Erdoğan’ın İsviçre’de banka hesaplarının bulunduğu iddialarını” belirterek, bu konuda herhangi bir Türk yetkiliyle temasa geçip geçmediklerini sorması üzerine Crowley, belgelerin içeriğine dair yorum yapmayacağını söyledi.

Laptopları bırakın ricası

Crowley, WikiLeaks olayının ülkeden ülkeye farklılık gösterebilecek “bazı etkilerinin” görülebileceğini kabul ettiklerini, önceden daha fazla diplomatın yer aldığı bazı toplantılara şimdi daha az sayıda diplomatın katıldığını, en azından bir toplantıda, dizüstü bilgisayarların odanın dışında bırakılması yönünde ricada bulunulduğunu da belirtti.

Hem ABD Dışişleri hem de Savunma Bakanlığı (Pentagon) yetkilileri, bazı ülkelerle güven sorunu yaşandığını ve ABD’nin dış ilişkilerinin zarar gördüğünü belirttiler.

WikiLeaks Belgeleri ve Türkiye

Cumhuriyet 09.12.2010
Davutoğlu, Clinton’la görüşmesinin ardından “Clinton Türkiye’den özür diledi” şeklinde bir açıklama yaptı. Oysa, gerçekte Clinton’ın Türkiye’den özür dilemediği, sadece gizli kalması gereken belgelerin açıklanması nedeniyle derinden üzüntü duyduğunu söylediği ortaya çıktı. TBMM kürsüsünden de açıkladım. Yalan söylemeyi itiyat haline getirmiş bir Dışişleri Bakanımız var.


Şükrü M. ELEKDAĞ CHP İstanbul Milletvekili

WikiLeaks ifşaatının ABD dış politikasına çok ağır zararlar vereceğinin ve bazı devletlerle arasında skandal boyunda krizlere yol açacağının ortaya çıkması, bu sızmaların ABD tarafından yürütülen bir “dezenformasyon” ve “manipülasyon” operasyonu olduğu yolundaki iddiaların inandırıcılığını kaybetmesine yol açtı. Halen, ifşaattan en çok zarar görenlerin başında, ABD büyükelçisinin portresini “Nezaket ziyaretimde uyuyakaldı. Yorgun ve aklı başka yerde görünüyor” şeklinde çizdiği İtalyan Başbakanı Berlusconi ile mafya babası olarak tanımlanan ve mafyaya siyasi suçlar işlettiği iddia edilen Başbakan Putin geliyor. Belgeler, her ikisi hakkında fevkalade hakaretamiz ve küçültücü olayları ve akçalı yolsuzluk iddialarını içeriyor.

“Bu durumda AKP iktidarının, WikiLeaks sızmalarının arkasında ABD ve İsrail’in bulunduğu ve gerçekte AKP iktidarı ile Başbakan Erdoğan’ı ve çevresini hedef alan bir komplo olduğu yolundaki iddiası da çöküverdi.” Ancak belgelerde yer alan, Başbakan Erdoğan’ın “vizyonsuz” , “okumayan” ve “dizginsiz hırsa sahip” olduğu, ayrıca “İsviçre bankalarında hesapları bulunduğu”, Başbakan’ın danışmanlarının ve çevresinin, “sığ”, “yeteneksiz”, “yalaka” ve “yolsuzluğa bulaşmış” kişilerden oluştuğu, Davutoğlu’nun “olağanüstü tehlikeli ve deli” bir kişi olduğu, hükümetin dış politikasının ise “İslami eğilimli” ve “Rolls Royce ihtirasına ama Rover gücüne sahip bulunduğu” yolundaki iddia ve yorumlar, AKP iktidarını öfkelendirmeye devam ediyor. Bu nedenle, iktidar ve yandaş basın, ABD büyükelçilik raporlarının gerçek dışı bilgileri ve “uydurma iftira ve söylentileri” içerdiğine Türk kamuoyunu inandırmak için, bunları “sığ”, “kalitesiz”, “dedikodudan başka bir şey olmayan”, “ciddiyetten uzak” ve “önemsenmemesi gereken” belgeler olarak niteleyen yoğun bir psikolojik harekâta girişmiş bulunuyor. “Başbakan da kendisi hakkındaki iftiraları ‘araştırıp soruşturmadan’ rapor eden ABD büyükelçileri hakkında yargı yoluna başvuracağını söyledi ve bu diplomatların ABD yönetimince de cezalandırılmasını istedi.”

Başvurulabilecek hukuk yolu yok

Ne var ki, 2 Aralık’ta ABD Dışişleri Bakan Yardımcısı ve Sözcüsü Philip Crowley, “Büyükelçilerimiz ve konsoloslarımızın yaptığı mükemmel işi inkâr etmiyoruz” diyerek ABD’li diplomatların görevlerini ifa ediş tarzlarının sorgulanmayacağının altını çizdi. Bunu takiben 3 Aralık’ta Yabancı Basın Merkezi’nde de ABD diplomatlarına yönelik olarak herhangi bir yasal girişimde bulunulmayacağını açıkladı. Bu yaklaşımla, Obama yönetimi, Diplomatik İlişkiler Hakkında Viyana Sözleşmesi’nin diplomatlara yargı bağışıklığı öngören 39/2 maddesini deldirmeyeceği hususundaki kararlılığını ve diplomatlarına karşı açılabilecek davalara karşı tutum aldığını da ortaya koymuş oldu. ABD’ye ve diplomatlarına karşı başvurulabilecek hukuk yollarına gelince, bu alanda işlerliği olan bir seçenekten söz etmek şu nedenlerle gerçekçi değil: (1) Bir devletin başka bir devleti yargılama yetkisi olmadığını öngören uluslararası hukuk kuralı nedeniyle, belgelerin yayımlanmasındaki kusur veya ihmali nedeniyle ABD’ye karşı Türk mahkemelerinde dava açılamaz. (2) ABD federal mahkemelerinde belgelerin yayımlanmasından zarar gören kişiler, örneğin bazı bakanlar veya Başbakan’a yakın işadamları ABD’ye karşı tazminat davası açabilirler. Ancak tarafların kirli çamaşırlarının aleniyete dökülmesine yol açacak böyle bir yargı sürecinin davacıya zarar vermesi olasılığı yüksektir. Bu nedenle uygulanabilir bir seçenek değildir. (3) ABD, Uluslararası Adalet Divanı’nın (UAD) yargı yetkisini kabul etmiyor. Bu nedenle, sorunun UAD’ye götürülmesi için, Türkiye’nin önce ABD’yle arasında tazminat konusunda bir anlaşmazlık yaratması, sonra da ABD’yi Divan’ın yargı yetkisini tanıyan bir beyanda bulunmaya ikna etmesi gerekiyor. Bu da mümkün değil. “Bu hususlar, Başbakan Erdoğan’ın yargı konusunu diline pelesenk etmesinin kendini avutmaktan başka bir şeye yaramadığını ortaya koyuyor.”

Davutoğlu alnımı karışlayacak mı?

Dışişleri Bakanı Davutoğlu, 29 Kasım’da ABD Dışişleri bakanı Hillary Clinton’la görüşmesinin ardından, Clinton’ın WikiLeaks belgeleriyle ilgili olarak “Türkiye’den özür dilediğini” alayıvala ile ilan etmişti. Akşam Genel Yayın Müdürü İsmail Küçükkaya bu işte bir bit yeniği olduğunu hissetmiş ki Bakan’a “Clinton’ın özür ifadesinin net olup olmadığını” sormak ihtiyacını duymuş. Davutoğlu’nun bu soruya verdiği cevap şöyle: “Açıkça özür dilendi bizden. Birileri karşımıza çıkar aksini söylerse alnını karışlarım” (Akşam, 03/12/2010). Oysa, AFP ajansının 30 Kasım tarihli Washington kaynaklı haberinde yer alan şu ifadeler Davutoğlu’nu kesinkes yalanlıyor: “Davutoğlu’yla toplantıdan sonra Clinton, ABD’nin gizli olması gereken belgelerin açığa çıkmış olmasından dolayı derinden üzüntü duyduğunu söyledi.” Hemen belirtelim ki, Davit Crowley de 2 Kasım’daki basın toplantısında Clinton’ın özür dilemeyip üzüntüsünü beyan ettiğini vurgulamıştır.

“Clinton’ın açıklaması, Davutoğlu’nun bir nefeste iki katmerli yalan söylediğini ortaya koyuyor. Birincisi, Clinton özür dilememiş, üzüntü beyan etmiştir. İkincisi, Clinton’ın derin üzüntüsünün nedeni belgelerin Türkiye’de yarattığı rahatsızlık değil, gizli belgelerin yasadışı yollardan açıklanmış olmasıdır. TBMM kürsüsünden de açıklamış olduğum üzere, Davutoğlu yalan söylemeyi bir alışkanlık haline getirmiştir.” Nitekim, Davutoğlu, İsrail askerlerinin Mavi Marmara gemisine saldırısı olayının Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) Güvenlik Konseyi’nde görüşülmesinin ardından yayımlanan başkanlık açıklamasında, İsrail’in kınanmasını sağlamış olduğunu bir başarı olarak ilan etmişti. Oysa, İsrail kınanmamış, gemideki direnişçilerle birlikte İsrail askerlerinin eylemleri kınanmıştı.

Dış politikada yalana başvurularak sağlanan kazancın kısa vadeli olacağı ve ülkenin güvenilirliği ve inandırıcılığı üzerinde telafi edilemez zararlar yaratacağı bilinmelidir. Bu endişeyi, WikiLeaks belgeleri arasındaki 1 Aralık 2010 tarihli ve 09ANKARA 1472 sayılı raporun incelenmesi sırasında duymamak kabil değil. “Rapor, projenin kesinkes İran’a karşı olduğunun ve İsrail’i koruma amacını güttüğünün kesinkes bilinmesine rağmen Başbakan Erdoğan’ın NATO çatısı altında uygulandığı takdirde Türkiye’nin projeye katılacağını muhataplarına söylediğini açıklıyor.” AKP iktidarının Amerikalılardan talep ettiği husus, İran’ın “kör kör parmağım gözüne” hedef olduğunun ilan edilmemesi suretiyle İran’ın kandırılabilmesi için zemin hazırlanmasıdır. Bütün bunlar, “Davutoğlu’nun, Lizbon zirvesinde ‘Türkiye’nin çabasıyla İran’ın NATO açısından ana tehdit odağı olarak kabul edilmemesini sağlandı’ yolundaki açıklamasının bir başka kuyruklu yalan olduğunu gösteriyor.”

Esasında ABD büyükelçilerinin raporlarının çoğunun, analitik değeri olan ve AKP iktidarının politikalarını ve siyaset felsefesini derinlemesine değerlendiren belgeler olduğu görülüyor. Uluslararası ilişkilerde karşı tarafın ne düşündüğünü bilmek en önemli kozlardan biridir. Türkiye’ye komşu ülkelerin politikalarını da değerlendiren WikiLeaks belgeleri, Türk siyaset adamları için bir hazine değerindedir. Belgelerden çıkarılacak önemli dersler vardır. Örneğin, Suudi Arabistan, Mısır, Ürdün ve Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri’nin liderleri, ısrarla ve bir an evvel ABD’nin İran’ı vurmasını istiyorlar. Bu ülkeler İsrail’i kendilerine İran’dan çok daha yakın görüyorlar. Bu konjonktür, Suudi Arabistan’ın İsrail uçaklarına İran’ı bombardıman için hava sahasını açacağını ortaya koyuyor. “Bu ortamda ABD Savunma Bakanı Gates de Savunma Bakanımız Vecdi Gönül’e ‘İsrail İran’ı vurabilir’ demiştir. Bunun anlamı, İsrail’in İran’a muhtemel saldırısına ABD’nin yeşil ışık yaktığından başka bir şey olabilir mi?”

İsviçre’deki hesaplar

Başbakan’ın İsviçre bankalarındaki hesaplarına ilişkin iddialar hakkında Kılıçdaroğlu ölçülü ve dikkatli bir açıklama yapmıştı. Buna rağmen Başbakan’ın “WikiLeaks hezeyanlarına sarılıp bunları siyaset malzemesi yapmak, fırsatçılıktır, alçaklıktır, seviyesizliktir” demesi iç siyasette tansiyonu tırmandırdı. “Başbakan’ın bununla da yetinmeyerek aynı hakaretamiz ifadeleri medyaya karşı da kullanması ve bu haberleri manşet yapanların akıbetlerinin Silivri cezaevi olacağını ima eden sözler söyleyerek medyaya karşı terör havası estirmesi son derece talihsiz bir olay oldu. Bu tehdidin Türkiye’de esasen baskı altında bulunan basın özgürlüğü üzerinde daha da kısıtlayıcı etkiler yaratacağı kuşkusuzdur.” Kılıçdaroğlu’nun, “mali sicilinin ve mali geçmişinin temiz olmadığını” ileri sürdüğü Başbakan’ı televizyonda tartışmaya davet etmesi, WikiLeaks belgelerindeki yolsuzluk iddialarının seçim kampanyası sırasında hayli işleneceğine işaret ediyor.

Assange için yürüdüler

Cumhuriyet 11.12.2010
Dış Haberler Servisi - WikiLeaks internet sitesinin kurucusu Julian Assange, İngiltere’de tutulduğu cezaevinde “güvenliği gerekçesiyle” tek kişilik hücreye alınırken, destekçileri çeşitli şekillerde kampanyalarına devam ediyor. Avustralya’nın Sydney ve Melbourne şehirlerinde dün yüzlerce kişi Avustralyalı Julian Assange için yürüyüş düzenledi. “Assange’a özgürlük”, “ABD’nin askeri, ekonomik ve kültürel egemenliğine hayır”, “İfade özgürlüğü temel bir haktır” ve “Bırakın demokrasi yaşasın” yazılı pankartlar taşıyan göstericiler, Avustralya hükümetine Assenge’ın haklarına sahip çıkması çağrısında bulundu. “GetUp!” (Ayağa Kalk!) isimli aktivist grup, 50 binden fazla kişinin haber alma özgürlüğünü destekleyen bir dilekçeyi imzaladığını ve dilekçenin Amerikan gazetelerinde yayımlanması için yaklaşık 250 bin dolar para toplandığını açıkladı.
“Avaaz” (Ses) isimli küresel hareket grubu da, WikiLeaks’in kurucuları ve çalışanlarına sindirme politikası uygulanmaması ve ifade ve basın özgürlüğünün sağlanması çağrısıyla “www.avaaz.org” adresinde imza kampanyası başlattı.Hollanda’da 16 yaşında bir genç, WikiLeaks’e ödemelerde kredi kartlarının kullanımını durduran Visa ve Mastercard’ın internet sitelerine siber atak düzenlediği iddiasıyla gözaltına alındı.

WikiLeaks’te Pfizer dosyası

Cumhuriyet 11.12.2010
Belgelere göre 11 çocuğun ölümüne yol açan testlerle ilgili dava açılmasını önlemek isteyen Amerikan ilaç firması, Nijerya Adalet Bakanı’nın yolsuzluk yaptığına ilişkin kanıt bulsun diye adam tutmuş


Dış Haberler Servisi - WikiLeaks’in sızdırdığı gizli bir Amerikan belgesine göre, Amerikan ilaç firması Pfizer, Nijerya’da 11 çocuğun ölümüne, onlarcasının sakat kalmasına yol açan bir ilaç testiyle ilgili davayı engellemeye çalıştı.
İngiliz Guardian gazetesinin yayımladığı, Nisan 2009 tarihli, Nijerya’daki ticari ateşe Robert Tansey tarafından yazılan belgede, Pfizer’ın, dönemin Nijerya Adalet Bakanı Michael Aondoakaa’nın yolsuzluk yaptığına ilişkin kanıt bulsunlar diye adam tuttuğu, dava açılmasın diye baskı yapmayı amaçladığı belirtiliyor. Mayıs 2007’de, menenjit ilacı Trovan’ın testleri sırasında ölüme sebebiyet vermekten 2 milyar dolar tazminat talebiyle Pfizer aleyhine dava açılmış, taraflar 30 Temmuz’da 75 milyon dolar tazminatta anlaşmışlardı.
Daha sonra da baskılar sonucu dava geri çekildi. Belgede Pfizer’ın Nijerya’daki yöneticisi Enrico Liggeri ve Amerikalı yetkililerin bir araya gelerek konuyu görüştükleri kaydediliyor. Aondoakaa geçen şubat ayında, Nijerya Devlet Başkanı Goodluck Jonathan tarafından görevden alındı. Belgede, geçen şubat ve mart ayında yayımlanan yolsuzluk iddialarıyla ilgili yazıların Aondoakaa’ya zarar verdiği belirtiliyor.

‘Küba ekonomisi çöker’

WikiLeaks’in sızdırdığı ve İspanyol El Pais gazetesinin yayımladığı gizli Amerikan belgesine göre, çeşitli ülkelerin diplomatları, Küba’da ekonomik durumun 2-3 yıl içinde kötüleşeceği öngörüsünde bulunmuşlar. Söz konusu belge, geçen şubat ayında, yani Küba yönetiminin geçen eylül ayında uygulamaya soktuğu ekonomik reformlardan önce yazılmış.

Belgede, Küba’da ABD’li bir diplomatın ev sahipliğinde Çin, İspanya, Kanada, Brezilya, İtalya, Fransa ve Japonya ticari ateşelerinin katıldığı bir kahvaltıda konuşulanlar yer alıyor.

Belgeye göre, İtalyan diplomat toplantıda Küba’nın 2011’de iflas edeceğini söyledi. Çinli diplomat da Küba yönetiminin ödemeleri zamanında yapmamasından ve kredi vadelerini bir yıldan dört yıla çıkarmak istemesinden yakınınca, Fransız ve Kanadalı diplomatlar “Kulübe hoş geldin” diye karşılık verdiler.

Aynı belgede, Çinli bir diplomatın Kübalı yetkililerle reformları tartışmayı “gerçek bir başağrısı” olarak nitelediği de kaydediliyor.

Yine sızan belgelere göre Batılı diplomatlar Myanmar ile Kuzey Kore arasındaki işbirliğinden büyük endişe duyuyor. Ancak diplomatlar Pyongyang rejiminin Myanmar ile nükleer teknoloji paylaştığı konusundaki haberleri doğrulayamıyor.









29 Kasım 2010 Pazartesi

WikiLeaks; TÜRKİYE İLE İLGİLİ ORİJİNAL BELGELER- 10

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SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE (GARBE)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2018

TAGS: PGOV SCUL TU

SUBJECT: TURKEY: CHARITY FUND SCANDAL PROMPTS PM ERDOGAN

BATTLE WITH PRESS TYCOON

REF: ANKARA 1626

Classified By: POL Counselor Daniel O'Grady, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. A very public and ugly battle has erupted between Prime Minister Erdogan and the Dogan Group. The conflict dominated the news this week after Erdogan lashed out at business and media mogul Aydin Dogan for reporting on allegations in a German court that the German-based Deniz Feneri Charity laundered funds to individuals in Turkey who are close to Erdogan and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). The charges focus public attention on widespread allegations about corruption in the AKP, a key vulnerability for the party. Still, Erdogan seems indifferent to reporting on the scandal in other media outlets, and has turned his wrath solely on the Dogan Group with competing charges about corruption linked to a zoning deal for the Istanbul Hilton. Erdogan launched a milder campaign against the Dogan group in Febuary for carrying “pornographic” photos of women on its front pages, but the latest attack is a significant escalation of tensions. Erdogan has not been this truculent since long before the AKP court closure case; ironically, the new scandal has fed speculation that a second closure case could result. END summary.

It Only Took A Spark
--------------------
¶2. (SBU) On September 1 the first court case against Deniz Feneri convened in the Frankfurt Regional Court. By September 5, German Prosecutor Kerstin Lotz publicly stated that the Turkish Government “tried to intervene in the case and wanted suspects released.” The next day, CHP leader Deniz Baykal announced on NTV, a non-Dogan media outlet, that “Mehmet Gurhan, International Director at Kanal 7, acknowledged he took money from the German Deniz Feneri and passed it to PM Erdogan.” Baykal implied that he Prime Minister and his party were direct recipients of funds embezzled from the charity. Dogan's three flagship papers – Hurriyet, Milliyet, and Radikal – quickly picked up the story the next day with screaming, front-page banner headlines.

¶3. (U) In response, Erdogan publicly charged Dogan with corruption regarding a zoning application for new residences at the Istanbul Hilton. Dogan responded to the allegation by declaring: “The German judiciary claimed that the Prime Minister was involved in this case. The main opposition party leader announced this on NTV, but I am having difficulty understanding why I stand accused of reporting this in my papers.” In a second attack, the Prime Minister announced that Dogan had not been granted permission by the Turkish Board of Television and Radio (RTUK) to use an additional TV terrestrial frequency that he had purchased. Dogan denied Erdogan's charges and accused the Prime Minister of trying to stifle any press criticism of himself.

Tango with Turkey's Rupert Murdoch
-------------------------

¶4. (C) Dogan Media Holdings owns several mainstream daily newspapers and three major television stations. Although relations between Erdogan and Dogan have never been particularly warm, a detente of sorts has existed for most of the Erdogan administration. Dogan media players were only moderately critical of the Government, and the Goverment did not put undue pressure on Dogan's other business interests. Long before the public barbs, a familiar behind-the-scenes tango was taking place. Because of the Turkish media ownership structure, media owners use their press resources to curry favor with the Government on behalf of their own businesses. They also punish governments that, in their view, do not give them a sufficient cut of Government largesse. With control of 30-40 percent of the nation's media, Dogan is a major player in this game. Two years ago, the goverment fined Dogan's Petrol Offisi $200 million for tax evasion. This appears to have been the spark that ignited the current tensions.

Erdogan Spokesman on the Media: Feed the Beast or Else

Ankara 00001643 002 of 002
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¶5. (C) PM Spokesman Akif Beki contends, “It's a media habit. They want something; they don't get it, so they attack.” He defended RTUK's refusal to allow Dogan to use his recently purchased terrestrial television channel by arguing that this station would have put Dogan in control of more than 50 percent of the media. Beki also believes this fight will not last long. “Dogan is wrong,” he argued, because he is “printing allegations being adjudicated in a German court as (if they are) pure truth.” AKP Vice Chairman Nihat Ergun made the same point to us in a September 11 meeting at the Parliament. (COMMENT: Although Beki contends that Erdogan's criticism is justifed and that the Prime Minister has actually shown admirable restraint, there are suggestions of a deliberate political move against Dogan. Several weeks ago, Minister of Trade Simsek told a group of investors in London to sell their Dogan stock because Dogan “won't be around much longer.” END COMMENT) Indeed, after Erdogan's attacks began last week, Dogan stock fell 8 percent. And although Dogan Holding showed a profit last year, several media and business sources have indicated the lack of government tenders and contracts is beginning to hurt the massive conglomerate.

¶6. (SBU) Last fall the editorial stance noticeably shifted at Dogan's flagship newspaper, Hurriyet. The paper became more critical of the government. xxxxx described for us several factors which he said led to the shift. Among them was the Petrol Offisi case, a decision by the Government not to issue a valuable Ceyhan oil refinery tender to Dogan, and a blistering speech Erdogan made to a closed AK Party meeting where he called Dogan a crooked businessman. The last item was taken personally by xxxxx because Dogan has supported Erdogan in his press on certain issues in the past.

Comment
--------
¶7. (C) This battle could be seen as just a very direct and personal fight between two titans. However, coming on the heels of other recent accusations of corruption in the AKP, the Dogan attacks may represent a broader shift in Government-media relations. Such shifts have been seen with other governments in the past. In earlier cases, however, the media did not generally escalate attacks until a government appeared at the end of its life, like sharks smelling blood in the water. With Erdogan's approval ratings still over 50 percent, it will be difficult to maintain such a criticism level absent hard evidence and actual convictions. Still, only six weeks after the conclusion of the AKP closure case, it is striking that media coverage is predicting the AKP could face closure again if these or additional corruption charges are substantiated.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

Wilson

WikiLeaks; TÜRKİYE İLE İLGİLİ ORİJİNAL BELGELER- 9

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SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EUCOM PLEASE PASS TO POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2018

TAGS: PGOV PREL TU

SUBJECT: IMPLICATIONS OF AKP CLOSURE CASE AND OUR PUBLIC

POSTURE

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROSS WILSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

¶1. (c) Summary: The closure case against Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is a blow to this country's future. It reflects unresolved conflicts about the nature of Turkey, the state, the extent of popular democracy and the role of religion in society. It also results from failed leadership by PM Erdogan over the nine months since his re-election victory last July. The outcome is uncertain, but the crisis here must be viewed through the peculiar entity that is Turkish democracy -- imperfect, crabbed, but functional in its way. US priorities are sustaining our ability to work with this country on mutual interests and supporting its democratic process in a broad sense, but we should avoid opining on the specifics of Turkish politics. This approach will respect the raucous and historic debate and politicking among Turks taking place now about the futureof their country -- a vital process for democracy here to continue to mature. End Summary.

Implications of the Closure Case
--------------------------------
¶2. (c) Here is one way of looking at the AKP closure case. It is an attempted judicial coup, a Clausewitz-like extension of politics by legal means. The indictment reads like a political tract. It relies on newspaper clippings to justify excluding the party and 70-odd leaders from politics. Among more bizarre bits of proof that the AKP intends to undo secularism are press reports of Secretary Powell praising the country,s "moderate Muslim" government and on its support for BMENA. The propriety of banning parties is questionable in any democracy. A ban based on a legally weak indictment of a party which nine months ago received 47 percent of the vote nationally and pluralities in 76 out of Turkey's 85 constituencies looks like a travesty for democratic values and the rule of law.

¶3. (c) Another way of looking at the case focuses on its consistency with democracy Turkish style. The constitution and laws have long provided for banning politicians and dissolving parties, 26 of which have fallen victim. The AKP had many years in office to change this and other questionable policies (like Article 301 on insulting Turkishness), but did not. What looks to Western democracies like an unusual power in the judiciary to compromise the results of last July's election is one of Turkey's check and balancing mechanisms to protect the rights of the minority -- in this case secularists who feel threatened by the AKP.

¶4. (c) Some truth exists in both of these points of view. One clear thing is that PM Erdogan has stumbled badly. One blunder was failing to make political bans more difficult when relevant legislation was amended several years ago. As if dizzy with his own success, Erdogan failed to reassure the 53 percent who voted against his government last July that it would respect their interests too. He failed to use his re-election mandate to continue EU-related reforms that were the most formidable tools for calming fears of Islamization and untrammeled majority rule. He allowed himself to be goaded by the National Action Party (MHP) into putting the headscarf ban at the head of the reform queue. For this short-term populist win, he sacrificed a larger constitutional reform package that would have significantly strengthened Turkey's democracy. Effective, progressive governance that was the hallmark of early AKP years in office dried up in the 2007 election year, and no momentum returned after that. These and other missteps exacerbated fears among many that Erdogan was going too far, too fast; that there were no effective constraints on the AKP (especially after the military's botched intervention last spring); and that fundamentalists might soon dominate the bureaucracy, judiciary, universities, etc., to change Turkey in dangerous and permanent ways.

¶5. (c) The closure case on its face is a set-back for democracy and stability in Turkey. For many, especially the large swath of previously neglected voters who make up Turkey's emerging middle class and whom Erdogan's populism galvanized, the message is that Turkish democracy is too poorly developed to protect their interests against the traditional elite. This message is even more threatening to ANKARA 00000691 002 OF 003 those here who are still marginalized, especially Kurds. More broadly, the case looks like, and to some extent is, the revenge of an unelected and unaccountable bureaucracy against Erdogan and popular democracy. Turks fear the Deep State and many, including strong critics of the AKP, are deeply uncomfortable with the judiciary's attempt to manipulate the power balance. Associated turmoil also renders Turkey's vulnerable economy more uncertain at a time when global trends are already very negative; a big downturn would reinforce the sense of crisis here.

¶6. (c) Today, however, Turkey remains a secure, relatively stable emerging democracy. There is no serious violence on the streets, and the economy has not crashed. The closure case is not a catastrophe or the undoing of Turkey's peculiar and imperfect democracy, at least not now. It is better seen as one among many moves in a very long chess game that all sides here, including Erdogan and the AKP, are adept at playing. The mere fact of the indictment has already moderated the AKP's rhetoric and pushed it to emphasize effective governance and more consensual policies, especially EU accession-related reform. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that this is the way Turkey's crabbed, military-drafted constitution intended the system to work. Figures ranging from former President Demirel to former parliamentary Speaker Cetin have remarked to us recently that Turkey has seen worse and will come through these difficulties all right. At this point, at least, their reassurances seem more justified than not.

¶7. (c) How matters will play out in the short-medium term is uncertain.

-- A "victorious" AKP will still face intransigent opposition from one-third of the public, not to mention the courts, bureaucrats and generals.

-- A post-closure AKP will reorganize under a new name and almost certainly still have the votes among its un-banned MPs to form the next government alone. People already talk about plausible, post-closure scenarios that involve bringing Erdogan and other potentially banned figures back into the picture.

-- Banishing the AKP will not change the reality that the main opposition parties are weak, divided and ill-equipped for 21st century politics. Space may be created for a new centrist party, but credible leaders are not evident now, and the outlook for new elections that would propel them to prominence is uncertain. The Islamist fringe in and outside the AKP could coalesce and become more radical; tarikats like the Gulenists may become more significant power centers than they are now. Without broad constitutional reform to replace the current top-down state and better protect individual liberties, and without more consensus on the extent and limits of secularism in modern Turkey, this struggle is likely to continue.

¶8. (c) This episode will last at least six months and possibly a year or more. In the meantime, Turkey's leadership will be distracted and cautious. Unfortunately, this comes during a period of immense challenges to and opportunities for Turkish interests domestically and in the region that include the Kurdish issue, relations with Iraq and the KRG, energy security, Cyprus, Armenia, EU accession, terrorism, etc. Policy creativity, never Turkey's strong suit, will diminish. We also note that before the Constitutional Court decides the AKP's fate, it will likely rule on the headscarf amendments; reinstituting the ban at universities may actually calm matters and defuse the anti-AKP case. The Court may also rule on the closure of the Kurdish nationalist Democratic Society Party (DTP); this could prove more explosive than the AKP case, given that DTP leaders and constituents accept much less of the constitutional/legal order here than the AKP mainstream.

Our Public Posture
------------------
¶9. (c) None of this changes the reality that Turkey is an extremely important ally in a dangerous region and that it ANKARA 00000691 003 OF 003 is, despite many faults, more democratic and free than any other country in the Muslim world. We should not stifle, through our intervention, what should fundamentally be a debate by Turks about the future of their country that is essential if its democratic institutions are to mature. Doing so would make this a US issue in ways harmful to our interests, our influence and to democratic values here. We should stick to general principles, and let Turks sort out the details. At some point, as matters develop, our intervention to head off a political meltdown here may be necessary, but that moment isn't now and may well never come.

¶10. (c) With this in mind, our public comments should take a positive and high road. We should:

-- Make clear our strong support for Turkey, its democratic institutions and its commitment to democratic values and secular principles that define our alliance and partnership.

-- Urge Turkey's leaders and institutions to work for pragmatic solutions that reinforce stability and build consensus at a critical time for the country and in the region.

-- Emphasize support for Turkey's goal of accession to the EU and its need to legislate and implement comprehensive political and economic reforms that will sustain that goal and secure liberty and prosperity in the future.

-- Look forward to continuing to work with Turkey on behalf of common interests in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Caucasus, the Balkans, on terrorism, on energy security, on the Cyprus problem and elsewhere in the region and the world.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON

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SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2018

TAGS: PGOV TU

SUBJECT: TURKEY: RULING AKP TO TRY TO OVERCOME CLOSURE CASE

BY AMENDING CONSTITUTION

REF: ANKARA 526 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: PolCouns Janice G Weiner, reasons 1.4 (b), (d)



¶1. (C) Summary: Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is drafting a mini-constitutional amendment package to attempt to overcome the closure case filed against it in Constitutional Court. The package will include a temporary clause that would wipe out existing closure cases, including against the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP). If necessary, the GOT would be prepared to take the package to referendum. End summary.

¶2. (C) xxxxx told us March 19 the party is hard at work on a mini-constitutional amendment package. The party sees the closure case as political in nature. Its intent, he stated, is to decapitate the party and ban PM Erdogan from politics. By the weekend, a small AKP committee will have drafted a package to deal with future party closure cases; it will include a temporary article intended to eliminate existing closure cases, including the case against the DTP. AKP will then sit down and talk with the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) in parliament, which, according to MHP General Secretary Cihan Pacaci, is drafting its own package. Pacaci will speak to MHP's proposal on the floor of parliament March 20, in a manner designed to condemn party closures in general and avoid the specifics of existing cases.

¶3. (C) With respect to the concern voiced by many that the current case is “untouchable” because Article 138 of the Constitution prohibits legislative activity on ongoing cases, xxxxx said that much in the large body of legislation parliament has passed in AKP's five years in government has touched on issues before the courts. It is a basic principle of Turkish law that if a new provision works in someone's favor, the person may benefit from it; if it would work against the person, it does not apply. They will forge ahead.

¶4. (C) xxxxx AKP will work at a compromise with MHP; if that is not possible, AKP will push the package through parliament. AKP on its own (likely with DTP, which stands to benefit) has more than the 330 votes required to send a constitutional amendment package to referendum. Pacaci, who claimed to know the contents of the AKP package, said he did not like it. He confirmed that in the absence of agreement with MHP (which would give the package a vote total that would obviate the need for a referendum), AKP would likely send it to referendum.

¶5. (C) Asked whether AKP, in pushing such a package, was not playing with fire, xxxxx responded the party had concluded it would be more dangerous for the country to go through another prolonged period of political and economic instability and uncertainty than to face this head on. It was preferable to take abrupt, decisive action to cut off the closures cases; then the GOT could proceed with its agenda. He did not believe this was a matter in which the military would interfere. Both xxxxx to us that AKP had made mistakes, including failure actively to push its parliamentary agenda in recent months, and its failure when it dealt with Article 69 on party closures in 2005 to limit the Chief Prosecutor's sole discretion to file a closure case. But the party did not deserve to be closed, nor did the 47% of the people who had voted for AKP.

¶6. (C) Comment: The AKP appears determined to fight this head on. This is well-aligned with PM Erdogan's street-fighter instincts, and with the party's reaction to the April 27, 2007 e-coup. They are indeed playing with fire - but to be fair, the fire was lit under them first. If the package moves through parliament to referendum, it is hard to believe it would not garner a solid majority.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

Ankara 00000536 002 of 002

Wilson

WikiLeaks; TÜRKİYE İLE İLGİLİ ORİJİNAL BELGELER- 7

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SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2017

TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON TU

SUBJECT: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE AKP'S "SECRET ISLAMIC AGENDA"

REF: A. ANKARA 0629

¶B. ANKARA 0610

Classified By: Political Counselor Janice G. Weiner for reasons 1.4(b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary. Ever since its victory in the 2002 general elections, rumours and suspicion have swirled around the ruling Justice and Development Party's (AKP) "secret" Islamist agenda. After more than four years in power, some doubters are relieved to find an AKP that appears conservative, Western- as well as Islam-oriented, reform minded and democratic. Others remain convinced that AKP is determined to impose Sharia law in Turkey and undermine the country's secular system once it gains control of the triple crown - the presidency, prime ministry and parliament - in this year's double elections. The evidence either way is circumstantial, but the issue is central to Turkey's future. Turkey's traditional secularists (including the civil service, judiciary and military), opposition parties and even ultra and neo-nationalists are resorting to increasingly desperate maneuvers, including rumour and innuendo, to counter the perceived "threat" of an AKP-dominated triumverate. Their concern is undoubtedly heightened by the realization that AKP's reform agenda threatens the established elite's traditional, top-down control. To keep the public's trust and minimize tension as Turkish society evolves, AKP leaders will need to continue to employ broad-reaching, moderate, balanced rhetoric. End summary.

The Origins of Suspicion
------------------------
¶2. (SBU) Those looking to brand the AKP as Islamists determined to undermine the Turkish Republic point first to the AKP's religious origins and PM Erdogan's political roots. AKP evolved from Necmettin Erbakan's Welfare Party (RP), an Islamist party founded in 1993. Critics focus on Erdogan, who in 1994 as Istanbul's mayor, called himself the "imam of Istanbul" and praised God that he was a servant of Sharia. Later, in 1998, Erdogan served four months of a 10-month sentence for inciting religious hatred by reading a religious poem at a rally. When the Constitutional Court outlawed the RP in 1998, Erdogan and other RP members formed the Islamic-oriented Virtue Party (FP). When FP was banned in 2001 for unconstitutional anti-secular activities, Erdogan split off from Erbakan and formed AKP with more pragmatic members willing to work within the existing political system. Erbakan and more hardcore Islamists formed Saadet (Felicity) Party. Erdogan moderated his rhetoric, making it easier for voters to turn to AKP in the 2002 elections as an alternative to traditional parties, mired in scandals, corruption and an economic crisis. AKP surged to power with 34 percent of the vote, one of the largest parliamentary majorities in Turkey's history.

For the Defense
---------------
¶3. (C) Those who view AKP as reform-minded and democratic are quick to cite AKP-backed reforms that strengthened freedoms and democracy. AKP legislation that reduced the military's influence in the National Secuity Council (MGK) and eliminated military membership in the security courts and the Board of Higher Education (YOK), among others, improved the civil-military equilibrium that had been heavily skewed toward military control. They cite as evidence of the party's western-oriented, free market approach AKP's liberal economic policies, which have stimulated the private sector, increased foreign investment, reduced inflation and stabilized the currency. AKP supporters argue that Turkey's traditional power centers (the military, judiciary, bureacracy) feel threatened by EU-linked human rights and rule of law reforms that enhance individual freedoms. By promoting EU membership, the AKP is slowly introducing more balance into Turkey's strictly secular, statist society. Supporters maintain that Erdogan's appointment of AKP loyalists to influential positions previously held by secularists has generated resentment against the AKP, further fueled by the party's popularity. They frame attacks against the party as desperate measures by entrenched secularists who fear that further democratization will undermine their traditional control and the economic benefits they derived from state intervention in the economy.

¶4. (C) Opponents charge that AKP only pushed a reform agenda ANKARA 00000648 002 OF 004 as far as necessary to convince the EU to begin accession talks. Even then, AKP focused on those reforms needed to dilute the military's power rather than those that might interfere with the party's Islamic agenda. They note Erdogan's support for greater freedom to express Islamic practices (such as wearing the headscarf), and point to his failure to allow Alevis, Kurds, Armenian and Greek Orthodox communities similar freedoms. Suspicious that the accession process is just a cover for the AKP's anti-secular Islamic agenda, some in the military and opposition are reconsidering the merits of EU membership. AKP officials admit reform efforts have slowed, but explain that Turkey's bureaucracy needs time to absorb and implement significant changes, such as the complete overhaul of the Penal Code, Criminal Procedure Code and Punishments Law passed between 2002 and ¶2004. They also note that parliament passed in November 2006 much of another major reform package, including legislation relating to minority foundations and schools, military audits, military courts and political party funding. In some cases, parliament has had to re-approve the legislation to overcome President Sezer's veto.

Circumstantial Evidence
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¶5. (C) Conspiracy theorists and concerned secularists alike build the case against AKP using persuasive but largely circumstantial evidence. Many claim that Erdogan has used AKP's parliamentary majority to weaken Turkey's secular educational, financial and judicial institutions. They warn that an AKP troika of president, PM and parliament speaker would control the appointments process, transforming Turkey's secular system into something approaching an Islamic republic. They point to AKP-sponsored changes in the strictly secular education system to allow graduates of religious high schools (imam hatip) to compete for limited university seats and qualify for government jobs. Previously, imam hatip, like other vocational school graduates, advanced to the clergy or other appropriate professions. In addition, opponents charge that AKP has undermined state regulation of private Koranic schools by lifting age limits and extending hours of attendance. As a result, the number of Koranic schools has increased significantly, with correspondingly less government oversight.

¶6. (C) Erdogan is also frequently accused of trying to infiltrate the higher education system with Islamist-minded professors and administrators. After some university rectors resisted AKP efforts to introduce more Islam into the curriculum, AKP opponents claimed the government began a harrassment campaign. Police arrested one obstinate rector in Van twice in 2006; both times he was reinstated by court decision. Legislation creating 15 new universities gave the government authority to appoint the new rectors, rather than the usual procedure of approvals by YOK and the president. The law, pushed through over President Sezer's veto, is viewed as an end-run to allow Erdogan to select 15 new rectors of his mindset. Parliament currently is considering a proposal to establish another 17 new universities.

Green Money Seeping In
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¶7. (C) While many acknowledge AKP economic successes, some doubters flag the alleged influx of "green" money from Islamic sources as proof of the real direction AKP is taking Turkey's economy. AKP opponents note that Islamist capital is hard to track and question whether it is ultimately tied to more Islamist policies. Increased investments from the UAE and a promised doubling of trade with Saudi Arabia after the Saudi King's unprecedented 2006 visit raised suspicions among some western-oriented investors. The overall trend of increased foreign investor inflows actually counters insinuations of an Islamist take-over of Turkey's financial sector, however. Investments from Islamic sources pale in comparison to total foreign inflows and do not seem to be of economic or political significance.

¶8. (C) Erdogan reputedly has manipulated the political appointments process to place Islamist bankers in key economic positions. Along with Finance Minister Kemal Unakitan - a former board member of one of Turkey's leading Islamic banks (al-Baraka) - Erdogan's appointment of seven other al-Baraka officials to key positions in Turkey's Savings Deposit Insurance Fund is cited as support for an ANKARA 00000648 003 OF 004 Islamist take-over theory. In 2006, the PM virtually paralyzed financial policy when he tried to appoint an Islamist as head of the Central Bank against President Sezer's firm opposition. (The compromise candidate has demonstrated independent decision-making since his appointment.) To round out the "damning" evidence, critics cite FM Gul's background as a specialist at the Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah from 1983 to 1991 and his reported objections to state scrutiny of Islamic enterprises.

Packing the Court
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¶9. (C) Erdogan is also accused of staging a take-over of the judiciary. The AKP pushed through legislation to lower the mandatory retirement age for technocrats, opening the way for Erdogan to name almost 4,000 of 9,000 judges and prosecutors. In a stand-off with the judiciary, AKP has threatened to refuse to implement high court rulings against the government for obstructing AKP-sponsored legislation. Similar struggles between AKP and President Sezer have caused Sezer to veto over 3,000 AKP appointments and send over 100 AKP-backed laws to the Constitutional Court for review. But for Sezer, Erdogan would already be implementing his "secret" agenda, worried secularists claim. Economic reformers, including the IMF, for their part, would be only too happy to see an AKP-inspired change in the judiciary, which has consistently blocked forward-looking economic reforms.

¶10. (C) Erdogan rebutted the secularists' charges in 2006 by noting that the AKP hadn't been in power long enough to reshape the judiciary. Rigid bureaucratic controls on promotions and a 15-20 year career path for judges limit the influence of any particular government on the judiciary's orientation. But critics note that Justice Ministry budgetary control over the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors, which oversees assignments within the judiciary, gives the AKP indirect influence that can have a long-term impact. The president appoints five of the seven council members. The Justice Minister, however, heads the council and controls its funding, which could discourage council members from voting against the Minister's proposed appointees. The most recent charge is that the Minister, by not attending Supreme Council sessions, is preventing 29 judicial positions from being filled.

Small Changes
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¶11. (C) AKP's strategy to infiltrate its Islamist agenda into Turkey's secular institutions extends to the municipal level and beyond, according to AKP opponents. The party contro four of Turkey's five largest cities (Ankara, Istanbul, Bursa and Konya). Measures by some AKP mayors to ban alcohol on municipal property, establish women-only parks or equip ferries with prayer rooms are seen as Islamic encroachments on the secular system. Erdogan and other party leaders explained the alcohol restrictions as consistent with the state's obligation to protect children from alcohol, drugs and gambling, rather than a religious proscription. Municipalities are authorized to ban the sale and consumption of alcohol on municipal property and near schools, religious sites and related locations. Of the 62 provincial capitals that have such a ban, 18 have non-AKP mayors. Of the 19 without alcohol bans, 14 have AKP mayors. As another often-cited example of small but telling changes, critics note that employees at the Health Ministry and state-owned Turkish Airlines reported being questioned about their religious beliefs and attitudes toward the Koran, an unprecedented practice.

Internal Balancing Act
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¶12. (C) Erdogan has performed a delicate balancing act to maintain unity within the AKP, despite the sometimes conflicting interests of its competing factions. Many party faithful are pious; keeping their allegiance is central to the AKP's hold on power but Erdogan has won them few tangible successes. He has not upheld earlier pledges to lift the ban on headscarves in public buildings, though his strong objections when the European Court of Human Rights upheld the ban in public schools resonated with the party's more devout members. AKP's more conservation faction was disappointed by the failed attempt to criminalize adultery in 2004. Erdogan's attempts to put loyalists into government jobs can also be viewed through the prism of rewarding the party ANKARA 00000648 004 OF 004 faithful.

The Jury Is Out
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¶12. (C) Comment. To date, AKP critics can only muster circumstantial evidence of an AKP Islamist agenda. Opposition leaders, some media outlets, the military and extreme nationalists have used this to play up fears that an AKP triumvirate will allow Erdogan to make significant, perhaps irreversible, changes that would undermine Turkey's secular system. Using dramatic ad campaigns and threatening rhetoric, they warn that Turkey may soon have an Islamist president with a head-scarf wearing wife ready to take the country back to the pre-republic "dark ages". President Sezer, military leaders and the MGK chief have all warned  Erdogan against unconstitutional moves that might change Turkey's secular identity. The secular establishment's concern that AKP poses a genuine threat to Turkey's secular system is undoubtedly heightened by the realization that AKP's reform agenda threatens the established elite's traditional, top-down control.

¶13. (C) Those not convinced of a nefarious AKP plan contend that more than four years in power have matured the party. Erdogan has had to moderate his message to balance factions within AKP and lessen tensions with secularists threatened by AKP reforms. Much of the party's success stems from its image as being less corrupt ("AK" in Turkish means "clean", a dubious claim for any party here) and more effective than the opposition. Its record to date describes a center-right, conservative party with Islamic roots that has modestly advanced Kemal Ataturk's core principles of westernization and modernization. Some of the changes tied to that process will inevitably transform the traditional power balance and strengthen civilian leaders. To keep the public's trust and minimize tension as Turkish society evolves, AKP, and Erdogan in particular, will need to continue to employ broad-reaching, moderate, balanced rhetoric. End Comment.

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WILSON