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23 Nisan 2011 Cumartesi

EMPERYALİZMİN KURUMLARI:The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program

The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program form a joint transatlantic research and policy center. The Joint Center has offices in Washington and Stockholm, and is affiliated with the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University and the Institute for Security and Development Policy. It is the first Center of its kind, and is today firmly established as a leading center for research and policy worldwide, serving a large and diverse community of analysts, scholars, policy-watchers, business leaders and journalists.

MISSION

The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and the Silk Road Studies Program constitute a joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center. The Center is independent and privately funded, and has offices in Washington, D.C., and Stockholm, Sweden. The Center is affiliated with the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University, and with the Stockholm-based Institute for Security and Development Policy. It is the first Center of its kind in both Europe and North America, and is firmly established as a leading focus of research and policy worldwide, serving a large and diverse community of analysts, scholars, policy-watchers, business leaders, journalists, and students.

Origins

The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and the Silk Road Studies Program were designed, in 1996 and 2002 respectively, to respond to the increasing need for information, research and analysis on these regions with the identical ambition: to help bring these regions out of the shadows of the American and European consciousness to which fate had consigned them. By encouraging Americans and Europeans to enter into an active and multi-faceted engagement with the region, and by promoting serious and well-informed policies towards it, the founders hoped the new institutes could help a neglected world area to reclaim its legitimate and appropriate place in the world order. Realizing the complementary and identical aims of providing rigorous, applied and policy-relevant research on this region, as well as the added value of further structured cooperation in research, teaching, and publications, CACI and SRSP resolved in 2005 to institutionalize their existing cooperation and to formally merge into a joint Research and Policy Center.

Agenda

The joint Center strives to promote study and policy-related work on the region through five main channels: Impartial research; publications and dissemination; forums and conferences; teaching; and acting as a "switchboard" for knowledge and information.

Impartial Research

The joint Center fosters both fundamental and applied research in a wide range of disciplines in the social sciences and humanities, ranging from short research projects involving a sole researcher to larger, multi-year endeavors involving numerous researchers. This research is undertaken mainly at the Center's two offices, but often involves sponsoring research in the field. The Center also often receives visiting scholars. In fields formerly dominated by males, women have been prominent among scholars at the Center. Featured research initiatives include continuous work on U.S. and European policies toward the region; a multi-year cooperative project and the narcotics trade in Eurasia; and a multi-year initative on conflict management in Northeast Asia. For further information, consult the "Research" tab on the left.

Publications and Dissemination

A main task of the joint Center is the publication and dissemination of its research to a large and varied audience consisting of both policymakers, academics, and the educated public. The Center aspires to fulfill this task through publishing research findings in a wide variety of outlets; through issuing a series of publications on the issues under its mandate; and through frequent interviews and lectures given by the Center's staff at to various media outlets and institutions around the world. The Center publishes the following publications:

- A book series in cooperation with M.E. Sharpe Publishers.

- The Silk Road Papers, the Center's Occasional Papers series ranging from 50 to 150 pages in length, are published electronically and in print, and are freely available online.

- The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a globally leading periodical for analysis and information on the region, freely accessible online. Established in 1999 and edited by Svante E. Cornell, the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst has established itself among the world's most authoritative sources of analysis and information on the region.

- The Fact Sheets, Eurasian Narcotics, are based on an extensive database and provide insights on the drug problem in each regional country in an accessible manner.

- News Digests. The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst includes a News Digest, while the Center also provides a weekly news digest on the narcotics and security situation in Eurasia.

Forums and Conferences

The Center organizes two periodic forums in their respective locations as well as occasional joint conferences. In Washington, the W.P. Carey Forum has developed into the country's premier locus for rigorous discussion of issues pertaining to Central Asia and the Caucasus. In Stockholm, the Silk Road Forum fosters discussions on the region in a similar manner. These forums have several aims:

- To keep the region in the attention of the western foreign policy makers;

- To make available the fruits of the most authoritative research on the region;

- To bring attention to questions that are important but neglected in the public debate;

- To give important officials in the region an opportunity to present their views to a wider audience than might otherwise be available to them.

Teaching
While devoted mainly to research and policy issues, the joint Center regularly offers undergraduate and graduate courses on the region as well as supervision of master's and doctoral theses. In Washington, graduate courses on Central Asia and the Caucasus are provided at Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies.

A Switchboard of Knowledge and Information

The Center serves the most promising scholars and analysts working on Central Asia and the Caucasus. Such men and women are extremely decentralized. The best younger researchers in the U.S. and Europe frequently teach at universities and colleges that are distant from the traditional academic centers of international studies. Numerous centers for serious study exist throughout Central Asia and the Caucasus, among them being the Institutes of Strategic Studies that exist in every capital, and with which the Center maintains regular ties. The joint Center has become an unofficial embassy for Central Asia and Caucasus Studies in Washington and a kind of "intellectual switchboard" for such studies globally. The Washington office welcomes hundreds of visitors each year, including individuals, groups, and official delegations, while the Stockholm office, building on a long and leading tradition of studies of Central Eurasia in Europe, serves the same function.

The Center's Officers

The Joint Center's Chairman is Dr. S. Frederick Starr. A research professor at SAIS, Starr co-founded the Kennan Institute, served for 11 years as President of Oberlin College, and served in the early 2000s as pro-tem Rector of the University of Central Asia. He is a leading specialist on the society and politics of Central Asia including Afghanistan, as well as Russian politics and foreign policy, U.S. policy in Eurasia, and the regional politics of oil. The Center's Research Director is Dr. Svante E. Cornell. An Associate Research Professor at SAIS, Cornell is a specialist on security issues, regional security and state-building in the Caucasus, Turkey, and Central Asia. The Center's Program Director is Dr. Niklas L.P. Swanström. Swanström is a specialist on conflict management, security, and negotiation in Northeast and Central Asia.

The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program: 2008 YILINDA KURGULANMIŞ, 2023 TÜRKİYESİ İLE İLGİLİ SENARYOLAR...HANGİ SENARYO?

Prospects for a ‘Torn’ Turkey: A Secular and Unitary Future?

Svante E. Cornell
Halil Magnus Karaveli

SILK ROAD PAPER October 2008

Turkey in 2023: the Republic at 100

Judging the Likelihood of Scenarios

Attributing degrees of likelihood to the three scenarios mentioned above is necessarily tentative. The least probable scenario is the third, which appears at best a possible result of a confluence of negative trends. As for scenario one, it is fully plausible given the strength and clarity of current trends in Turkey. Yet a reading of recent history also suggests that the prospect of a linear development in Turkey is not probable, and that any ruling coalition is likely to be weakened and replaced within the timeframe envisaged in this study. That leaves scenario two, which is by far the most optimistic scenario for Turkey’s future. Again, that scenario may appear to be wishful thinking given the current acrimonies of Turkish politics and the growing “culture wars”, to borrow and American term, in society. In the final analysis, the most likely development for Turkey lies in some form of combination of the event foreseen in scenarios one and two.

The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program: 2008 YILINDA KURGULANMIŞ, 2023 TÜRKİYESİ İLE İLGİLİ SENARYOLAR...SENARYO 3: ASKERİ İDARENİN DÖNÜŞÜ.

In a third scenario, the tensions between Islamic conservatism and secularism had finally become impossible to contain. The AKP government was emboldened by its ability to defeat the challenge to its power in 2008, and did not bother to take the seculars’ sensibilities into due consideration. A new constitution was tailored, curtailing the power of the Constitutional court and with a redefinition of secularism to imply a greater public role for religion. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and president Abdullah Gül miscalculated when they assumed that the military would not be able to challenge them; the AKP government was overthrown by the military in 2011, in an intervention reminiscent of the March 9, 1971, memorandum and the February 27, 1997, “postmodern coup” – but with a more pointed threat of a full-scale coup. The Chief of the General staff, Gen. Işık Koşaner, who had struck a staunchly secularist and die-hard nationalist chord in his inauguration speech as new army chief in 2008, had in fact been forced to take pre-emptive action as a coup outside the chain of command threatened.

The conditions in 2011 were markedly different to those of 2007-2008, when the hands of the military had been tied by external and internal factors. The global economic crisis of 2008-2010 had effectively undermined the power of the AKP government, which was no longer seen as being able to offer economic stability and growth. The AKP had also lost much of its international backing. Although the EU had remained supportive of the Turkish Islamic conservatives, it no longer seemed to offer any prospect of membership to Turkey. Thus, for the secular, pro-European voters, therationale for supporting the AKP had disappeared. These were instead increasingly attracted by the neo-nationalism of the opposition Republican People’s party, the CHP. Most importantly, the AKP had lost its backing in the U.S, when it failed to deliver support when the incoming U.S. Administration decided to take action against Iranian nuclear facilities. Indeed, the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran in 2010 changed the map of the Middle East. With the replacement of the Iranian theocracy by a secular regime in an ensuing popular uprising, the perception of Turkish secularism in the U.S. had changed as well. By then, it had become apparent that “moderate” Islamism did not serve America’s interests, leading to a re-evaluation in the U.S. of the secular alternative for the Middle East.

The extended transitional regime brought in by the military took decisive measures to counter-act the effects of decades of Islamicization. Significantly, the education system was overhauled. Notably, the expansion of the imam schools was checked, and secular alternatives to the attractive schools run by the religious fraternities were created. However, the suspension of democracy exacerbated ethnic tensions. The Kurdish population was increasingly tempted by separatism. Gen. Koşaner, who as new army chief in 2008 had called for giving priority to a military solution to separatism, responded by the use of force, leading to an intensification of conflict that further damaged Turkey’s international standing and tested the unity of the country to its limits, as in the early 1990s. Furthermore, military authoritarianism had the effect of radicalizing the Islamic movement.

The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program: 2008 YILINDA KURGULANMIŞ, 2023 TÜRKİYESİ İLE İLGİLİ SENARYOLAR...SENARYO 2: DEMOKRATİK UZLAŞMA.

In a second scenario, the 100-year old republic has managed to reconcile conservatism and secularism. The AKP was fatally hit by the global economic crisis more than a decade ago, and growing revelations of highlevel corruption that were reminiscent of the center-right of the 1990s. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was not re-elected in 2011. Yet, the stumbling of the AKP did not amount to a defeat for Islamic conservatism. A new, untainted leader emerged from within the ranks of the AKP and formed a new party. The new party explicitly positioned itself as a centrist force, appealing to religious conservatives as well as to a significant portion of the seculars. It also received the implicit support of the military, which feared the consequences of political instability, significantly wanting to avert the risk that the Kurds in the southeast would revert to the Kurdish nationalist party, under a new incarnation after being closed down in late 2008.

The crumbling of the AKP served as an encouragement to secular opinion, which had become dispirited by the apparent invincibility of the Islamic conservatives displayed in 2007-2008. When the fears that the republic was about to become an “AKP republic” – where the opposition to the ruling party was destined to be driven to the margins of the political system – were dissipated, the seculars regained a healthy self-confidence. The attraction of extremist alternatives diminished with the earlier desperation; and the civilian secularism that had manifested itself during the mass rallies in 2007 was channeled into politics. When Deniz Baykal was finally persuaded to resign as leader of the Republican People’s Party, he was replaced by Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who had caught the public attention in 2008 when he had contributed to revealing the rampant corruption among AKP dignitaries circles. The CHP re-emerged as a modern, European-style social democratic centrist party. The reformation of the party – as well as the strengthening of civilian secularism – owed a lot to the support given by European parties, EU institutions and European civil society associations.

With a center-right party appealing to the religiously conservative bourgeoisie, to the Kurds of the southeast, as well as to right-leaning seculars, and a social democratic alternative that caters to the center-left seculars while being equally attentive to the economically vulnerable part of the conservative electorate, the centenary republic had been equipped with a political equation that manifested democratic reconciliation and secured stability.

The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program: 2008 YILINDA KURGULANMIŞ, 2023 TÜRKİYESİ İLE İLGİLİ SENARYOLAR...SENARYO 1: DAHA MUHAFAZAKAR BİR TÜRKİYE.

Prospects for a ‘Torn’ Turkey: A Secular and Unitary Future?

Svante E. Cornell

Halil Magnus Karaveli

SILK ROAD PAPER October 2008

Turkey in 2023: the Republic at 100
Scenario One: A More Conservative Turkey

In this scenario, the republic that celebrates its 100th anniversary is a markedly more conservative nation than what its founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, had once envisaged. Yet, it is also a country with strong, secular traditions that continues to set it apart among most other Muslim countries. Turkey has by no means become an Islamic state, ruled by the Sharia. But Islamic conservatism has become established as the dominant societal force. The co-existence of two divergent world-views – religious conservatism and secularism – will have continued to generate friction, and to furnish Turkish politics with a defining context.

In its second term in power (2007-2011) the AKP government was severely tested by a global economic crisis, which threatened to reconfigure the dynamics and alignments that had once opened the gates of power for it. The flight of foreign capital in particular during the global crisis revealed the vulnerabilities of the Turkish economy, and made it difficult for the AKP to maintain the generous welfare policies which had contributed to its victory in the elections of 2007.

Yet, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan once again proved that he is an astute leader, capable of overcoming dire challenges. The AKP recovered, and won the elections held in 2011. The main opposition party, the secularist and nationalist Republican people’s party, CHP, had once again failed to evolve into a modern social democratic force, and hence remained more or less marginalized. Instead, a new centrist force emerged as the main opposition party, together with the far-right MHP. In 2014, Turkey held its first popular election for president; Recep Tayyip Erdoğan won with a large margin and succeeded Abdullah Gül, who became prime minister. Erdoğan was re-elected in 2019.

The continued marginalization of the opposition made it difficult for the AKP to control its authoritarian impulse to have it all; a new political crisis erupted in 2011 when President Gül appointed Islamic-oriented judges to the Constitutional court. However, the new constitution that the AKP had tailored and put to referendum in 2010 had already curtailed the powers of the court, which could no longer rule on the closure of political parties, except when they were involved in acts of violence. Yet, the Chief of Staff, General Işık Koşaner, reacted sharply to the appointments to the court, and issued a

warning that the principles of Atatürk had to be respected. As had happened in 2007-2008, the military, fearful of scaring off foreign investments, and failing to receive a green light for a coup from Washington, had to content itself with issuing a verbal warning, after which it got back to business-asusual with the Islamic conservative government.

The AKP managed to keep the Kurdish issue under control. Islamic loyalty proved more powerful than the nationalist temptation. Yet, the Kurdish PKK continued to cause trouble. Its acts of violence sparked Turkish nationalism, and occasionally exacerbated tensions between Turks and Kurds in the western and southern parts of the country. Secular opinion remained politically marginalized, and was increasingly attracted to anti-Islamist and anti-western neo-nationalism.

2008

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