Reference ID Date Classification Origin
08ANKARA691 2008-04-11 12:12 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
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OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #0691/01 1021244
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O 111244Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5884
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/39ABG INCIRLIK AB TU
RHMFISS/425ABG IZMIR TU//CC//
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU
RUEPGAB/MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ
RHMFISS/USCENTCOM SPECIAL HANDLING MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GEC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000691
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: IMPLICATIONS OF AKP CLOSURE CASE AND OUR PUBLIC
POSTURE
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROSS WILSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
¶1. (c) Summary: The closure case against Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is a blow to this country's future. It reflects unresolved conflicts about the nature of Turkey, the state, the extent of popular democracy and the role of religion in society. It also results from failed leadership by PM Erdogan over the nine months since his re-election victory last July. The outcome is uncertain, but the crisis here must be viewed through the peculiar entity that is Turkish democracy -- imperfect, crabbed, but functional in its way. US priorities are sustaining our ability to work with this country on mutual interests and supporting its democratic process in a broad sense, but we should avoid opining on the specifics of Turkish politics. This approach will respect the raucous and historic debate and politicking among Turks taking place now about the futureof their country -- a vital process for democracy here to continue to mature. End Summary.
Implications of the Closure Case
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¶2. (c) Here is one way of looking at the AKP closure case. It is an attempted judicial coup, a Clausewitz-like extension of politics by legal means. The indictment reads like a political tract. It relies on newspaper clippings to justify excluding the party and 70-odd leaders from politics. Among more bizarre bits of proof that the AKP intends to undo secularism are press reports of Secretary Powell praising the country,s "moderate Muslim" government and on its support for BMENA. The propriety of banning parties is questionable in any democracy. A ban based on a legally weak indictment of a party which nine months ago received 47 percent of the vote nationally and pluralities in 76 out of Turkey's 85 constituencies looks like a travesty for democratic values and the rule of law.
¶3. (c) Another way of looking at the case focuses on its consistency with democracy Turkish style. The constitution and laws have long provided for banning politicians and dissolving parties, 26 of which have fallen victim. The AKP had many years in office to change this and other questionable policies (like Article 301 on insulting Turkishness), but did not. What looks to Western democracies like an unusual power in the judiciary to compromise the results of last July's election is one of Turkey's check and balancing mechanisms to protect the rights of the minority -- in this case secularists who feel threatened by the AKP.
¶4. (c) Some truth exists in both of these points of view. One clear thing is that PM Erdogan has stumbled badly. One blunder was failing to make political bans more difficult when relevant legislation was amended several years ago. As if dizzy with his own success, Erdogan failed to reassure the 53 percent who voted against his government last July that it would respect their interests too. He failed to use his re-election mandate to continue EU-related reforms that were the most formidable tools for calming fears of Islamization and untrammeled majority rule. He allowed himself to be goaded by the National Action Party (MHP) into putting the headscarf ban at the head of the reform queue. For this short-term populist win, he sacrificed a larger constitutional reform package that would have significantly strengthened Turkey's democracy. Effective, progressive governance that was the hallmark of early AKP years in office dried up in the 2007 election year, and no momentum returned after that. These and other missteps exacerbated fears among many that Erdogan was going too far, too fast; that there were no effective constraints on the AKP (especially after the military's botched intervention last spring); and that fundamentalists might soon dominate the bureaucracy, judiciary, universities, etc., to change Turkey in dangerous and permanent ways.
¶5. (c) The closure case on its face is a set-back for democracy and stability in Turkey. For many, especially the large swath of previously neglected voters who make up Turkey's emerging middle class and whom Erdogan's populism galvanized, the message is that Turkish democracy is too poorly developed to protect their interests against the traditional elite. This message is even more threatening to ANKARA 00000691 002 OF 003 those here who are still marginalized, especially Kurds. More broadly, the case looks like, and to some extent is, the revenge of an unelected and unaccountable bureaucracy against Erdogan and popular democracy. Turks fear the Deep State and many, including strong critics of the AKP, are deeply uncomfortable with the judiciary's attempt to manipulate the power balance. Associated turmoil also renders Turkey's vulnerable economy more uncertain at a time when global trends are already very negative; a big downturn would reinforce the sense of crisis here.
¶6. (c) Today, however, Turkey remains a secure, relatively stable emerging democracy. There is no serious violence on the streets, and the economy has not crashed. The closure case is not a catastrophe or the undoing of Turkey's peculiar and imperfect democracy, at least not now. It is better seen as one among many moves in a very long chess game that all sides here, including Erdogan and the AKP, are adept at playing. The mere fact of the indictment has already moderated the AKP's rhetoric and pushed it to emphasize effective governance and more consensual policies, especially EU accession-related reform. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that this is the way Turkey's crabbed, military-drafted constitution intended the system to work. Figures ranging from former President Demirel to former parliamentary Speaker Cetin have remarked to us recently that Turkey has seen worse and will come through these difficulties all right. At this point, at least, their reassurances seem more justified than not.
¶7. (c) How matters will play out in the short-medium term is uncertain.
-- A "victorious" AKP will still face intransigent opposition from one-third of the public, not to mention the courts, bureaucrats and generals.
-- A post-closure AKP will reorganize under a new name and almost certainly still have the votes among its un-banned MPs to form the next government alone. People already talk about plausible, post-closure scenarios that involve bringing Erdogan and other potentially banned figures back into the picture.
-- Banishing the AKP will not change the reality that the main opposition parties are weak, divided and ill-equipped for 21st century politics. Space may be created for a new centrist party, but credible leaders are not evident now, and the outlook for new elections that would propel them to prominence is uncertain. The Islamist fringe in and outside the AKP could coalesce and become more radical; tarikats like the Gulenists may become more significant power centers than they are now. Without broad constitutional reform to replace the current top-down state and better protect individual liberties, and without more consensus on the extent and limits of secularism in modern Turkey, this struggle is likely to continue.
¶8. (c) This episode will last at least six months and possibly a year or more. In the meantime, Turkey's leadership will be distracted and cautious. Unfortunately, this comes during a period of immense challenges to and opportunities for Turkish interests domestically and in the region that include the Kurdish issue, relations with Iraq and the KRG, energy security, Cyprus, Armenia, EU accession, terrorism, etc. Policy creativity, never Turkey's strong suit, will diminish. We also note that before the Constitutional Court decides the AKP's fate, it will likely rule on the headscarf amendments; reinstituting the ban at universities may actually calm matters and defuse the anti-AKP case. The Court may also rule on the closure of the Kurdish nationalist Democratic Society Party (DTP); this could prove more explosive than the AKP case, given that DTP leaders and constituents accept much less of the constitutional/legal order here than the AKP mainstream.
Our Public Posture
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¶9. (c) None of this changes the reality that Turkey is an extremely important ally in a dangerous region and that it ANKARA 00000691 003 OF 003 is, despite many faults, more democratic and free than any other country in the Muslim world. We should not stifle, through our intervention, what should fundamentally be a debate by Turks about the future of their country that is essential if its democratic institutions are to mature. Doing so would make this a US issue in ways harmful to our interests, our influence and to democratic values here. We should stick to general principles, and let Turks sort out the details. At some point, as matters develop, our intervention to head off a political meltdown here may be necessary, but that moment isn't now and may well never come.
¶10. (c) With this in mind, our public comments should take a positive and high road. We should:
-- Make clear our strong support for Turkey, its democratic institutions and its commitment to democratic values and secular principles that define our alliance and partnership.
-- Urge Turkey's leaders and institutions to work for pragmatic solutions that reinforce stability and build consensus at a critical time for the country and in the region.
-- Emphasize support for Turkey's goal of accession to the EU and its need to legislate and implement comprehensive political and economic reforms that will sustain that goal and secure liberty and prosperity in the future.
-- Look forward to continuing to work with Turkey on behalf of common interests in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Caucasus, the Balkans, on terrorism, on energy security, on the Cyprus problem and elsewhere in the region and the world.
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