Part
III: Different president, same plan
“As the
international community continues to search for ways to resolve Syria’s civil
war, this Perspective argues that recent developments in Syria and the region -
including the cessation of hostilities that was sponsored by Russia, Iran, and
Turkey - reinforce the prospects for a national ceasefire based upon agreed
zones of control backed by external powers. [...] After nearly six years of
humanitarian catastrophe and geopolitical upheaval from Syria, the prospects of
the removal of the Assad regime and a near-term transition to the ‘moderate
opposition’ are poorer than ever. But there is a chance for the new
administration in Washington to make real progress on de-escalating the
conflict and contributing to stability in Syria if it focuses on a realistic
but achievable end-state: a decentralized Syria based on agreed zones of
control recognized and supported by outside partners.”[54] -RAND Corporation
in its third proposal for a “peace plan” for Syria in February 2017
While Hillary
Clinton was the pre-eminent candidate for war in the 2016 US presidential
elections, Donald Trump campaigned on a more non-interventionist policy.
Campaign-Trump spoke out against attacking the Syrian government many times,
suggesting that American involvement could embroil his country into a global
war with Russia. Although he said he would continue the war against ISIS, he
expressed reservations about supporting the “moderate rebels” and also about
ousting Assad, as he shared a mutual enemy with him.[55] On 30 March, following
steady Syrian army military gains throughout the country, Secretary of State
Rex Tillerson announced a dramatic u-turn in Washington’s long-held policy of
removing Assad, stating that “the long term status of President Assad will be
decided by the Syrian people.”[56] Following Tillerson’s remarks, a senior
Trump administration official admitted that the policy change is “a measure of
just realism, accepting the facts on the ground,” adding that “Assad is never
going to have sufficient force to reassert control over the whole country.”[57]
A week later, however, both Trump and Tillerson signalled they again sought
Assad’s expulsion.[58] The reason? Assad, in a most suicidal move one can think
of, supposedly gassed his own people in an area of no strategic significance on
the eve of peace talks that would most likely have consolidated his future.
While at first
hand it looked like Trump’s Middle East policy would have differed to some
extent from that of his predecessor, it does not seem likely that he is going
to put a halt to the agenda of balkanisation. To the contrary, a few days into
office, Trump said he “will absolutely do safe zones” and reportedly requested
the Pentagon and State Department to craft a plan within 90 days for setting
them up.[59] Moreover, the temporarily frozen CIA funding of “moderate rebels”
was restored in early April after a Western, Gulf and Turkey-backed new
military alliance was set up, with al-Qaeda clone Ahrar al-Sham likely to play
a dominate role.[60] Finally, the debate over “safe zones” coincides with the
increased involvement of US troops and military assets into both Syria and
Iraq,[61] which would in all likelihood further exacerbate sectarian tensions
as the US keeps playing the divide and conquer-game by providing logistical
support and funding to ethnic and religious minorities with whom it is aligned.
Following the recent missile strikes on a Syrian army airbase near Homs,
National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster even advised Trump to sign off on a
plan that would put 150.000 troops on the ground in Syria.[62]
All this
suggests that Trump is not really in charge of US foreign policy. In addition
to his unconditional support for Israel, a myriad of hawkish war-hungry
generals occupy senior posts in the Trump administration. In his article “The
president who loved generals,” William Hartung has shown that Trump’s foreign
policy will in all probability be led by the military rather than by
diplomats.[63] Indeed, investigative journalist Nafeez Ahmed has observed that:
“the Trump regime is not operating outside the deep
state, but mobilizing elements within it to dominate and strengthen it for a
new mission. [It] is not acting to overturn the establishment, but to
consolidate it against a perceived crisis over a wider transnational deep
system [and] to save the deep state from a decline caused by the failures of
successive American administrations. [...] It would be mistaken to assume that
Trump’s conflicts with the US intelligence community mean he is necessarily at
odds with the military-industrial complex. On the contrary, his defense
appointees and advisors are embedded across the military-industrial
complex.”[64]
So, while
mainstream pundits opposed to the Trump administration - such as the New
York Times (Thomas Friedman; Bilderberg attendee and member of the Council
on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Trilateral Commission) and the Guardian
(Hamish de Bretton-Gordon)[65] - keep advocating for the breakup of Syria,
Trump happily follows their advice. Michael Flynn, Trump’s former national
security advisor, even suggested a multinational occupation of Syria in a 2015
interview with Der Spiegel:
“The sad fact is that we have to put troops on the
ground. We won’t succeed against this enemy [ISIS] with air strikes alone.
[...] We can learn some lessons from the Balkans. Strategically, I envision a
break-up of the Middle East crisis area into sectors in the way we did back
then, with certain nations taking responsibility for these sectors. [...] The
United States could take one sector, Russia as well and the Europeans another
one. The Arabs must be involved in that sort of military operation, as well,
and must be part of every sector.”[66]
The Trump
administration, and the influential generals in it, are thus likely to follow
orders from the Pentagon. Therefore, current US policy might be close to a
strategy for partitioning Syria as laid out in a three-part series called A
peace plan for Syria published by RAND corporation, a think tank closely
aligned to the Pentagon. The first paper was initiated after Philip Gordon,
senior fellow at the CFR and Bilderberg attendee, resigned as advisor to Obama
and wrote an op-ed for Politico arguing for radical decentralisation in
September 2015.[67] In the first RAND report, the authors, among them Gordon,
claimed that establishing “safe zones” was “far better than the status quo and
far more practical than any of the available alternatives;”[68] in the second
piece, they presented a number of options, ranging from decentralisation to
autonomy;[69] and in the last one, published in February 2017, they advised the
new administration to enforce a balkanised Syria by establishing “control
zones,” even though by then the Syrian army had retaken Aleppo and had made
other military and diplomatic gains that shattered RAND’s previous plans.[70]
From their first
publication onwards, RAND, just like Kissinger (who started advising Trump not
long after his election), prioritised breaking up Syria over Assad’s removal,
and in their last article, the authors even acknowledged that “it is now
virtually certain, and widely accepted, that Assad will remain in power for the
foreseeable future.”[71] Moreover, whereas they in 2015 envisioned the
sovereign Syrian government’s “control zone” to stretch only from the border
area with Lebanon from Damascus through Homs to Hama to the Latakia and Tartus
governorates along the Mediterranean coast, they were now forced to accept
government control over the whole of Western Syria, including Aleppo and
Palmyra but absent the area around Daraa in the south and Idlib and the Kurdish
and Turkish controlled areas in the north. RAND did not recommend the US to
leave the cleansing of the remaining pockets of the Western- and Gulf-backed
terrorist insurgency to the Syrian government, however, the latter which has
proven to be capable of doing just that with the help of the Russians,
certainly if foreign countries would stop aiding and abetting the jihadis.
Rather, the think tank proposed to carve out as much territory from sovereign
Syria as possible, which they deemed possible because:
“In the west, the regime would be primarily focused on
consolidating its rule, stamping out pockets of resistance, dealing with
extremist threats from JFS [Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, formerly Jabhat al-Nursah,
aka al-Qaeda] in Idlib, and rebuilding areas devastated by six years of war.
Russia and Iran, having committed to preserve the Assad regime but not to
assist in efforts to reconquer the areas it does not currently control, would
focus their assistance on reconstruction and defense, rather than continued
offensive operations.”[72]
RAND recognised
that Idlib will likely fall to the government, but that does not mean that
Turkey, the Gulf states, Israel and the US are going to let their proxies go
down without a fight. Due to an agreement Turkey made with Russia,
Turkish-supported armed groups, with their weapons, were allowed to leave for
Idlib in the wake of east Aleppo’s liberation from years of extremist
occupation.[73] Indeed, thanks to the Western media’s hypocritical outcry
surrounding the retaking of Aleppo and their heroisation of the foreign-backed jihadis,
thousands of al-Qaeda-linked fighters were allowed to be bussed out to
rebel-held Idlib.[74] In addition, two days after the Khan Shaykhun chemical
weapons attack in early April, the CIA restored logistical support and funding
to the insurgents in northern Syria after a new military alliance of “rebel
groups” was set up to “consolidate military control over Idlib province, the
western part of Aleppo province and parts of Latakia province” under the
auspices of the “Friends of Syria” coalition.[75]
According to a
“Free Syrian Army” (FSA) source, Turkey is planning to install a unified rebel
army to lead a second phase of Turkish operations in Syria which would focus on
Idlib province.[76] In addition, RAND estimated that it is unlikely that Turkey
will give up the territories it acquired under Operation Euphrates Shield,
adding the possibility that Turkey will seek to further expand its “control
zone” to include al-Bab (which it indeed captured from ISIS not long after the
publication of RAND’s report) and Manbij (currently still under Kurdish
control). As Turkey is now training a “Free Syrian Police” to assist the FSA
with “secondary operations,” it does indeed look like Turkey is not going to
leave Syria any time soon.[77] Regarding the Kurdish-Turkish rivalries in
northern Syria, RAND foresaw a freezing into three zones of control - two
Kurdish zones, separated by an Arab one controlled by the FSA and backed by
Turkey. It concluded that “the United States could continue to support - but
also restrain - both its Kurdish and Turkish partners,” or in other words, play
them out against each other.
In the south,
RAND claimed that the opposition around Daraa, where the foreign-backed jihadi
insurgency started in March 2011, is comprised of more moderate Western-backed
groups. As the area does not pose a strategic risk to Damascus any longer, the
authors postulated, the Syrian government might tolerate them in the context of
a national ceasefire. In light of this, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu in early April expressed his desire to establish a buffer zone
against Syria, Iran and Hezbollah on Syria’s border with Israel and Jordan.[78]
This would undoubtedly further decrease the chances of Israel ever giving back
the illegally occupied Golan Heights to Syria. As an American company linked to
Dick Cheney has obtained the right to explore oil and natural gas in the Golan
Heights from the Israeli government in 2013, this would benefit the US,
too.[79]
Finally,
ISIS-controlled areas in eastern Syria are to be carved out as well according
to RAND. On the grounds that it would “antagonize most U.S. allies in the
region” and that somehow the Syrian army, contrary to Washington’s “moderate”
proxies, would not be capable of preventing a return from ISIS, the authors
desired that the US-supported Kurdish forces, along with their Arab
auxiliaries, would outstrip and precede the Russian-backed Syrian government’s
effort to retake Raqqa. They recognised, however, that a Kurdish-controlled
Raqqa would not be tolerated by Turkey and thus proposed that the Kurdish
component of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) should leave the city once it
is taken, leaving behind the Arab “liberators.” Lastly, RAND called for a joint
American-Russian effort to drive ISIS out of its last stronghold around Deir
Ezzor, but given that Damascus already has a foothold there (and held onto it
after the US bombed it, supposedly by accident, in September 2016), it
acknowledged that the city is likely to fall back under the authority of the Syrian
government. Just recently, the US deployed forces along the Syrian-Jordanian
border, however, and could therefore nevertheless try to reach Deir Ezzor
before the Syrian army following a potential incursion into Syrian
territory.[80]
In this way, the
Sunni-dominated heartland the Gulf countries, Turkey, Israel and NATO had long
hoped to carve out of sovereign Syrian territory would come about after all.
But crucial to that effort is the exclusion of the Syrian government from the
operation to remove ISIS from Raqqa. Therefore, when government forces were
making rapid gains east of Aleppo and southward alongside Lake Assad, the SDF,
with ample support from the US, was able to cross the Euphrates river in March,
thereby cutting off possible government advances towards Raqqa (see map). By
the end of March, the SDF had also reached the strategically important Tabqa
Dam, which sustains its reservoir Lake Assad, thereby gaining control over one
of the country’s main sources of water for agriculture and livestock.[81] This
echoes concerns raised by Maram Susli, who has pointed out that the Kurdish
controlled al-Hasakah governorate in northeastern Syria holds many of the
country’s agriculture and oil riches. Whereas the governorate’s wealth was
previously shared by all of Syria’s 23 million inhabitants, federalism or
partition will leave the recourses to only a fraction of the population.[82]
The Syrian government might thus have consolidated control over the country’s
main population centres, less populated parts of the country, with resources
that are badly needed to sustain those populous regions, might never return to
their previous owners.
Meanwhile in
Iraq, the years-long Anglo-American occupation, the subsequent rule by Shia-led
governments, stronger autonomy grievances of the Kurds, the rise of sectarian
militias and the emergence of al-Qaeda and ISIS have all contributed to further
sectarian divide, as Iraqis are killing one another like never before. Now,
other minorities aside from the Sunnis, Shias and Kurds are vowing for
autonomy, too. In 2016, al-Monitor reported that Turkmens were calling
for independence in the centre of Ninevah province, while Christians and
Yazidis were opting for their own autonomous areas in the same province as
well.[83] In March this year, this eventually resulted in the three minorities
presenting a joint statement calling for three contiguous semi-autonomous
regions in the country’s north: Tal Afar for the Turkmens, Ninevah Plain for
the Assyrian Christians and Sinjar province for the Yazidis.[84] It remains to
be seen what will happen to Iraq after ISIS has vanished from the face of the
earth, but the long process of gradual balkanisation seems almost irreversible
today.
Bas Spliet | April 23, 2017
newsbud
Bas Spliet, Newsbud Analyst & Author, is a bachelor’s student in
History and Arabic at the University of Ghent, Belgium. He is interested in
geopolitics, focusing most of his time on getting a better understanding of
wars in the Middle East. Mr. Spliet is proficient in English, Dutch and Arabic.
Notes
PART III
[54] James Dobbins, Philip Gordon and Jeffrey Martini, A peace plan for Syria III: agreed zones of control, decentralisation and international administration (RAND Corporation, 2017), 1,
[55] Tom McKay, “Here are 45
times Trump said attacking Syria was a bad idea and might start World War III,”
Mic, 07.04.2017,
[56] Tyler Durden, “McCain
furious at Rex Tillerson for saying Assad can stay,” Zero Hedge,
31.03.2017,
[57] “US changes its policy on
Assad staying in power,” New York Post, 31.03.2017,
[58] Jacob Pramuk, “Trump,
Tillerson suggest Assad should be removed, in apparent reversal,” CNBC,
06.04.2017,
http://cnbc.com/2017/04/06/trump-tillerson-suggest-assad-should-be-removed-in-apparent-reversal.html.
[59] Julia Edwards Ainsley and
Matt Spetalnick, “Trump says he will order ‘safe zones’ for Syria,” Reuters,
25.01.2017,
[60] Mariya Petkova, “Syria’s
‘moderate rebels’ to form a new alliance,” al-Jazeera, 06.04.2017,
[61] Whitney Webb, “Safe zones
as soft military occupation: Trump’s plan for Syria, Iraq is taking shape,” Mintpress
News, 04.04.2017,
[62] Mike Cernovich, “H.
R. McMaster manipulating intelligence reports to Trump, wants 150,000 ground
soldiers in Syria,” Medium, 09.04.2017,
“Report: US boots on the
ground in Syria by June,” Russia Insider, 09.04.2017,
[63] William Hartung, “The
president who loved generals: Trump’s foreign policy will be led by the
military, not diplomats,” Salon, 10.03.2017,
[64] Nafeez Ahmed, “How the
Trump regime was manufactured by a war inside the deep state,” Insurgence
Intelligence, 10.02.2017,
[65] Thomas Friedman,
“President Trump’s real-world Syria lesson,” New York Times, 05.04.2017,
Hamish de Bretton-Gordon,
“After missiles, the plan: here’s how Syrian safe zones could actually work,” Guardian,
07.04.2017,
[66] Matthias Gebauer and
Holger Stark, “We were too dumb: ex-US intelligence chief on Islamic State’s
rise,” interview with Michael Flynn, Der Spiegel, 29.11.2015,
[67] Philip Gordon, “It’s time
to rethink Syria,” Politico, 25.09.2015,
[68] James Dobbins, Philip
Gordon and Jeffrey Martini, A Peace plan for Syria (RAND Corporation,
2015), 9,
[69] James Dobbins, Philip
Gordon and Jeffrey Martini, A peace plan for Syria II: options for future
governance (RAND Corporation, 2016),
[70] Dobbins, Gordon and
Martini, A peace plan for Syria III.
[71] Dobbins, Gordon and
Martini, A peace plan for Syria III, 4-5.
[72] Dobbins, Gordon and
Martini, A peace plan for Syria III, 7.
[73] Fehim Tastekin, “Is
Turkey rattled by Russian-Kurdish deal?”, al-Monitor, 24.03.2017,
[74] Bas Spliet, “Coverage of
Aleppo: a new low in the mainstream media’s integrity,” Scrutinised Minds,
03.02.2017,
[75] Petkova, “Syria’s
‘moderate rebels’ to form a new alliance.”
[76] Petkova, “Syria’s
‘moderate rebels’ to form a new alliance.”
[77] Khaled al-Khateb, “Free
Syrian Army getting backup from Turkish-trained police,” al-Monitor,
23.03.2017,
[78] “Israel seeks buffer zone
on borders with Syria,” Middle East Monitor, 08.04.2017,
[79] Daniel Graeber,
“Cheney-linked company to drill in occupied Golan Heights,” Oil Price,
22.02.2013,
[80] “Syrian war report -
april 10, 2017: US deploys forces at Syrian-Jordanian border,” South Front,
10.04.2017,
http://southfront.org/syrian-war-report-april-10-2017-us-deploys-forces-at-syrian-jordanian-border/;
Tony Cartalucci, “Syria: watching
the Jordanian border,” Land Destroyer, 14.10.2017,
[81] “Syria’s Tabqa Dam: a
strategic prize,” Arab News, 29.03.2017,
[82] Maram Susli, “Why a
Kurdish enclave in Syria is a very bad idea,” Global Research,
06.04.2016,
[83] Wassim Bassem, “Iraq’s
Turkmens call for independent province,” al-Monitor, 14.10.2016,
[84] Saad Salloum, “Iraqi
minorities move forward with autonomy plan,” al-Monitor, 16.03.2017,
